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The performance of various Contingency Selection methods has been investigated 
within the framework of accuracy for application to steady-state power system security 
assessment and suitability for execution in a real-time environment. 
In the study the following requirements have been considered: 
(a) Effectiveness: in identitying contingencies which may cause limit violations 
and discarding all others; 
(b) Adaptability: 
(c) Flexibility 
(d) Computational 
Efficiency 
(e) Ability 
to model both permanent and temporary changes in the 
system; 
to model any number and type of contingencies; 
in terms of speed in selecting the sub-set of contingencies as 
well as in terms of storage requirements; 
to update and augment on-line the list of contingencies given 
the actual system operating data. 
Real-Time Contingency Selection algorithms are systematic procedures for predicting 
which contingencies, taken from a large number of anticipated outages, will pose a 
threat to the security of a power system. The ultimate goal is to shorten the original 
long list of contingency cases without performing extensive simulations. The smaller set 
of contingencies is passed on for a detailed evaluation. 
The contingency selection methods are classified into two categories: fast screening 
methods and ranking methods. Fast screening methods use subnetwork solution to 
identifY the components under violation following a contingency. Ranking methods 
involve the computation of a system-wide scalar performance index to quantifY the 
severity of each case in the contingency list. 
An integrated method for branch contingency evaluation suitable for real-time 
application is presented. The method merges the selection and evaluation processes in 
one phase only in order to reduce the time spent on the contingency analysis. The 
xviii 
method determines simultaneously which contingency will cause system failure, the 
system components which are likely to result security constraint violations, and the 
magnitude of such violations. The contingency analysis has been performed on a 
multiprocessor computer machine with 16 processors using parallel FORTRAN. 
Results for the Brazilian Southern Electric System have been obtained with the 
proposed technique and are compared with those obtained by the conventional AC 
Load Flow method. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1. GENERAL 
The security and reliability of a power system is generally judged in terms of the 
capacity of the system to meet the load demands within the component ratings and the 
voltage limits at any time and of the ability of the system to withstand the impact of 
sudden changes due to equipment outage. If any component fails then the system will 
be less secure and may not be able to meet the demands placed upon it. Alternatively 
the failure itself may not lead to a catastrophe but it may place the system in such a 
situation where a second failure would do so. A contingency assessment is necessary to 
enable the operating engineers to judge the likely severity of an outage and to be able to 
predict its subsequent effect on the security of the system. 
The standard approach to steady-state contingency assessment consists of running a 
load flow for the post-transient steady-state condition following all potential outage 
conditions. Different network topologies and operating states must be tested in order 
to examine the system security. Some of the outages may result in system constraint 
violations such as transmission line or transformer overloads and load bus voltage or 
reactive power production outside their normal limits. Although very fast techniques 
have been developed for contingency analysis exhaustive contingency testing becomes a 
prohibitively long process when hundreds of contingencies are involved. 
In order to reduce the total execution time computer-aided methods, called Automatic 
Contingency Selection algorithms, have been developed. The contingency selection 
techniques estimates how many contingencies, taken from the total number of possible 
contingencies, will cause system failure. They must be carried out in such a manner that 
sequential contingency analysis can be performed in more detail only for those cases 
which are likely to result in security constraint violations. 
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To be able to further reduce the time needed to identifY and to analyse those 
contingencies that yield limit violations an integrated method has been developed. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to present an integrated method for branch 
contingency evaluation to be applied on a real-time environment. The method merges 
the selection and evaluation processes in one phase only in order to minimise the time 
spent on the contingency analysis. The method determines simultaneously which 
contingency will cause system failure, the system components which are likely to result 
security constraint violations, and the magnitude of such violations. This work also 
investigates the application of parallel processing to the contingency assessment on a 
practical system. The contingency analysis has been performed on a multiprocessor 
computer machine with 16 processors using parallel FORTRAN. The integrated 
contingency assessment technique is carried out in such a manner that the contingencies 
to be analysed are distributed among the computer processors with various 
contingencies being processed concurrently. The algorithm has been tested on the 
Brazilian Southern electric system with 749 buses and 1275 branches. The solution 
given for each contingency is postulated as if a conventional full ac power flow had 
been run. 
1.1 PLAN OF THESIS 
The material presented in this thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter I is an 
introduction to the work carried out in this thesis, followed by a plan of the thesis. It 
shows where contingency evaluation fits into the hierarchy of power operating 
problems and discusses the main security functions incorporated in a computerised 
supervisory control centre. 
Chapter II presents a general discussion on automatic contingency selection and it 
includes a discussion on the classification of the problems faced by all the contingency 
selection algorithms as far as misclassifications are concerned. It also examines the 
Automatic Contingency Selection procedure in the security assessment. 
2 
In Chapter III the two strategies for selecting contingencies in the real-time mode are 
presented. The methods defined under the heading of the Fast Screening Methods and 
the Performance Index Based Ranking are discussed. Also included in Chapter III is 
the misranking problem faced by Performance Index methods and procedures for 
dealing with this are considered. In addition this Chapter gives the different criteria for 
the stopping threshold. This represents the point on the ordered list of contingencies 
beyond which the contingencies are found not to produce any abnormal operating 
condition. 
Chapter IV describes the basic aspects of parallel processing and the common measures 
of parallelism of an algorithm. It also gives the main characteristics of the high 
performance computing platform used on this work. 
Chapter V is devoted to formulating the proposed mtegrated algorithm for contingency 
evaluation using sequential and parallel processing. Both physical explanations and 
computational considerations of the model are presented. 
In Chapter VI the test results are presented for the implemented integrated algorithm. 
The tests are performed on two systems and the results compared against a 
conventional full ac load flow method. 
Chapter VII gives the main conclusions drawn from the study and the suggestions for 
future developments. 
References and Appendices with complementary theory are included in the thesis. 
Appendix A describes the standard approaches for performing steady-state security 
analysis studies used in off-line contingency assessment. The second Appendix gives 
the data for three different electric systems for which some test results are given. 
Finally Appendix C is a compilation of the routines, written in FORTRAN, developed 
for the implementation of the integrated contingency evaluation method. 
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1.2 AN OUTLINE ON POWER SYSTEM SECURITY 
Historically, the system planner has always sought to ensure the security of the system 
by providing comfortable margins in generating capacities, transmission line capabilities 
and tie-line interconnections. The planner, however, cannot predict all possible system 
configurations and load demands. A system which is well planned under adequate 
engineering assumptions for secure operation will not be so necessarily under 
unpredicted conditions. Indeed, a well-planned system is vulnerable to possible 
disturbances and this vulnerability can be catastrophic. Not only the planner, but the 
system operator is very much concerned with system security. 
Security is a term used to reflect a power system's ability to meet its loads without 
unduly stressing its apparatus or allowing network variables to stray from prescribed 
ranges. 
Nowadays the operation of generation and transmission facilities close to their design 
capabilities is a practice of many utilities in order to minimise capital requirements and 
use to the maximum extent possible the system facilities already installed. With higher 
loading levels on the transmission system there is a reduction in system margins and 
flexibility resulting in a increased potential for operating problems. Moreover, although 
the growth of large interconnected power systems achieves substantial reliability and 
yields economic benefits, the day-to-day operation of the system demands a high degree 
of security for normal operation. This requirement emerges from the fact that the 
possible disturbances in large power systems could have catastrophic results such as 
partial or even total system shutdown. Therefore it is the duty of the power system 
control centre to retain the operating point within secure boundaries. In order to 
control the security of the system the level of system security must be monitored and 
analysed and must be enhanced if it does not fulfil the system security requirement. 
The security functions in a power system can be carried out in two ways: in real-time 
mode and in study mode. In the real-time mode, the static model of the power system 
under observation is generally derived from the output of the state estimator, with any 
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model of the unobserved (or external) system attached to it. Real-time application 
functions have a particular need for computing speed and reliability. 
In the study mode, the static model of the entire power system usually represents a 
forecast operating condition, generated from historical patterns, recent trend 
information, and specific knowledge or hypothesis. The system studies consist of any 
study for which the operator wishes to set up hypothetical future system conditions. 
The main aim of study mode functions is to plan for future security of power system 
operation. 
There are two main aspects related to the system security: Security Assessment and 
Security Enhancement. The two are interconnected, the purpose of Security 
Assessment is to provide information on the current level of system security whilst that 
of Security Enhancement is to formulate the appropriate control decisions necessary to 
improve the level of system security. 
1.2.1 Security Assessment And Security Enhancement 
Security Assessment involves an ordered analysis of the actual, or expected, operating 
state of a power system with the objective of ensuring that it and the states which may 
occur following a credible contingency are acceptable. By contingency it is understood 
the loss of one or more power system components which alters power system voltages 
and currents. In general, any event that will tend to affect adversely the value of a 
controlled variable can be considered as being a credible contingency. 
Security Assessment involves evaluation of: 
(a) the capability of the system to meet expected demands, taking into account 
generation and transmission branch outages; 
(b) the impact of operator decisions on the scheduling of generation and/or components 
outages; and 
(c) the effect of strategies which are under consideration to alleviate potential system 
operating problems. 
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The effectiveness of control strategies for security enhancement will depend strongly on 
the validity and completeness of the information provided by security assessment 
functions. This information is produced by: 
(i) Security Monitoring 
(ii) Security Analysis 
Security Monitoring is achieved by on-Iinel monitoring of actual system operating 
conditions and the dynamically displaying of the relevant information to the control 
engineers. The procedure involves the periodic checking of all those system variables 
which are subject to specified operating limits and the consequent identification of any 
out-of-Iimit conditions. 
Security Analysis consists of applying simulated contingency conditions to the system 
in order to evaluate the level of system security and provide information on which to 
base enhancement strategies. On-line contingency testing and preventive measures are 
complementary; the first provides the logical basis for the second when such a study 
indicates that the system security is threatened or security constraints are violated. 
Security Enhancement involves a set of control actions each aimed at the elimination of 
security constraint violations. When a contingency occurs in a power system then 
immediate actions will be necessary to relieve any stress in the system caused by the 
outage. 
1.3 ON-LINE COMPUTER CONTROL 
The operation and control of electric power systems have experienced a dramatic 
development since the real-time2 computer became cost-effective in recent years. The 
J An activity associated with a computer that is carried out in communication with, or under the 
control of, the central processing unit (CPU) of a computer. In contrast, off-line operations are not 
under the active control 0/ a CPu. they .~ not carried out in real-time and therefore much slower 
Ihan on-line operations (Cambridge 11ustrated Thesaurus o/Computer Science" -A. Godman 1984). 
, A term used to describe the operation of a computer system that is capaple of receiving, processing 
and sending out information at speed that allows it to influence or control an activity that Is being run 
concurrently In a separate environment ("Computing Terms And Acronyms: A Dictionary". 
R.Hipgrave 1985). 
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introduction of computerised supervisory control system was a step in the direction 
where increasingly complex power systems could be operated more securely. 
Power System Security is concerned with the ability of the system to tolerate unplanned 
outages. Ensuring that the power system is not in danger is the concern of the operator 
in the control centre. If the outage of a component in the power system is believed to 
violate the security constraints it is treated as a contingency; the most, least predictable, 
violations result from contingencies. If the contingency actually takes place it may 
cause disturbances and power interruptions. 
Large power system control centres incorporate functions for on-line security analysis 
as a matter of routine. 
SECURITY 
CONTROL 
-.. 
""'" 
FORECAST 
UPDATE 
L-~=~_~~~~~-1 ON·LINE ~LO~~~flO~W~~------~ 
, ..... I ..... 
·FAULT·LEVEL 
:EVALUATION 
'" .. · .. T·· 
'-------------------' L. -....-;aaol( STOP) 
Fig.l.l Outline Configuration Of Security Monitoring And Functions 
Analysis In A Control Centre 
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Fig.l.1 illustrates the overall structure for various security monitoring and analysis 
functions in such a control centre. We can now examine the security assessment in 
more detail. 
The first step is the setting up of a real-time database. Data acquisition starts with the 
measurement of the physical quantities in the system, these include branch quantities 
such as real power, reactive power and current magnitude and node quantities such as, 
where applicable, real and reactive power injections and voltage magnitude. In addition, 
data on the status (open or closed) of circuit breakers and switches is required. This 
data is telemetered from the actual site to the control centre computer. Bad data is 
rejected by filtering the received information using a simple check of reasonability or of 
the consistency between breaker status and analogue information. In some cases a 
smoothing routine is used. The real-time information on the open/close status of circuit 
breakers and isolating switches is processed systematically in order to determine the 
network topology which determines the electrical connectivity of the network. 
Network configuration provides input data to state estimation, power flow function and 
to external equivalent update. 
In practice, in the real-time environment, missing and erroneous data frequently occur. 
Faced with these inevitable errors in the information, with missing measurements and 
errors in transmitted data, the available data must be processed to obtain an estimate of 
the current state of the power system. State estimation is a mathematical procedure for 
computing a "best" estimate of the state variables (i.e., the vector of bus voltage 
magnitudes and phase angles) of the system based on the available data. All values for 
telemetered and non-telemetered quantities can be calculated from the estimated state 
variables. External network modelling is an intimately related function of the state 
estimation software package. 
The security monitoring is an on-line check on the operating limits of the power system 
based on the calculated values. 
An operating state is said to be secure if none of the contingencies in the next-
contingency set - NCS (the set of reasonably probable contingencies) can cause 
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violations of the security constraints. The contingency evaluation, i. e. the response of 
the system to these contingencies, is carried out using an on-line load flow. This uses 
the actual load model of the system under consideration and a simplified external 
equivalent model of the neighbouring systems. The external equivalents are 
approximate, reduced models of the non-monitored parts of the system. Since 
contingencies are possible events in the near future a load forecast is used to predict the 
load demand (when in study mode). 
Following an outage study a short-circuit analysis is necessary in order to evaluate the 
network and equipment behaviour under fault condition for the postulated future 
circumstances. Nowadays with the advent of numeric relays communication can be 
established so that monitoring and adjustment of the settings of protective relays can be 
done from the control centre. Nevertheless, to add the fault analysis as a real-time 
security analysis function the fault-level tools need to be improved to speed up its 
calculation and solution time in order to guarantee the time need for taking decision 
and for implementing any control action. 
Many of the post-transient conditions will be abnormal to some degree. Possible 
problems include abnormal frequency (in the event of loss of load or of a generator), 
generator overloads (due to real or reactive power demands), transmission line 
overloads and voltage outside normal limits. Most of these conditions will require 
corrective action. Clearly, the more abnormal the condition the greater will be the 
corrective action required and the less secure was the pre-disturbance operating state. 
If the abnormality is a line overload so severe that the line will be'disconnected before the 
operator has time to adjust generation and relieve the condition then the original 
operating state was insecure. 
A set of control actions to relieve system problems and improve the security of a power 
system include: 
(1) adjusting phase-shift transformers. Although generators constitute the only source 
of megawatt power in a system, the real power in the network can be modified by 
adjustment of the settings of phase-shifting equipment so forcing power to flow in 
alternative paths. Thus, they can be used to reduce system overloads. If this is 
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successful it provides a correction which does not move generators out of 
economic dispatch; 
(2) rescheduling of real power generation to modifY real power flows; 
(3) rescheduling of reactive generation to maintain a good voltage profile; 
(4) using the thermal capacity of system components to meet short-term peak demands 
or other contingency conditions; 
(5) changing the network topology via switching action in order to reroute power 
flows and thereby relieve overload conditions, or to maintain a good voltage 
profile; 
(6) moving transformer taps; 
(7) switching of reactive sources such as capacitors or reactors; 
(8) modifying the settings of protective relays. 
These actions can be carried out automatically or by system operators using 
supervisory control equipment. 
The number of available control actions which can be performed in a emergency 
situation is limited because of the short time available. In these cases the dynamics of 
the power system are too fast for any major intervention by a control centre apart from 
the drastic step of shedding load in order to remain within the limits imposed by the 
generation and transmission capacity of the system operating under the new conditions. 
1.4 CONTINGENCY SELECTION PROBLEM 
Modern power system control centres are required to provide real-time security 
assessments which are usually evaluated for a large number of actual and anticipated 
contingencies. As the number of contingencies increase, the solution (and computer 
execution time) increases to a point which may be a burden to the overall real-time 
control function or may be so long as to be meaningless in terms of real-time dispatcher 
response. Under these circumstances it becomes desirable to select the most important 
contingencies on which to perform a detailed contingency analysis. Hence it is 
important to determine which, out of the total possible, contingencies should be 
included in the next-set. 
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Until recently defining the set of contingencies to be considered by the security analysis 
programme was based largely on subjective judgement. Since it was unrealistic to test a 
large power system for every conceivable disturbance a nominal contingency list was 
created on the basis of historical records, operator experience, off-line simulation 
studies, company operating policies and planning guidelines. 
Considerable research has been pursued into the development of efficient digital 
algorithms to reduce the time required for contingency selection and sometimes for 
contingency evaluation. Ideally, each contingency should be analysed by a full ACLF, 
but although this provides accurate results it is obviously more expensive in 
computational terms and is rarely feasible in real-time enviromnent. 
Using an approximate (where possible, linear) power system model with appropriate 
techniques is the procedure used so that a large amount of system contingencies can be 
analysed quickly off- and on-line. Some of these techniques are presented on Appendix 
A. 
In spite of recent improvements in computational speed and efficiency the large number 
of cases to be analysed is still time consuming. A more satisfactory approach is the 
development of a systematic technique to screen the total and select a limited number 
which can be further examined by AC contingency analysis. The selection of those 
contingencies to be studied by the on-line security analysis programme should be based 
on the current operating conditions, they should be adaptive and the use of a fixed list 
based on off-line studies should be avoided. 
A logical security-analysis technique based on actual system operating data can 
automatically update or augment this nominal list. This process of selection in a real-
time enviromnent is referred to as Automatic Contingency Selection (ACS). It involves 
an algorithmic procedure aimed at reducing the number of contingency cases necessary 
for the assessment of the steady-state security level of the power system. The ultimate 
goal of contingency selection techniques is, therefore, to determine which subset of 
contingencies, taken from the set of all possible contingencies, will cause system failure. 
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Extensive research has been pursued during the last decades to develop a reliable 
algorithm for ACS. The fonowing two chapters contain a comparative study of the 
ACS techniques for security assessment of power system. 
More recently a merged solution where contingency selection and evaluation become a 
single process is the ideal situation pursued. The ACS technique not only identify the 
severeness of a contingency but it also evaluates simultaneously those contingencies 
identified as critical. This approach is referred as Integrated Contingency Analysis. 
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Chapter Two 
AUTOMATIC CONTINGENCY SELECTION 
2. INTRODUCTION 
Dy Liacco states (Dy Liacco 1975) that each time the contingency evaluation process 
is performed it should include a scientific, i.e. systematic, determination of those 
contingencies which should be considered in more detail. In order to accomplish this a 
classification scheme is employed to select automatically those cases which are deemed 
likely to create out-of-limit conditions. This is referred to as an Automatic Contingency 
Selection-ACS algorithm. 
The Automatic Contingency Selection problem is concerned with developing computer 
. algorithms for the fast and efficient identification of those contingencies which may 
cause limit violations and discarding all others. 
The use of the ACS algorithm in real-time differs fundamentally from its use in a 
planning programme. In real-time terms each contingency is modelled by a network 
topology processor which takes into account the static network data, real-time load and 
generation values, and the open/close status of breakers/switches representing the real-
time status of breaker/switch plus the opening of breakers needed to produce the 
contingency being studied. In addition, the operator wishes to find only the single 
contingencies which will cause a problem rather than combinations of contingencies as 
used in planning studies. Secondaryl changes may be caused by the input 
contingencies and they are taken into account by the topology processor which 
determines the final network configuration. Finally, in real-time contingency analysis, 
the results are always required as quickly as possible, particularly since the analysis may 
find its greatest usefulness in studying a network just after a major outage has occurred 
in order to discover the worst "next" outage. 
1 Secondary changes are dependent outage events. 
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The development of an ACS algorithm should consider the following factors: 
(a) the computational burden for the selection process and the subsequent complete 
analysis of the selected contingencies must be less than for the AC analysis of all the 
contingencies; 
(b) since the ACS is performed in real-time, the algorithm should be as simple as 
possible in order to save computer operating time; 
(c) the accuracy of the selection must be such that no contingencies which might 
present a risk for the security of the system are overlooked. 
As noted above, the use of an ACS algorithm in on-line security assessment involves 
two important considerations: 
(i) the reliability of the selection process, 
(ii) the computing time required. 
Since the ACS procedure does away with the need to run the complete set of cases it 
decreases the time spent in determining those which give rise to the serious problems. 
Thus the contingency selector may be thought of as a contingency selection filter in 
which the worst cases are "filtered out" by selecting from amongst all the possible 
outages. The reduced list of cases can then be subjected to a detailed examination. The 
contingency selector should be used before any significant change in system topology is 
made since this is where it really helps by identifying the next most troublesome cases. 
Referring to Fig.l.I - Chapter I the security analysis function is then modified to 
include the ACS procedure which is illustrated in Fig.2.1. The input data required by 
the ACS algorithm is the set of all contingencies, the network configuration and the 
loadings. For the given list of possible contingencies the ACS algorithm is applied to 
determine which of the contingencies will cause system problems (e.g. a component 
overload or a bus voltage out-oC-limit). A smaller set of contingencies called the Next 
Contingency Set-NCS is created for further evaluation with the contingencies that 
cause at least one violation. The contingencies included in the NCS change with 
changes in the base case network configuration, generation and loading. 
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Fig.2.1 Modification Of Security Analysis Function To Include An ACS Algorithm 
The contingencies are then classified into two categories as follows: 
(i) the non-critical contingencies, those which do not result in out-of-Iimit conditions, 
and 
(ii) the critical contingencies, those that give out-of-limit conditions or, more 
specifically, constraint violations. Only the members of this set need to be evaluated 
in detail. 
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The classification process is, fundamentally, a decision problem, in fact Halpin and 
Fischl (Halpin 1982) explicitly discuss it in the framework of decision theory, where a 
contingency is either classified as critical or non-critical. 
ACS techniques are commonly used to detennine violation limits in branch flows, bus 
voltages and generator V Ar demands resulting from a given contingency. Violations of 
steady-state stability limits can be catered for by appropriate modification in the branch 
flow limits. Thus ACS methods can be used to select: 
(i) transmission branch contingencies that adversely affect the real power flow in the 
network branches; 
(ii) transmission branch contingencies that adversely affect bus voltage profile; 
(iii) transmission branch contingencies that adversely affect the reactive power 
injections at the generation buses; 
(iv) real power injection contingencies that adversely affect the real power flow in the 
, 
network branches; 
(v) reactive power injection contingencies that adversely affect the reactive power 
flows in the network branches or the bus voltage profile. 
2.1 PROBLEMS IN CONTINGENCY SELECTION 
Ideally, the final list produced as a result of applying the ACS procedure should contain 
all those contingencies that produce security constraint violations and no others. 
Unfortunately, none of the methods currently available can yet reach this ideal. At best 
they are able to produce a set containing most of those cases which will cause system 
failure and some severe contingencies may be omitted as well as some unimportant 
contingencies included. 
The flow chart depicted in Fig.2.2 shows the ACS algorithm described in (Ejebe et al 
1979). The Next Contingency Set selected by the ACS technique mayor may not result 
in a problem for the system. 
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Although ACS algorithms have the potential to reduce computational effort when 
assessing the system security without sacrificing accuracy this has not yet materialised 
in practice and current methods present two types of anomalous behaviour, namely the 
classification of unimportant contingencies as important and/or the classification of 
important outages as unimportant. The first type, false alarms, are not necessarily 
dangerous unless the misclassification is extensive but time is wasted in solving the 
cases which actually do not cause problems. In addition they may mask important cases 
which otherwise would have been considered when running the full ACLF. The second 
type case, misclassification of important outages named miss alarms, can be highly 
dangerous in the on-line automatic environment; underestimating the severity of an 
event is a more serious error than overestimating it. The situation described above is 
illustrated in Fig.2.3 (taken from Ref.(Halpin 1982». The contingencies that cause no 
violations are referred to as inactive contingencies and those that cause at least one 
violation are called active contingencies. The unimportant contingencies classified as 
critical are indeed inactive outages since no violations are detected during the 
contingency analysis. On the other hand the important contingencies classified as non-
critical are active outages in the sense of resulting in system constraint violations and 
they would deserve to be studied in more detail. For an ACS algorithm free of 
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misclassification all critical contingencies are active and all noncritical are inactive. 
Unfortunately a misclassification produced by a particular algorithm might well result in 
mistrust of the selection procedure as a whole. 
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Fig.2.3 Classification Of Contingencies By ACS Algorithms 
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An improved ACS algorithm (Fischl et a11982, Halpin 1982, Galiana 1984, Cheng et al 
1984) illustrated in Fig.2.4 provides for the classification of contingencies into the 
following categories: 
(i) definite non-critical contingencies 
(ii) definite critical contingencies 
(iii) unclassified contingencies where the identification as (i) or (ii) is not positive 
Before proceeding to a further discussion of the misclassification problems occurring in 
current ACS algorithms the procedures used to assess system security will be described 
below. 
2.2 STRATEGIES TO SELECT CONTINGENCIES 
For many years the judgement of the engineer, based on experience, was all that was 
available so far as contingency evaluation was concerned. This judgement is important 
but it must be reinforced by qualitative and quantitative methods for the evaluation of 
security in the complex systems of the present day. 
2.2.1 Deterministic And Non-Deterministic Security Assessment Criteria 
There are two general strategies which might be used to help in contingency selection: 
( a) deterministic 
(b) non-deterministic 
The deterministic security strategy may either involve the performance of an actual 
physical experiment, such as dropping a line, or one of the procedures described at 
(Appendix A) named point-wise and region-wise approaches. The point-wise approach 
is largely used to determine the system performance in terms of security constraint 
violations. Such an approach uses a fast but approximate power flow simulation of all 
conceivable future contingencies followed by a check for the limit violation. By 
monitoring the appropriate post-contingent quantities (flow, voltages) the severity of 
the contingencies can be directly quantified in some heuristic manner for ranking 
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purposes. The limitations are that the first is usually impractical due to associated 
operating difficulties whilst the second would reliably indicate which contingencies 
ought to be investigated using the more accurate ACLF, however it takes a long time 
and the feasibility of on-line implementation becomes remote. In practice the number of 
contingencies to be tested is limited to a few cases and the selection of the set of 
contingencies is based on a mixture of judgement, tradition and experience. If the 
selected contingencies do not cover all the important cases then the resulting system 
may be unreliable. 
The second strategy is called non-deterministic not because it involves modelling the 
outage probabilities of system elements but rather it involves the use of one of the many 
methods available for estimating in advance which contingencies are likely to cause 
limit violations. This procedure aims at eliminating the dependency on judgement in the 
selection of contingencies that can contribute to the risk of the system security. This 
strategy constitutes an adaptive contingency processor since the number of cases 
selected for further analysis will vary depending upon system conditions. 
2.2.2 Ranking And Fast Screening Approaches 
In the last strategy used to select contingencies there are two approaches which might 
be pursued: 
(a) ranking 
(b) fast screening 
Ranking methods involve the computation of some sort of performance index for each 
contingency and then sorting them according to expected severity. The value of the 
scalar function represents the degree to which the system operating state is approaching 
or exceeding its static limits. Those contingencies which are more likely to result in out-
of-limit conditions are ranked high. The contingencies can then be tested starting with 
the more severe (in terms of causing transmission branch overloads, abnormal voltage 
profile or reactive power problems) and proceeding down the ranking to the less 
severe. These methods will be referred to as PI Ranking methods. 
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Contingency ranking methods divide the problem of selection into the following stages. 
First a mathematical function, called the Performance Index (PI) is defined. The 
system scalar PI is chosen as a measure of the deviation from rated values of the 
system variables. Then a base-case operating condition is established. A list of branch 
and/or generatorlload outage contingencies is defined. Next, the PI value when the 
system is subjected to a contingency is computed using a PI -Ranking algorithm. This 
value is then used to rank the outages in order of severity. Only those contingencies 
with severity indices above a threshold need be analysed further. It should be noted that 
the PI function choice and/or the PI ranking algorithm may be a source of 
inefficiencies and inaccuracies. 
Reasonably reliable PI methods have been developed for ranking contingencies based 
on branch overloads, others have been suggested and tested for detecting voltage 
problems. Those for detecting voltage problems have been found less reliable than the 
branch flow equivalents and most attempts to speed up the former have resulted in 
unsatisfactory accuracies. 
The following chapter includes a through review in selection contingency techniques 
concentrating on the performance methodologies for solving the contingency problem. 
The techniques are divided into two categories, the Screening methods and the PI-
Ranking methods. Each category is divided according to the type of system failure 
being considered, i.e. component overload and bus voltage-reactive generation 
deviations. 
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Chapter Three 
METHODS FOR AUTOMATIC CONTINGENCY SELECTION 
3.1 FAST SCREENING METHODS 
The computational effort in contingency analysis methods increases dramatically as the 
network size increases because the network solution time, the number of monitored 
elements, and the number of contingencies are each approximately proportional to the 
network size. Fast Screening methods (Lauby et al 1983, Cheng et al 1984, Galiana 
1984, Brandwajn 1988, Ejebe et al 1988) have been devised to reduce the 
computational effort by solving only a subset of the total network and monitoring only 
a limited number of elements for each contingency to identify cases causing limit 
violations. With approaches of this kind the computational cost of analysing each 
contingency is affected very little by system size and the overall computational effort 
should be approximately proportional to the number of contingencies, which is 
approximately proportional to the network size. Information generated during the 
subnetwork solution is utilised to save a list of cases, so that a full load flow solution 
will only be carried out on those selected events. 
The screening technique differs from ranking methods which cannot identify the 
components under violation following a contingency, rather they quantify the severity 
of each contingency by a scalar index. The nature of a contingency (critical or non-
critical) is a straightforward result when applying screening methods. For the ranking 
. methods the nature of a contingency is only obtained by the comparison of the index 
value against a certain threshold. If the threshold value is not chosen accurately the 
contingency may be misdassified. 
With this approach either an overloading problem or a voltage violation followed by a 
branch contingency can be addressed. 
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3.1.1 Selection Of Contingencies Causing Branch Real Flow Violations 
The contingency selection technique presented in (Cheng 1984, Ga1iana 1984) uses a 
sequence of approximate network solutions (considered as a filter), each progressively 
more complex and accurate, to identify cases causing violations. A number of 
potentially non-critical, critical and uncertain contingencies are identified after each 
stage (filter) with only the uncertain cases passed on to the next tighter contingency 
filter. The proposed method involves an innovative utilisation of the DCLF formulation 
where the computation required for the first few filtering process is very Iow compared 
to a DCLF solution. Most of the non-critical contingencies are identified by the simpler 
filters with the last one corresponding to a DCLF solution for the entire network. The 
number of filters placed sequentially to result in an effective method is a decision made 
by the user, so that he/she can control the trade-off between computational effort and 
computational accuracy. 
Ga1iana uses the branch distribution shift factors to calculate the redistribution of real 
power flow on the network lines following a line outage contingency. Branch factors 
relate a contingency flow to its base case value and the base case flow of the line under 
outage. In other words, the line flow across an arbitrary line i with line It in an outage 
mode is given by the base case flow across line i plus a proportion of the base case 
flow across the removed line (the line factor times the base case flow in line It) , i.e. 
where 
Pbr I is the contingency flow in line i after the loss of line It 
pt,. j is the base case flow in any line i 
diA. is the branch shift distribution factor from branch It to branch i 
Pbr A. is the power flow in the outaged line during the base case. 
( 3.1) 
The distribution factors diA. have a magnitude less than or equal to one and for their 
calculation a large computational effort or storage is required. 
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Instead of calculating the exact factors, Galiana suggests a computation of bounds on 
these parameters which are less computationaUy demanding. From these factor bounds 
and Eq.3.1 the contingency flows are bound, i.e. 
_b Ab 
-\ ~ diA. ~ do .. ~ diA. ~ i ( 3.2) 
and consequently 
A 
( 3.3) 
where the symbols "-" and "1\" denote the lower and upper bounds, and "b" denotes 
the type of bound, i.e. b = 0, ... , NF where b = 0 is the most conservative and easiest to 
find bound. Bound NF corresponds to the DCLF and both upper and lower bounds in 
Eq.3.3 give the same value. Hence 
Ai A2 ANF 
P br i ? P br i ? ... ?. P br i = l1r i ( 3.4) 
and 
-1 -2 -NF 
~ <-"'< P. P P - =b' brl brj P hr ; rl ( 3.5) 
_b Ab 
Depending on the position of the bounds P br i and P br i relative to the line flow 
security limits Pb~1I} three types of decisions on the contingency flow may result: 
(i) definitely secure 
(ii) definitely insecure 
(iii) uncertain 
When analysing a certain contingency A by filter b the group of lines which lie inside 
the line flow ratings 
_b Ab 
lim Urn 
-Pb .~Pbri~Pbri'5,Pb . r I r I ( 3.6) 
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will be considered secure, i. e. the given contingency will not cause any overload for 
these lines. This means that out of the nf lines being analysed by filter b, nsecb are 
considered secure. On the other hand, if for another group oflines the bounds on the 
contingency flows lie outside the ratings 
( 3.7) 
or 
( 3.8) 
these lines will be considered insecure. The number ofinsecure lines will be denoted by 
nini. The remaining nuncb = nib - n secb - ninsb line flows which do not satisfy 
Eqs.3.6 or 3.7 or 3.8 cannot be classified by filter b as either secure or insecure, and 
are called uncertain. The corresponding contingency ,t with its nuncb uncertain flows 
is passed on to the next b + 1 contingency filter (nuncb = nlb+1). 
The sequence of filters are defined by estimating upper and lower bounds on the 
contingency flows. The first filter, called Filter 0, for b = 0 sets the lower and upper 
bounds to 
( 3.9) 
and 
( 3.10) 
This gives the following simple bounds on the contingency flow Pbr i: 
( 3.11) 
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Tighter bounds on "d" can be found from the expression which results from the 
application of Inverse Matrix Modification Lemma - IMML on the linear real power 
equation (E = -{ B~ applied to the power line flow across an arbitrary line i with line 
A. outaged (Pbr I) (Galiana 1984) 
d,. =( ~hX y/x/. ) 
Y. 1-~Y.Xll ( 3.12) 
with 
t[B -I' xjA =!Ej rl !EA (3.13) 
and 
xAJ =!E~[Brrl!EA ( 3.14) 
where 
Ya'YA represent the admittance magnitude oflines i and A. respectively 
~YA is the variation on the admittance magnitude of branch A 
m i ' m A are connection vectors for branches i and A. null except for positions + 1 
and -I in the branch terminal-bus positions 
Brrl is the inverse (or factors) of the susceptance matrix. 
Bounds on d can be obtained by bounding the quantities Z II and Z / •. Bounds on Z II 
and Z /. are estimating by decomposing the original network into two subnetworks, the 
retained network and the external network, for each contingency and each successive 
filter. 
The bounds on Z II are obtained from the retained network which contains a number of 
nodes and branches around nodes p-q, the terminating buses of branch A. The next 
larger retained network includes the previous structure plus all nodes and branches 
adjacent to it, at the limit the retained network structure is the original network. 
Ga1iana states that the use of the smallest possible retained network formed by only the 
line A. does not lead to a useful bound on diJ.. The retained buses which give bound 
estimates of good accuracy are chosen by inspection with no systematic way to select 
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them. It has been observed that for a tightly interconnected network it is necessary to 
have fewer retained nodes than for networks with wide loops. Yet, according to the 
author's recommendation, it does not pay to estimate bounds on Z Lt beyond b= 1 for 
the effect of this bound on the ability of filters to identifY the nature of a contingency 
flow is much less crucial than the effect of the bounds on Z t.\. 
Three types of bounds on Zi~ are suggested in (Cheng et al 1984) which are estimated 
depending on the network topology. Bound 1 on Zi~ is computed for cases with direct 
connections between the outaged line A. and the monitored branch i, whose flow is 
uncertain. Bound 2 considers the cases where the outaged line and uncertain line are far 
apart. Bound 3 is the exact DCLF solution. 
In short, the elements involved on the calculation of the various filters suggested by 
Cheng and Galiana in (Cheng et aI 1984) are summarised in Tab.3.1. 
Filter 0 does not require to calculate bounds on either Z Lt or Z i.. Filters 1 and 2 use 
the same bound on Z AA and the bounds on Z i.! depend on the topological characteristic 
of the network. Finally, Filter 3 is the exact DCLF solution used for to analyse those 
contingencies not filtered out by the previous filters. 
FILlERS dj}" 
XAA Xt.\ 
0 
- -
1 xl. I Zi~ 
2 xl. 2 Xi~ 
3 DCLF Solution 
Tab.3.l Elements Used For Bounding On djA, For The Various Filters 
Based on numerical studies performed by the authors the efficiency of each filter 
improves as the system load level decreases. Also, through different combinations of 
these filters a reduction on the overall numerical effort can be achieved without 
affecting the accuracy of the method. 
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The advantages and limitations of the method can be summarised as follows: 
(1) The method does not result in misclassification for the critical and non-critical 
selected contingencies; 
(2) The method is fast and therefore suitable for real-time applications; 
(3) At each filter output the number of contingencies to be analysed is reduced as well 
as the number of monitored lines for the uncertain contingencies; 
(4) The method achievement is twofold in the sense that it finds the magnitude of line 
flow violations and the number of critical and non-critical contingencies; 
(5) A trade-off between the computational accuracy and computational effort can be 
controlled by the user; 
(6) A group of uncertain cases may result and additional time spent to determine the 
nature of these contingencies; 
(7) A systematic way for selecting the retained network is required; 
(8) The proposed method is not effective for generation outage analysis. 
An efficient bounding method inspired on the above bounding estimates method has 
been proposed by V.Brandwajan (Brandwajan 1988). The main objectives in further 
improving the bounding method for detecting branch MW flow violations are higher 
efficiency in terms of speed whilst maintaining good screening results and more 
generality in terms of number and types of contingencies, permanent and temporary, to 
be simulated, including multiple bus splits. 
The network is also divided into subnetworks, namely: internal suhnetwork, external 
suhnetwork, and the boundary. The internal subnetwork contains, at the minimum, all 
nodes directly affected by the contingency. According to the author, best results are 
obtained when the internal subnetwork is formed by a topological search for a closed 
path around the outage area. The external subnetwork is separated from the internal 
subnetwork by the set of boundary nodes. 
The computational efficiency of the method is achieved by the use of a boundary 
incremental angle spread criterion which establishes that "the change in the incremental 
angular difference across any branch in the external subnetwork cannot exceed the 
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maximum change in the incremental angular difference between any two buses that lie 
on the boundary". The application of the incremental angle criterion makes possible the 
identification of branches potentially vulnerable to violations, then an exact 
computation of branch flow and limit checking are performed for these endangered 
branches. To determine the set of endangered branches the internal subnetwork has to 
be solved. The factorisation pathl is formed for the nodes that make up the internal 
subnetwork and then the solution is computed efficiently using sparse vector methods. 
The method efficiency is additionally increased by incorporating existing advancements 
in sparse matrix techniques such as sparse [L U] factors of the network matrix, sparsity-
oriented compensation methods to take into account temporary network structure 
changes, partial refactorization methods to account for sustained topological changes 
and sparse vector methods to perform fast solutions. These programming techniques 
make possible the handle of contingencies with any kind of topological and 
load/generation modifications. 
The main advantages of the efficient bounding method over the bounding estimates 
method are: 
(1) speed, since the efficient bounding method make use of the most recent 
programming techniques; 
(2) larger scope of contingencies can be simulated; 
(3) detection of all branch MW flow violations caused by the contingencies, i.e. no 
uncertain flow violations result; 
(4) the performance and efficiency of the method has been verified on large practical 
problems. 
For the most part, the method proposed by Brandwadjn is described with words. To 
facilitate the explanation and comprehension it would be helpful if the author had used 
an example, to illustrate his proposed ideas, to show the operations. 
1 A factorisation path is defined as an ordered list of columns for fast forward substitutions, or rows 
for fast backward substitutions. 
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3.1.2 Selection Of Contingencies Causing Voltage Problems 
The methods described above are based on linear active power flow models where 
reactive power considerations are not included. The accuracy of these linear models is 
best for strong high-voltage transmission systems with high XIR ratios where its 
assumed that voltage magnitudes and reactive power flows change very little after a 
contingency. 
The voltage-reactive power contingency problem has acquired significant importance 
and this section addresses itself to this matter. In screening for voltage security, 
accuracy is a major concern because of the non-Iinearities involved. 
A fast screening method for detection of local voltage problems caused by a branch 
contingency is described. The method consists of finding a local or neighbourhood 
solution for each outage assuming that voltage changes caused by a contingency are 
often greatest in the area of the contingency, and are often confined to the area of the 
contingency. 
A voltage deviation from the base case greater than 2% was selected as the definition 
of significant voltage changes. A list of cases with at least one deviation greater than 
the specified value is saved to be further tested. 
The procedure for identification of local voltage deviations uses a Gauss Seidel-GS 
solution algorithm. The system is divided into topological tiers of buses which are 
expanded outwards. Tests performed by the authors (Lauby et aI 1983) indicate a total 
of three tiers as the best balance between accuracy and speed. 
The tier buses are selected around the contingency. The first tier consists of buses 
directly connected to the terminal buses of the outaged equipment. The next tiers are 
determined by the buses in direct connection with the outmost tier. 
A GS solution is calculated within the defined tiers with the initial bus voltage values 
given by the base case solution. The remainder of the. network is assumed to be 
electrically rigid and at its pre-contingency values. During the solution, voltages on 
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buses inside the tiers are updated while voltages on buses outside the study area are 
assumed to be constant. 
After the solution for the first tier is found, the updated voltages are compared against 
their pre-contingency values. If the change is not significant the contingency under 
study is considered as non-critical. Otherwise the second tier buses are included to be 
updated and the process is repeated up to the third tier which defines the whole pocket 
area where the contingency is supposed to have any effect. Branch outages resulting in 
at least one voltage deviation greater than 2%, in any of the analysed tiers, are selected 
as critical. Note that the violated buses are pointed out as well as the magnitude of the 
violation as also are the contingency which cause such violation. 
For the tested system the method correctly identified all the contingencies which 
actually exceeded the specified threshold. The method also identified some cases (about 
4% of the outaged branches tested) with deviations less than 2% as they had had 
significant voltage changes, i.e. pseudo violations were identified by the proposed 
method. 
According to the authors' method, the Local Solution Method - as it is also called, 
might miss certain widespread voltage collapse cases which do not originate from the 
pocket area but occur some distance away from the contingency. 
Another method for detecting bus voltage problems is given in (Ejebe et al 1988). The 
method is based on an existing voltage-reactive ranking method (A1buyeh et aI 1982) 
but adapted to the screening approach characteristics where explicit contingency 
screening is performed on all contingency cases using a subnetwork solution. The 
present method also deals with the contingency evaluation which is performed for the 
selected contingencies. The method, therefore, addresses both the selection and analysis 
issues. 
The contingencies are screened after a single iteration of the Fast Decoupled Load 
Flow-FDLF (Stott et al 1974) with the half t.rJ./V - t.T!.. iteration performed over a 
subset of buses with potential voltage problems (voltage-sensitive buses). 
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The selection of the voltage-sensitive buses is based on the Incremental Branch Flow 
Criterion which is expressed by: 
( 3.15) 
where 
A is the set ofbuses whose voltage magnitudes is expected to be substantially 
changed as a result of the contingency under study; 
ll.Pbr i is the incremental branch MW flow across branch i; 
r specified incremental branch power lower bound whose value is system 
dependent (voltage levels and network loading). The numeric value is 
experimentally selected for the system under study. 
The first-half lJ.E./V - lJ.§? iteration is performed over the entire network and ll.Pbr i 
computed for voltage-sensitive bus selection purposes. If the set A is empty, the 
contingency under study does not offer any threat to the system in terms of voltage 
magnitude violation. As observed by the authors, the reactive power mismatches, lJ.Q, 
are significant only at buses within the voltage-sensitive subnetwork. Hence, only the 
MJJV for these buses are calculated with the remaining buses power mismatches set to 
zero. Since the significant voltage changes are expected to be found in the voltage 
subnetwork, there is interest in computing the bus voltage magnitude changes, ll.!:: only 
at the buses of the voltage-sensitive subnetwork. Note, therefore, that both ll.gjV and 
lJ.!:: are sparse vectors with the same sparsity structure. As a consequence the 
factorisation paths for the sparse vectors are the same and are determined in order to 
select the columns and rows of [B"] that will take part on the solution of the equation 
ll.<J./V = [B"jlJ.!::. 
The post-contingency voltage magnitude for the monitored buses is then computed 
(v = v o + ll.v) to check for any violation within the voltage subnetwork. 
For the test cases studied by the authors all contingencies with voltage violation were 
correctly captured. 
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A fast contingency evaluation method for the selected contingencies is proposed by the 
authors. The fast contingency evaluation is achieved by the application of the Adaptive 
Reduction-AR method proposed by W.F.Tinney and J.M.Bright (Tinney et a11987). 
Recalling that the first iteration of the FDLF method has been carried out over the 
retained subnetwork, the idea now is to reduce the entire system so that a fast full 
solution ofthe FDLF can be run for the screened contingencies. 
The network is then classified into the retained buses (R), which include the buses of 
the sensitive-voltage subnetwork plus their factorisation path (note that this set has 
been determined at the screening stage), the extemal buses (E) to be eliminated, the 
buses ofR with connections to buses in E, called boundary buses (B), and the buses of 
R not in B, represented by F. The network is reduced to the set of buses B by 
computing an equivalent for the outward buses. 
Tests performed by the authors in (Tinney et a11987) show that the reduced equivalent 
can be computed faster than one iteration of the FDLF when run for the reduced 
subnetwork. 
As raised by the discussors, Ms.Dangelmaier et ai, and agreed by the method's authors 
certain types of contingencies, such as generator/load outages or system islanding, may 
cause widespread generation dispatch and a local voltage subnetwork solution may not 
be the best approach when these contingencies are involved. 
The proposed contingency assessment algorithm gives two important contributions: 
contingency selection method for voltage problems and a fast contingency analysis 
solution method for the cases identified as potentially critical. Significant reduction of 
CPU is achieved for both the proposed steps. 
In Chapter V an integrated method for contingency selection and evaluation is 
proposed based on the fast screening techniques. The method is implemented on the 
sequential and the parallel mode and the speed up achievement is investigated. 
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3.2 PERFORMANCE INDEX BASED RANKING METHODS 
The majority of the current methods for selecting contingencies make use of defined 
system performance indices to quantifY the relative severity of each contingency. The 
system performance may be evaluated in terms of these indices according to the 
magnitude of component limit violations resulting from a particular contingency. The 
value of the index should increase as the system operation approaches its security 
limits. Contingency selection is then based on a prediction of the values of a 
Performance Index (PI) for each case of component outage in the contingency list and 
then ranking the results from the most important (largest and positive value of the PI) 
to the least important (smallest or even negative value of the PI) forming a ranked 
contingency list. The list is cut at some level of the PI where it is assumed that all 
outages having a lower PI do not violate the security constraints. The success of 
contingency ranking techniques is heavily dependent on the form of the PI selected. 
The criteria for selecting a "good" Performance Index suitable for contingency selection 
are twofold: 
(i) It must be accurate in identifYing system problems. The definition of PI affects the 
accuracy of the contingency selection which is measured by the capture ratio. The 
effectiveness of a ranked contingency list is discussed later. 
(ii) It must be computationally efficient. The function must be mathematically analytic 
with the algorithms used to rank contingencies requiring an efficient method of 
predicting the change in the PI when branches and/or units are dropped. The 
efficiency can be measured by the ratio of the execution times for the automatic 
contingency selection to that for AC analysis. 
Therefore an efficient PI technique is one which monitors the impact of a contingency 
on the system performance with the same degree of accuracy as that obtained from a 
physical experiment or an exact load flow study and with sufficient speed to be used in 
an on-line situation. 
System performance indices are not unique, they may take different forms depending on 
what they are designed to monitor (e.g. branch loading or magnitude voltage 
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violations) and the relevant physical properties of the system should be taken into 
consideration when selecting the appropriate PI. The prs are therefore defined in terms 
of variables dictated by the network constraints to measure the degree to which the 
system operating state is approaching or exceeding its static limits. There is a wide 
choice of heuristic definitions for the Performance Index. The great majority are 
intuitively defined through a series of trials. 
The performance indices hereafter discussed do not consider the system dynamics or 
the ability of the system to respond to transient disturbances. They simply measure the 
ability of the system to adequately meet its requirements in a specified set of states 
considering that the steady-state has been reached following the contingency. 
3.2.1 Valuation Of PI-Based Methods 
The effectiveness of an ACS algorithm can be evaluated by the capture ratio, rN • which 
is defined as the fraction of the number of critical cases flagged as dangerous by the 
ranking algorithm to the total number of critical cases given by a reference list, i. e.: 
( 3.16) 
where 
Nee is the number of critical contingencies included in the N entries of the list given 
by the ranking algorithm, and 
NTC refers to the N entries of the ranking given by a reference list. 
The capture rate gives the measure of accuracy of a specific algorithm for detecting 
critical contingencies in the top N contingencies of the ranked list. This means that for a 
value of rN less than 1.0 the top N entries in the ranking will not contain the N worst 
contingencies. 
In the reference list each contingency is ranked exactly according to the severity of its 
impact on the system performance. The list is generated by simulating the contingencies 
with a full AC Load Flow. For the ranking of the reference list a PI formula 
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corresponding to the method to be assessed is used. The ranking obtained by the 
selection method is compared to the actual ranking as obtained by full AC (in some 
cases DC) analysis. 
3.2.2 Contingency Selection - Stopping Criteria 
The objective of PI-Ranking approaches is the determination of a list of contingencies 
ordered according to their expected severity. From this ordering the contingencies may 
be studied one by one (in decreasing order of severity) until a point is reached where 
contingencies are found not to produce any abnormal operating conditions and 
consequently do not deserve any further consideration. Since the ranking accuracy is 
limited a different criterion to terminate the contingency evaluation has to be followed. 
In order to capture as many events as possible resulting in violation conditions whilst at 
the same time saving the amount of computation required, it is necessary to set up rules 
to limit the scope of contingencies to be studied. Use of an appropriately stopping point 
criterion may thus result in significant reduction in computer time without significant 
loss of accuracy. 
Stopping criteria may take different forms. The simplest one would exist as soon as the 
load flow for one case showed no constraint violations. However the PI is a measure of 
overall system stress and some contingencies may be highly ranked for representing a 
heavy system load condition with no component limit violation. If the suggested 
stopping criterion is applied as soon as a contingency causing no violations is reached 
no further analysis will be carried out. That stopping form would be reasonable if the 
ranking were based on the maximum violation and also free from misordering. 
The evaluation process may also be carried out until a specified time has elapsed with 
the risk of omitting some case deserving analysis. An natural stopping point in the 
analysis process would be the base case value of the performance index (Pt'). 
Another stopping criterion would require the execution of load flows for the top N 
cases in the ranked list. It is attractive because it reduces the execution time if the 
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number N is kept low, however it does not analyse contingency cases ranked below N, 
even when they cause out-of-Iimit conditions. 
Owing to approximations and inaccuracies in the ranking the stopping criterion would 
demand the execution of load flows until no limit violations were found on M 
consecutive outage cases this is the main criterion used today for stopping point. As M 
increases more severe contingencies are found, but only at the expense of solving many 
more contingencies, including some that are not severe and do not cause system 
problems. This criterion is based on the user's experience gained in using the selection 
algorithm on his system to set the number M of no-violation cases. The number of 
cases to be analysed varies along with the system conditions. The advantage would be 
in decreasing the chances of overlooking severe cases since misrankings may be present 
during the ranking stage of the method. 
A different criterion would be to establish the M worst cases that are possible (for a 
question oftime, maybe) or desired to be analysed. A set of N contingencies from the 
top of the list (with N> M) will be studied where this is believed to contain the M worst 
cases. This means that by running N cases off the top of the list one might be 
reasonably assured of getting the worst M cases. Once more, experience is required for 
the choices. 
A criterion to determine an appropriate value for M is suggested in Ref.(EPRI 1982). 
Two plots were drawn and based on the behaviour of the plotted figures a best value 
for M can be defined. The coordinates are given by 
(i) the number of contingencies studied in more detail as a percent of the total number 
of ranked outages, and 
(ii) The number of contingencies resulting in violation as a percent of all contingencies 
that produce violations 
those figures are plotted as a function of M As M is increased more severe 
contingencies are found but at the cost of solving more cases including some that are 
not severe and do not cause violations. 
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" It is noticeable that to make the contingency selector fully adaptive, the stopping 
criteria needs further investigation to eliminate the operator experience factor. 
R.Fischl (Fischl et aI 1981, 1982, Halpin 1982) presents a stopping criterion in which 
the prs are compared to a selected threshold value (111). By determining a PI function 
whose weighting factors are tuned according to the system under study the threshold 
point represents a certain value of the PI function. The contingencies that give PI 
values greater than 1H indicate that they will give out-of-Iimit conditions. 
Unfortunately the procedure does not eliminate misclassification problems. 
In the following sections the PI techniques are divided into component overload and 
bus voltage-reactive generation deviations. The PI fonnulas are rearranged in the most 
convenient computational form resulting in a significant difference in computational 
efficiency between methods. 
3.2.3 Contingency Selection Based On Overloads 
A representative PI function widely used relating the real power branch flows to their 
individual ratings can be written as 
P ~ (Phr ; 2 1 MW = Lw; )it;;") 
;=1 Phr ; 
(3.17) 
where 
w, weighting factor to assign the importance of certain branches; usually it is 
made equal to 1; 
Pbr , real power flow in branch i; 
Pbip} maximum real power flow in branch i; 
nbr number of branches in the network. 
Squaring the normalised flows further increases the contributions due to overloads 
whilst further decreasing the contributions from non-overloaded circuits. 
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Branch flow can be translated into phase-angle difference across the branch, based on 
DCLF model, using Eq.3 .18: 
(3.18) 
Thermal effects limit the power-handling capability of short and medium-length lines 2 
(up to 150 Km, approximately), whereas stability requirements impose limitations on 
long lines. The real power flow capacity (line flow limits) may vary in a non-linear 
fashion with line design (conductor size, length, type, geometry, spacing between 
towers, etc) and operating conditions (ambient temperature, wind velocity, etc), here it 
is assumed to be a linear function of the susceptance, i.e. 
(3.19) 
Substituting Eq.3.18 and 3.19 into Eq.3.17 PIMW gives the maximum allowable 
phase-angle difference across the branch 
(3.20) 
where 
() br j phase-angle difference across branch i 
egl'l maximum aIJowable phase-angle difference in branch i 
K, capacity proportionality constant (Kj = PgJ!l;/bj) with hi the susceptance of 
branch i 
Expanding the summation in equations 3.17 and 3.20, respectively it is seen that the 
two functions are equal at the initial value before any contingencies are considered. 
2 Thermal limitations on terminating equipment such as transformers may be more restrictive than 
those pertaining to the line itself 
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( 3.21.a) 
( 3.21.b) 
However when a branch "A" is dropped the two functions are not equal. Note that as 
b).. changes from its initial value to b).. = 0 the last condition represented by the 
superscript "t", the only corresponding pair of terms in the two summations which are 
not equal are those associated with branch A. 
In the limit, as b).. goes to zero, the branch flow must become zero although the branch 
angle does not. Thus, PIMW and PIe when the branch A is dropped, are related by 
Eq.3.23: 
Of 
P'l f _ p'Tf ro. ( br )..)2 MW - 'e -~).. K).. ( 3.23) 
The performance indices from Eq.3.17 and Eq.3.20, whatever the method used, give 
different rankings although both are calculated from the DCLF solution (Mikolinnas et 
aI 1981). Table 3.2 shows the results when PI MW and PIe are applied to the six-
bus, eight-transmission branch system described in Appendix C. The base case indices 
are obtained from the base case load flow and are a measure of the security of the 
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current state of the system. The list of contingencies was processed by the DCLF to 
compute PI MW and PIe. 
CONTINGENCY K PIMW PIe Of (rd) 
BRANCH Iim (ll;, ,Ill,) 
1 1-4 0.300 7.000 11.279 0.6205 
2 1-5 0.150 5.581 12.456 0.3933 
3 2-4 0.113 4.974 7.411 0.1756 
4 2-6 0.075 5.833 18.263 0.2645 
5 3-4 0.320 6.190 9.206 0.5557 
6 3-5 0.250 5.581 8.056 0.3933 
7 3-6 0.300 6.571 11.171 0.6413 
8 4-6 0.200 4.810 5.178 0.1214 
*BASE CASE: PI'Mfy = 4.345 
PI~ = 4.345 
Tab.3.2 PI MW and PIe Calculated From A DCLF For A Six-Bus System 
In Tab.3.3 the values of the appropriate indices for all the outages are then ordered 
according to their magnitudes. The two different rankings reveal the importance of the 
PI function definition when used for contingency selection purposes. 
Although a limited number of different forms of the overload performance index are 
considered in the literature the ranking algorithm derivations vary widely. 
Ordered Real Power Ordered Angle 
Outage Performanc Outage Performance 
Branch e Index Branch Index 
1-4 7.000 2-6 18.263 
3-6 6.571 1-5 12.456 
3-4 6.190 1-4 11.729 
2-6 5.833 3-6 11.171 
1-5 5.581 3-4 9.206 
3-5 5.581 3-5 8.056 
2-4 4.974 2-4 7.411 
4-6 4.810 4-6 5.178 
Tab.3.3 Comparison Ranking For PI MW and PIe When 
Using A DCLF On The Six-Bus System 
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The next section studies some methods of dealing with the transmission branch 
overload issue. 
3.2.4 Ranking Methods For Branch Outage 
Much of the work reported for dealing with the active-power problem uses DC power 
flow-type models. Assuming that the DC model is sufficiently accurate for the 
prediction of branch flows, expressions can be derived for the change in PI when a 
branch is dropped. These expressions may be obtained by repeated differentiation of the 
PI followed by substitution into a Taylor Series expansion. The relative magnitude of 
the changes in the PI as a consequence of outages are then used to rank the 
contingencies in order of severity. 
3.2.4.1 Taylor Series Methods 
The calculation of the sensitivity (partial derivatives) of PI for a branch outage based 
on PI MW and PIe formulations, gives rise to different algorithms for ACS analysis. 
The earliest method reported in the literature is the method developed by Ejebe and 
Wo\lenberg (Ejebe et al 1979). The authors suggest a contingency-ranking scheme 
based on a gradient technique to predict the change in a defined criterion function 
based upon active power flows. Although they have used Te\legen's Theorem to predict 
the change in PI MW, the same results can be obtained in a more straightforward 
manner by the use of differential calculus (Irisarri et al 1979). The first-order 
sensitivities of the criterion function-PI MW with respect to changes in system 
parameters are then used to rank the contingencies. The contingency ranking is given, 
in decreasing order of severity, by the largest positive performance index change to the 
largest negative performance index change. 
The ranking obtained was not perfect, some contingency cases which should have 
ranked higher in priority were low on the list (miss alarm) and conversely others which 
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should have ranked low were too high (false alarm). The "failures" mentioned are 
shown up from a comparison of the list obtained by this method with that by solving a 
load flow and calculating the value of PI MW directly for each contingency. 
One aspect of the problems faced by the method is the fact that PI is a non-linear 
function of the change in parameters and the prediction of the change in PI uses a 
linear projection based on the first-order derivative. The ranking wiI\ be incorrect 
whenever the linear approximation does not correctly predict the true relative value of 
PI for each contingency. In order to make sure that PI truly reflects the severity of the 
outage it must be a linear (or monotonic i function of the change in parameters, in this 
case of b).. The higher the exponent of PI is then the more non-linear the function 
becomes, this increased non-linearity causes the final ordering of the Gradient method 
to become worse. The method, however, represents a compromise on non-linearity 
using an exponent p = 2 to discriminate between critical and non-critical operating 
conditions but it takes into account the need to avoid an excessive in non-linearity so as 
to produce an accurate index-change estimate. 
An example of how misclassifications might appear is shown in Fig.3.1 where the 
performance of the first-order sensitivity based method is compared with the ranking 
resulting from a full ACLF. The data are based on the test results in Ref. (Irisarri et aI 
1979); from a set of 79 tested contingencies only the worst thirty are presented. A 
perfect ranking would produce a monotonically decreasing curve, however some 
misorderings are evident on the ranking by the selection algorithm. 
As an example take contingencies C4 and CS (see Fig.3.1); although contingency C4 is 
more critical than CS, as demonstrated by the ACLF curve, the sensitivity method 
classifies them in the reverse order. If PI MW were a monotonic function of b). then the 
3 Even if PI is a monotonic function misc/assijications may result depending on the degree of 
convexity or concavity of the function. 
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ranking resulting from the first-order sensitivity method would be the same as that 
obtained from an AC Load Flow. 
The capture rates found for the Gradient Selection method lie in the range 0.60-0.80 
which makes the method unattractive for energy utility applications. The capture rates 
may be inferior if the performance index is interpreted as the summations over 
individual circuits instead of equivalent branches (where parallel circuits are combined 
into a single equivalent branch); hence the summation over equivalent branches results 
in higher capture rates. The test results used to draw Fig.3.1 are used to compute the 
capture rates of the Gradient method shown in Tab.3.4. The PI MW summation was 
performed over individual circuits. 
'N 
N First-Order Second-Order 
Sensitivity Sensitivity 
1 1.000 1.000 
5 0.400 0.667 
10 0.400 0.700 
15 0.533 0.667 
20 0.650 0.700 
25 0.720 0.760 
Tab.3.4 Capture Rates When PI MW Is Used In A First-
And Second-Order Sensitivity Method 
The computational effort required by the first-order sensitivity method to monitor the 
changes in susceptances of the "nbr" branches in the network is accomplished by one 
DCLF solution for the base case and one additional DCLF solution to compute the 
changes in PI MW with respect to changes in every branch, i.e. the gradient vector 
VPlk == [/JPIMW 1IJbl,.··,8PIMW IlJbnbr ]. The following expression is derived for 
the change in PI MW when branch A. is dropped: 
( 3.24) 
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I 
r--
with vector pA given by 
For PI MW defined as 
the term (OPI MW lolpbr ..tl) yields 
where 
I number of monitored branches which is usually equal to nbr 
susceptance of branch A. 
angle difference across branch A. 
base case real power flow on branch A. 
real power flow limit on branch A. 
( 3.25) 
( 3.26) 
( 3.27) 
(nb -1) column vector which is null except for + 1 and -1 in the terminal-bus 
positions of branch A.. The phase reference bus is excluded from the m..t 
vector 
Br r I factors of the reduced susceptance matrix 
The change in PI MW is obtained by multiplying each derivative (OPI MW loll1r b by 
the total susceptance of the branch: 
( 3.28) 
where Ab..t = -b..t for an outage of branch A.. 
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Because the Gradient method is considered to be attractive in computational terms a 
later paper by G.Irisarri, A.M.Sasson and D.Levner (Irisarri et al 1979) extended the 
sensitivities in order to accommodate second-order PI MW sensitivities effects instead 
of just the linear terms. The change in PI MW becomes 
with pI! given by Eq.3.25 and X.u and [BI!] defined as 
( 3.30) 
(3.31)' 
For PI MW as defined by Eq.3.26 the term «(}2 PI MW I all),r i12) is given by 
( 3.32) 
To compute MI MW it is necessary for each contingency evaluation to perform one 
forward-backward (FIB) solution to obtain vector a A- = [Brr1mA-. When computing 
the terms XA-A. the term defined as (m~[Brrl[BI!][BrrlmA- can be evaluated 
simultaneously since both terms share the same solution vector given by [Br rIm A: The 
method also requires storage allocation for matrix [B I!] which has the same sparsity 
structure as that of the susceptance matrix as long as I is equal to nbr. 
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~ I 
I 
The results obtained with this method were better than those by the First-Order method 
but still insufficiently reliable, the improvement was not enough to justifY the increase 
of computational effort involved. Figure 3.2 shows the effectiveness profile of the 
Second-Order Sensitivity method as compared to the ranking obtained from an ACLF 
execution. Tab.3.4 also shows the capture rates for a range of values varying up to 
N == 0.3 *nbr. 
To further enhance the performance of the Automatic Contingency Selection methods 
all terms in the Taylor Series have been included; the method is then called the M-Order 
Sensitivity Method (Irisarri et al 1981). The expressions for the change in PI MW and 
PIe when branch A. is dropped are given by 
(3.33) 
with vector pA and matrix [BA] defined respectively by Eqs.3.25 and 3.31, and 
( 3.34) 
For MIe vector pA and matrix [BA] are defined as follows 
A I. ( 8Ple ~ f. = k slgn(Obr j) 1 '1' j = 1 t3 (br I I ( 3.35) 
and 
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~ I [o2PIe ~ t B = k .m· 
i = 1 ollhr il2 '-' 
( 3.36) 
The calculation of derivatives for the M-Order Sensitivity method is terminated either 
when a selected value for M is reached or when the calculated value of the remainder of 
the Taylor Series is equal or less than an established cut-off value. In Ref.(Irisarri et aI 
1981)Mhas been assigned a value of 50 and the cut-off a value ofO.lE-12. 
rN 
N PlMW PIe 
1 1.000 0.000 
5 0.800 0.400 
10 1.000 0.600 
15 1.000 0.600 
20 1.000 0.650 
25 1.000 0.600 
30 1.000 0.634 
35 1.000 0.657 
40 0.975 0.700 
45 1.000 0.712 
50 1.000 0.700 
55 0.982 0.727 
60 1.000 0.800 
65 1.000 0.862 
70 1.000 0.914 
75 1.000 0.974 
Tab.3.5 Capture Rates When PIMW And PIe Are 
Used In A M-Order Sensitivity Method 
Table 3.5 shows capture rates forbothPIMW (Eq.3.26) and PIe (Eq.3.20) based on the 
results obtained from an ACLF and used as reference for comparison. The capture rate 
values show the benefits when the PIMW index is used in conjunction with the M-
Sensitivity Based Selection method to rank contingencies. Reasonably reliable ranking 
is achieved by the use of this technique with captures rates between 0.80 and 1.0, 
misclassifications nevertheless are still present. 
50 
The unreliable classification given by PIe is attributed to the assumption which led to 
the PIe expression derivation when making the MW capacity of a branch proportional 
to the susceptance of the branch (section 3.2.3). The effectiveness of the M-Sensitivity 
Based Selection method is also shown graphically in Figs.3.3 and 3.4 for PIMW and 
PIe respectively. 
The computational complexity of the M-Order Sensitivity method is of the same order 
as that faced in evaluating the Second-Order Sensitivity of PIMW but the results of the 
first are far superior. Therefore the M-Order Sensitivity method is preferable to the 
Second-Order method. In applications where the network topology does not change 
between runs the terms responsible for the majority of the computational effort, i.e. 
x,uand n/iBrr1[BA][Brr1m .. do not have to be recomputed. Rather, they are 
computed once and stored in two vectors of dimension equal to nbr. Once the two 
vectors are retained the method requires only one FIB solution for ([Brrl fA) per 
execution of the algorithm to reflect the new base case condition. 
The two vectors need to be updated whenever there is a permanent change in network 
topology since both terms only depend on the network configuration and the network 
admittances. In this case the triangular factors of the network matrix are updated by 
using the sparse factor updating procedure (Benett 1965). Because the factors of [Br] 
are modified the original factors of [Br] need to be stored. The method also requires 
computational storage for matrix [nL1]. 
In the same paper lrisarri and Sas son (Irisarri et aI 1981) develop an alternative to the 
M-Sensitivity method called the Improved DCLF Based Contingency Selection 
method. This is described in the next section. 
3.2.4.2 Other Methods Of Predicting The Changes In PI 
An alternative to the Second-Order Sensitivity Based method is proposed by Irisarri, 
Levner and Sasson (Irisarri et al 1979) which uses a DCLF Based 
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Contingency Selection technique employing the Inverse Matrix Modification Lemma 
(IMML) to calculate explicitly the branch flows followed by a contingency. 
The new real flow in branch i after a change in susceptance for branch A of Ah;., are 
-b·8, . ., 
n _ { , or , • ,"" 
Ib '-
r, -(b;.,+LibA)8brA., i=A 
The bus angle vector after the contingency is given by 
with 
where 
fl = -([B,ri-TJO .. [B,rim .. m~[Brri)E 
=flo-TJe ;.,[Brrim;.,t9R, .. 
( 3.37) 
( 3.38) 
( 3.39) 
8 is the bus angle vector with the superscript "0" representing the base case 
condition 
P is a column vector of the real power injections 
T/e A. is a coefficient when using IMML with the subscript" 19 " introduced here to 
differ from the rtv A used in the MV Ar - V model 
The other parameters have been previously defined. 
Substituting Eq.3.38 into 3.37 yields 
and finally 
( 3.40) 
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----------------------------------------------------------
r with 
( 3.41) 
( 3.42) 
The new flows given by Eq.3.40 are then substituted into Eq.3.17 to calculate the value 
of the perfonnance index. Although computing the change in PIMW in this way requires 
as much effort as simulating the branch contingency in its entirety the effectiveness of 
this approach is much higher than the Second-Order Sensitivity method with both 
sharing the same computational effort. FigsJ.2 and 3.5 show the effectiveness profile 
for the Second-Order Based method and for the DCLF Based method, respectively. 
Since the branch flows are explicitly computed the exponent of PIMW for the DCLF 
Based method can be increased so that the PIMW value is forced to be large for overload 
conditions only. 
Although the DCLF Based Contingency Selection method does not introduce a new 
criterion for ranking the outage cases it has been presented because it originates a 
ranking method called the Improved DCLF Based Contingency Selection method 
(Irisarri et al 1981). The power flows expression given in Eq.3.38 is substituted into 
Eq.3 .17 and the predicted value ofthe perfonnance index yields 
(3.43) 
with (Jb~ A. obtained from vector f!..A which is defined as 
( 3.44) 
with vector P Il given by 
( 3.45) 
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Matrix [B~] is given by 
~ I 1 22 t [B ]=. L ~(liiU) bi !!!.i!!!.i 
1=1 Pbr A 
rN For DCLF Based Method 
DCLFBased Improved DCLF Based 
N Selection Method Selection Method 
1 1.000 1.000 
5 0.600 0.800 
10 0.800 1.000 
15 0.867 1.000 
20 0.850 1.000 
25 0.920 1.000 
Tab.3.6 Capture Rates For The DCLF Based Method 
And The Improved DCLF Based Method 
( 3.46) 
The capture rates for the tests carried out for the DCLF Selection method (Irisarri et aI 
1979) and the Improved DCLF Based method (Irisarri et a11981) are given in TabJ.S. 
The tests on which the results in Tab.3.6 are based were performed on the American 
Electric Power-AEP system under the same operation conditions. Only about 30% of 
the highest ranked contingencies are taken into account in the calculation of rN .. 
The effectiveness profile of the Improved DCLF Based method is shown graphically in 
Fig.3.6. The method resolution is better than that for the DCLF Based method (Fig.3.S) 
since the curve in FigJ.6 tends to follow the same profile as the curve given by PIMW 
when computed by an ACLF method. Even when a permanent change takes place the 
update algorithm for the network matrix factors maintains the advantage of the method 
over the Second-Order Sensitivity method and its alternative, the DCLF Based 
Contingency Selection method. Although the Improved DCLF Based method and the 
M-Sensitivity method are numerical and computationa11y equivalent (see Figs.3.3 and 
3.6) the first is simpler and easier to implement. 
In a method developed by F.A1buyeh (A1buyeh 1980) a performance index is defined 
and for each branch in the system a PIe value is computed. The magnitude of the PIe 
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shows the relative effect that the removal of a line in a set of parallel lines comprising a 
branch has on the system. 
The algorithm is designed for single contingency only, the line to be dropped from 
every branch is the one with largest capacity which is used to specity the importance of 
the branch in the system. 
The formula for PIe is 
where 
rfAX 
° Bbr j 
lim 
Bbr j 
J(iJ) 
r¥AX BO 
P'l"" = '" J J(/., J.)( blim~ i )2 . 1 "" ~ , J:: , ... ,nbr 
nbr Bbr i 
( 3.47) 
is the largest capacity of branch j 
is the phase-angle difference across branch i for the base case condition 
is the smallest of the maximum allowable phase-angle differences for the 
parallel lines comprising branch i 
is the (iJ) element of a Iacobian matrix of dimension (nbr x nbr). 
The I acobian matrix is defined as 
( 3.48) 
where 
[Ar] is the [(nb-I) x nbr] reduced bus-branch incidence matrix with the row 
corresponding to the slack bus removed 
[BA] isa (nb-1)x(nb-1)] matrix defined as B~]=[Ar][Wd][Ar]t 
[Wd ] is a (nbr x nbr) diagonal matrix whose (i,i)th element, denoted by branch 
capacity is defined as the sum of the parallel line capacity comprising a 
branch 
[Bbr ] is a (nbr x nbr) diagonal matrix whose (i,i)th element, B~r j' isthe voltage 
phase-angle difference across branch j. 
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The Jacobian matrix is a full matrix but when computing the magnitude of PIe for 
branch} the only required elements of [.I] are those of column}. Therefore, in order to 
save computational storage the matrix [.I] is not computed all at once but only the 
column of [.I] corresponding to the monitored branch. 
Matrix [B<l.] has the same sparsity structure as the susceptance matrix. The factors of 
[B<l.] are calculated and the vector defined as r!.j = [B<l.rl!!!j is computed by one FIB 
solution. Next, vector a j is pre-multiplied by vector m~ with /= l ..... nbr in order to 
obtain the Jacobian column vector, denoted by ,[,/ necessary to compute PIe. 
Nothing is said by the author regarding the procedure when a permanent change in the 
system takes place since in this situation matrix [B<l.] and its factors need to be 
modified. Also no reference is made to the capture ratio of the method. The 
computational effort involved in evaluating PIe makes the method not suitable for on-
line applications. 
Another ranking method developed by Mikolinnas and Wollenberg (Mikolinnas et al 
1981) gives an expression for evaluating the exact change in PIMW which recognises all 
terms of the infinite Taylor Series expansion. The analytical expression, written below, 
can be derived in a simpler manner using IMML providing an alternative and clear way 
of developing M'I MW. 
The expression is 
( 3.49) 
with 
(} A I (}A br .<. = !!!.<._ ( 3.50) 
( 3.51) 
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/ 
• 
( 3.53) 
( 3.54) 
( 3.55) 
where 
()~, ~ is the phase-angle difference across branch ,1, obtained from an additional 
DCLF solution for ft and a system with a power injection vector given by 
pA 
£lA isa[(nb-l)xl] vector as per Eq.3.51 
pA is a[(nb -1)Xl] vector as per Eq.3.52 
£l is the base case angle vector 
[BA] is a [(nb -1)Xl] [(nb -1)Xl] symmetric matrix as per Eq.3.53 
[A,.] is the reduced incidence matrix previously defined 
[~] is a (nb,xnb,) constant diagonal matrix as per Eq.3.54 
(i) ~ is the weighting factor of branch ,1, 
K, is a constant which relates p"~",; to hi (pl::'l = KA) 
XAA is defined as XAA = Xpp +Xqq -2Xpq where X p• is the (p,q)th element of 
the system sparse matrix [X] 
[X] is the sparse inverse of the susceptance matrix 
T ~ is defined as T ~ = 1',p + r;q - 21',. where 1',. is the (p,q)th element of 
matrix [T] 
[T] is a [(nb -1)x(nb -I)] square matrix as per Eq.3.55. 
In (Mikolinnas et al 1981) matrix [BA] is denoted by [W] and the designation of 
"branch" means individual circuits. 
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[ 
- The elements XL<, A = 1, ... ,n., made up of elements of the inverse of the original 
susceptance matrix, are evaluated from the system sparse inverse matrix to speed up the 
evaluation of M'IMW given by Eq.3.49. 
Because the computational effort involved in an exact evaluation of M'l MW is more 
demanding than to perform a DCLF solution for each contingency case, an 
approximation is introduced in the derived expression in order to make it 
computationally more efficient. The approximation takes place in the evaluation of 1".< 
which is redefined as 
( 3.56) 
where 
r is a constant whose value is determined experimentally and depends on both 
the power system under study and the computer on which the study is carried 
out. The critical point of this method is the choice of a value for r 
X~ is evaluated from the factors of a so called perturbed system matrix by 
applying the sparse inverse technique. 
In order to compute the term X~, A = 1, ... ,n., the branch susceptances are modified 
to 
( 3.57) 
and the perturbed system matrix, denoted by [B:] is constructed. Matrix [B:] is then 
factored followed by the evaluation of the sparse inverse matrix [XA]. 
When the approximate 1".< factors are calculated using arithmetic double precision the 
resulting values for the M' I MW'S are as accurate as if an exact evaluation of such 
factors, i.e. 1".< = T,p + 1'.. - 2T,. had been performed in single precision. 
62 
Mikolinnas and Wollenberg (Mikolinnas et al 1981) state that the resulting predictions 
of MI MW agree with those calculated by performing a DCLF for each contingency and 
computing the value of MI MW In other words, the algorithm capture rate when using 
double precision calculation is equivalent to that of the ranking based on a DCLF 
contingency evaluation. 
Although M I MW is accurately calculated, false alarms may still be present emphasising 
the importance placed on the PI function definition. The capture rates found for this 
method lie in the range of 0.90 to 1.0. 
The method has been implemented with a reasonable success in the security package 
for a large U.S. utility (pSE&G-Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Newark-New 
Jersey) in order to rank line outages and generator outages (Wrubel et al 1982). The 
algorithm works well when carefully tuned to the system under study. 
Based on the familiar IMML, Vemuri and Usher (Vemuri et aJ 1983) also developed an 
expression for the change in MIMW similar to that ofEq.3.49. The formula for t:J'I MW 
is expressed in terms of I'1b). such that either an outage of a single circuit in a set of 
parallel circuits comprising a branch or an outage of a whole branch can be represented. 
The expression for MI MW is 
( 3.58) 
All terms in Eq.3.58 have been defined during the description of the previous method 
with 1]0 A defined by Eq.3.39. 
A similar strategy to that in Ref.(Irisarri et al 1981) with regard to the storage of two 
vectors is applied to speed up the selection process. The two vectors are independent 
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of system loading conditions and depend only on the topology of the network, 
therefore they can be used between runs as long as the network topology does not 
change. The vectors are 17e (or X) and !. of length nbr whose elements are, 
respectively, the terms 17e A (X u) and TA defined as 
( 3.59) 
( 3.60) 
( 3.61) 
with ~A, equal to ~A, = [Br l-1!?!A, and [BA] given by Eq.3.53. 
Unlike the approximate calculation for TA in Eq.3.49, this method computes the exact 
value for the tau factors for the base case condition. The main feature of the method 
consists of an updating scheme for the two retained vectors whenever a simple 
permanent topology change takes place. 
In the new system topology due to the switching of line j the outage of line A. gives rise 
to new values for 17e A(XU) and TA denoted by 17,g A(x1) and 1'1 The new factors 
are derived in terms of X AA' X fA, and TA in the old topology, they are 
( 3.62) 
or 
( 3.63) 
and 
( 3.64) 
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Eqs.3.62 - 3.64 are obtained by including the effect of t'lb~ in the basic definition of 
1]0 ~, X ~ and t" J.. From the equations above the only term that need to be calculated 
is X j)., the others have been calculated for the original network. The term X jl is 
obtained from the expression which relates the new branch flows, after the permanent 
change takes place, to their old values by the branch distribution shift factor (Appendix 
ill ofVemuri et a11983), i.e. 
( 3.65) 
with the branch distribution shift factor d" defined below 
( 3.66) 
Substituting Eq.3.66 into 3.65 and isolating the % j A term yields 
( 3.67) 
with 
( 3.68) 
Thus, vectors 1/ 0 and T can be updated by storing the base case vectors P:" p. and 
performing 1 FIB solutions. Vector P represents the new system load conditions. 
In conclusion, for an unchanged network topology condition the algorithm requires 1 
FIB solution to compute the current operating state () dictated by the change in the bus 
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net real power injections and 1 FIB substitution to compute 0 11 (Eq.3.51). For a 
permanent network topology change as a consequence of a branch switching operation 
the two retained vectors are updated (1 FIB substitution) and vectors 0 and OA are 
computed (2 FIB solutions), considering that the network matrix has not been 
refactored rather updated. When bus configuration changes occur the computation 
effort is similar to that for the initial calculation of the algorithm [ (!lo + 5) FIB 
substitutions] . 
Although Eqs.3.49 and 3.58 are similar they differ in their evaluation procedures. The 
evaluation of Eq.3.58 for the original network is exact but computationally more 
demanding. Note that its computational effort depends on the number of contingencies 
processed whereas Mikolinnas-Wollenberg's method is independent. The retention of 
the vectors 1] 9 and .. and the updating strategy speeds up the method evaluation but 
the cumulative round-off errors on successive updates may lead to a gradual losing of 
precision. This round-off error could be mitigated by a periodic reevaluation of the 
parameters. 
The capture rates for the method, tested on three different systems ranging in size from 
30 to 455 buses, lie between 0.82 and 0.93. 
The analysis of single branch outages is extended to include the double-branch case. 
This is accomplished by developing a PIMW expression whose terms and updated 
parameters are evaluated in a similar way as for single outages. The capture rates are 
shown to lie between 0.8 and 0.9 but the increase in the computational effort required 
to evaluate !lP I MW is not analysed. 
An ACS algorithm called lP -IQ method (Albuyeh et al 1982) uses the results of the 
first-half iteration of the Fast Decoupled Load Flow-FDLF (Stott et aI 1974) to 
compute a Real Power Performance Index. The ultimate goal of the approach is to 
accomplish contingency ranking based on bus voltage violation, however when solving 
for 11ft. to update 0 and subsequently 11[ the resulting vector 0 is used to calculate 
the branch real power flows which are substituted in the following PI MW formula 
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( P
br if PiMW=. L IV; p,lim 
I Ea br i 
( 3.69) 
with a meaning the set of overloaded branches. As the method explicitly calculates 
P", j the summation in (3.69) is done over overloaded branches only in order to 
counteract misranking problems (false alarms). 
If only the overload problem were to be considered the method would be the 
application of the first iteration of the DCLF method to rank contingencies. 
rN 
N No Q Limiting With Q Limiting 
Consideration Consideration 
5 1.0 1.0 
6 1.0 1.0 
7 0.86 1.0 
8 1.0 1.0 
9 1.0 1.0 
10 1.0 1.0 
II 1.0 1.0 
12 1.0 1.0 
13 1.0 1.0 
14 1.0 1.0 
IS 1.0 0.93 
16 0.94 0.87 
17 0.88 0.88 
18 0.89 0.88 
19 0.89 0.95 
20 0.95 1.0 
Tab.3.7 Capture Rates For The IP - IQ Method 
The capture rates for this technique are shown in Tab.3.7. A full FDLF is taken as the 
basis for comparison, the ranking list is compared against load flow solutions with and 
without generator reactive power limiting considerations and the capture rates are 
found to be approximately equal. 
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The simplicity and the acceptable accuracy of the method makes it very much eligible 
for contingency ranking purposes. The FDLF method is the most popular load flow 
used by electrical utilities and the ranking method can be extended to address the 
voltage problem which will be discussed later in section 3.2.6.1. 
Another linear PI -Ranking algorithm is given in Ref.(Stott et al 1985) which uses the 
branch-oriented compensation method to derive an expression for M/MW. The 
expression is 
( 3.70) 
with 
( 3.71) 
Vector pI!. has been defined in Eq.3.45 and is rewritten below as 
.1 I ( 3.72) P = r 2a.pg ·b·m. 
- I r I I-I 
1=1 
and 
(l)j 
( 3.73) a·= 
I (p~imj)2 
The other parameters are 
fl. =(I-b.m~[Brtm.r~~. (3.74) 
and 
[T] = [XIBd~X] (3.75) 
with 
[.11 I 2 ( 3.76) B =. ~ ajbj !Ilj!llf 
I = I 
where 
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I is the number of monitored branches whose value depends on whether the 
entire system is to be monitored. 
For a rapid and exact evaluation of the IlPI MW formula, Stott, Alsac and A1varado 
suggest an efficient procedure which consists of assembling a (2x2) block matrix4 
denoted by [G] such that the factors of [G] contain the factors of matrix [B,] 
necessary to compute the vector ()" and the factors of matrix [T]. The sparse inverse 
of [G 1 contains the sparse inverse of matrix [ B,] to compute factor f3 and the sparse 
elements of matrix [T] required to evaluate the factors .<.; m ~ [1'] m.< . 
Matrix [G] is defined as 
[G] = [B, B"] 
o B, 
( 3.77) 
and its inverse is 
[Gr' =[B~' -T] B;' ( 3.78) 
Matrices [B, r and [T] have the same sparsity as the nodal susceptance matrix [ B,] 
Although both matrices are nonsparse the sparse inverse technique allows the 
calculation of only those elements in the position corresponding to the nonzeros of the 
factored matrix [ B, ] . 
The rows and columns of matrix [G] are rearranged in order to create a block-
symmetric matrix whose {k,l}th block is composed of elements 
( 3.79) 
• A matrix is said to be blocked ifits elements are matrices themselves 
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which yields a [G') matrix 
Br 11 
Ll 
-Bll Br 12 
Ll 
-BJ2 
0 Br 11 0 Br 12 [G'] = Ll Ll ( 3.80) 
Br 12 -B21 Br 22 -B22 
0 Br 21 0 Br 22 
Matrix [G'] is block-symmetrically factorized and the overall computing effort to 
factorize the matrix is said to be equivalent to two times that for factorizing matrix 
[Br J and four times less demanding than the factorisation of [G] This occurs because 
of the special structure of the blocks where the lower left-hand element of each (2x2) 
block remains zero and the two diagonal elements of the block are equal to each other. 
As a matter of fact, to factorize matrix [G') all that is necessary is to factorize [Br J 
with a standard (unblocked) matrix routine, adding the arithmetic statements involving 
operations on the upper right-hand elements of each (2x2) block to take into account 
matrix [BA]. 
The factors of [G'] allow the computation of the block sparse inverse of [G'] which 
requires approximately the same effort as the factorisation. Included in the factors of 
[G'] are the factors of [T] which can be used for ranking unit outages and considered 
therefore as a second attribute of the developed algorithm. The overall computing 
effort (factorisation plus sparse inverse) is approximately four times the work for the 
factorisation of [Br] itself. The method requires the same computational effort as that 
ofRef.(Mikolinnas et a119SI). 
The approach makes it possible to calculate the second-order performance index 
rapidly and without any approximation for either an individual circuit admittance 
change or full branch outage as well as for simultaneous contingencies. 
When simultaneous contingencies are to be considered Eq.3. 70 becomes 
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I. 
( 3.81) 
with 
( 3.82) 
where 
[1] is an (m x m) identity matrix 
Ob is a (m x m) diagonal matrix where each diagonal element represents the 
susceptance of an outaged branch 
[M] is a [(nb - 1) x m ]matrix whose columns are the vectors m~ for the 
corresponding outaged branch 
[8 a] is a (m x m) diagonal matrix whose elements are the coefficients m for the 
outaged branch A 
Qf is a (mxJ) vector of base case flows for the m outaged branches in the 
contingency case 
fl is a (mxl) vector as per Eq.3.82 
m number of branches simultaneously outaged. 
For a contingency case in which several branches are simultaneously outaged some 
elements of the sparse matrix corresponding to the mutual coupling of the outaged-
branch terminal buses may not be available. To obtain the extra elements the authors 
suggest the insertion of dummy zero-susceptance elements in [Br 1 and [B6] in the 
appropriate positions at the beginning of the calculations. This can lead to increased fill-
in and hence increased computing cost. 
In applications where the network topology does not change in-between runs the 
matrix factors and sparse inverses do not need to be recomputed. Also a saving of time 
can be achieved by the retention of the terms 2aiPI in Eq.3.72 and aiP/ in Eq.3.76. 
When topology changes occur the matrix factors are updated and the sparse inverse 
matrix re-evaluated. 
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The values of PIMW obtained when using the algorithm described above are identical to 
those obtained by the explicit calculation of the branch flows in the contingency cases 
and then substituting them into the base case PIMW formula. 
Another technique developed for improving the effectiveness of the ranking process 
(Fischl et al1981, 1982, Halpin 1982) associates the weighting factors with the concept 
of a security region and provides weightings which are independent of operator 
judgement but dependent on the network configuration. 
Halpin and Fischl have given a great contribution bringing insight to issues related to 
the measurement of the impact of the contingency on the system performance by 
proposing a theory for systematically finding the performance index - PI which is used 
in ACS algorithms. They use the concepts of security region and statistical decision 
theory to select the PI together with a threshold value (TH) as a stopping criterion so 
as to minimise the probability of misclassifYing the contingency such that the capture 
rate is improved. 
A set of security constraints which are mapped into the state variable space (:~::,~) 
defines the security region. The security region is not fixed but it changes according to 
the applied contingency. The region changes under branch outage contingencies, but it 
is unaffected by generator outageslload demand changes (see Appendix A). Therefore 
the theory is explained considering a branch outage contingency for it includes both a 
change in operating point!. and a change in the state space under a contingency. 
The PI, which is used to perform the analysis, is related to the security regions, which 
in turn are defined by the security constraints being tested for violations. It is an 
evaluation of a multi-dimensional problem with a single observation of the system. The 
decision theory is then applied to control th~ errors that will occur when using the ACS 
algorithm. 
The ACS problem is divided into three parts: 
(i) An event occurs and it brings about an impact on the power system's performance. 
The set of events that can occur defines the contingency impact space. The impact 
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caused by a contingency can be either inactive, when the contingency is non-critical, 
or active when the contingency is critical. 
(ii) An observation of this impact is made via PI. The set of all possible observations 
(or prs) is referred to as the contingency observation space. 
(iii)Based on the observation a decision is made about the impact of the contingency on 
the power system's performance, Le. the contingency is classified either to be 
critical or non-critical. The collection of possible classifications is referred to as the 
contingency classification space. 
The two classifications are paired with the two impacts. Thus each time a classification 
is made based on the PI one of the four things can happen: 
1. Correct classification of inactive contingencies - impact inactive, contingency 
classified as non-critical; 
2. Misc1assification of active contingencies - impact active, contingency classified as 
non-critical; 
3. Correct classification ofactive contingencies - impact active, contingency classified 
as critical; 
4. Misclassification of inactive contingencies - impact non-active, contingency 
classified as critical. 
Each of the four cases is expressed in terms of their conditional probabilities. 
Two classification criteria were formulated based on the Neyman-Pearson criteria: 
(a) capture all active contingencies (i.e. those which give out-of-limit conditions), or 
(b) delete all the inactive contingencies (i.~. those which give no out-of-limit 
conditions) 
The contingency classification problem stated in (a) and (b) are constrained 
optimisation problems whose objective functions are the volumes of convex defined 
sets. To capture all active contingencies the volume of a defined convex set is 
maximised such that it is imbedded in the security region. To delete all inactive 
contingencies the volume of a defined convex set is minimised such that it 
circumscribes the security region. The volume maximisation or minimisation problems 
is directly related to selection of PI and the threshold value. The parameters of PI 
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(PI = 7w jf)') adjust the volume of the convex set inion the security region. So, w/ and 
h (p is fixed by the authors) are tuned to the system under study, they are dependent on 
the net.work configuration. The threshold is the optimal value of the radii of the volume 
set. 
When the classification problem (a) is applied together with the active outages some 
contingencies are classified as active when they are actually non-critical (false-alarms). 
On the other hand, for the classification problem (b) when deleting all inactive outage 
some active outages are deleted as if they were inactive (miss alarms). The formulation 
as an optimisation problem minimises but it does not exempt the presence of 
misclassifications. 
In order to define a convex polytope security region the decoupled load flow model is 
used which dictates a linear region. The errors as a consequence of the non-convex 
region for the ACLF model and the convex region for the DCLF model are bounded to 
guarantee that the convex region is imbedded in the non-convex one. 
Although Halpin and Fischl give the foundation with elucidative concepts on the 
development of the PI for monitoring the impact of contingencies on the power system 
security, the method is not computationally efficient for real-time purposes. For an on-
line algorithm application the primary trade-off is between accuracy and computational 
effort. The authors are not concerned with this type of trade-off but rather in the trade-
offs made when addressing the accuracy question. The technique was tested on a small 
system with 6-bus and 8-transmission line. The computational cost relative to network 
size is an important issue not addressed by the authors for a large scale system. The 
technique needs to be more broadly tested especially on larger networks in order to 
establish the methods general effectiveness. The computational cost grows 
exponentially with the network size as agreed by the authors in a paper discussion in 
(Chow,J-C. et aI1990). 
It is argued by some researchers that the great majority of the ACS algorithms have a 
disadvantage given by the none-deterrnination of a" stopping point" which would 
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screen out the non-critical contingencies. On the other hand, it is reasoned that in real-
time implementation the knowledge of ill is not required but instead the ranked 
contingencies are processed in order by a fast contingency load flow algorithm until 
some consecutive violation-free cases have been analysed. Stopping criteria have been 
discussed in section 3.2.2. 
Various other schemes applied to the ranking of contingencies by MW overload have 
been proposed, however only those related to the historical beginning of the ACS 
philosophy and those that are considered as the most innovative or efficient have been 
reported here. 
3.2.5 Misranking Problem In PI-Ranking Methods 
One of the problems which arise in the use of ranking methods is the phenomenon of 
misranking. This phenomenon encompasses two types of anomalous behaviour 
previously mentioned as miss and false alarms (see Fig.2.3 in Chapter n), where some 
important outages which should be higher in priority are ranked low and less or 
unimportant outages are ranked higher in the ordered list of contingencies, respectively. 
In the group of false alarms the misclassification is characterised when in some 
instances a contingency which leaves a number of branches heavily loaded but not 
overloaded is ranked equally or higher than a contingency which produces a single or a 
small number of overloaded branches (a masking phenomenon). In particular, those 
cases with no overloads that are highly ranked represent situations of high overall 
system loading. 
Remembering that PI is a system wide measure and not a direct measure of branch 
overloads, as a measure of overall system stress, and not directly of extreme overloads, 
it is possible for the PI to find certain highly loaded states in which no branch overloads 
exist are more stressful than other states in which one or several overloads exist, but 
the remainder of the system is lightly loaded. 
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A changeover from DC-type PI formulation to AC-type models it seems not to bring 
about significant mitigations of this kind of misclassification. As the aim of ranking 
algorithms is to rank contingencies relative to each other, if the load factor of the 
branch flows does not significantly change from the base case to the contingency case 
in a considerable part of the system, the ranking can be done by a DC-type model just 
as good as with AC-type methods. 
In fact if some "unimportant" cases are classified high in the list, they may overshadow 
important cases which otherwise would have been considered when running the full AC 
Load Flow for the cases producing truly serious effects. 
A controversy exists over this matter and two points of view can be considered. First, it 
can be correctly argued that any contingency resulting in overloads should be 
considered severe. On the other hand, an argument can be made that a contingency 
which leaves a number of branches heavily loaded but not overloaded should be ranked 
equally with a contingency which produces a single overloaded branch, and both cases 
ought to be investigated further. The reason is that a very highly loaded state in which 
no overloads exist may, on the occurrence of additional contingency, lead to many 
more severe overloads than a state in which one or two overloads exist but in which the 
remainder of the system is lightly loaded (EPRI 1982). A system lightly loaded but with 
one or two overloads may result in relatively fewer problems when additional branches 
are dropped. Second-order indices (p=2) have a very limited ability to detect localised 
system overloading. 
A worse type of misranking, miss alarm, occasionally occurs when a contingency 
causes one branch to overload while several others decrease their flow thus effectively 
nullifying the change in PI due to the overload which, consequently, may not be 
recognised. A slightly different situation can emerge when, for instance the index for a 
case resulting in several small violations is comparable in value to the index for a case 
with one huge or few severe violations. By most operational standards, the latter case is 
much more severe. Yet, PI is an index which monitors the entire system and the choice 
of p=2 (exponent of PI) is often found to be very unsatisfactory since it fails to give 
sufficient discrimination. 
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3.2.5.1 Procedures To Tackle The Misranking Problem 
The adverse effects of misranking can be reduced by increasing the value of the 
exponent "p" so that the maximum overload stands out'. This procedure was justified 
in Ref.(Irisarri et a11981) by a comparison of the performance index ofEq.3.17 to the 
p-norm 
( 3.83) 
where 11 . lip indicates p-norm, and I Xj I represents the network variables, as for instance 
power flows, in normalised form (PbY i / p"~,,,;). As P tends to infinity the p-norm 
becomes the ao - norm. That is, 
IIxll = lim ~ p = max (1:11 11 ' 
P~oo I 
i = 1,2, .... ,nbr ( 3.84) 
Conceptually, the use of the PI with a high-order will result in a contingency ranking 
free of masking. Tests done (Mikolinnas et al 1981) by solving DC Load Flows and 
calculating PI directly have indicated that if the exponent could be raised to 8 or 10, 
then all contingencies causing overloads would be ranked above all contingencies not 
causing any overloads. In this case, when there are no overloads but many branches are 
close to their capability, the use of a large exponent will force a reduction of the 
performance index value. On the other hand, if there is only one slight overload in an 
unimportant facility the use of a large exponent will force a large value of the PI and 
thus a recognition of the overload condition. 
Although this approach is quite effective in mitigating the effects of false alarms, it 
introduces computational complications in the ACS process. Unfortunately, so far, a 
• This is not true when using the gradient method to select contingencies because the increased non-
linearity of PI causes the final ordering to become worse. 
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computational efficient technique for evaluating the change in PI has been found only 
for p=2. This restriction results from the requirement that the change in PI must be 
calculated with sufficient speed so as to be quicker than performing the conventional 
alternative, a load flow solution. Otherwise, there is no incentive to perform a ranking 
as opposed to performing a load flow for each contingency case. T.A.Mikolinnas and 
B.F.Wollenberg (Mikolinnas et al 1981) comment that "even if a method could be 
found that would allow efficient calculation of the final value of the PI for "p" greater 
than two, the rankings with p=2 would still provide valuable information". Misranking 
caused by the use of p=2 becomes a problem if one wishes to rank in the order of 
maximum overload. 
Another procedure for reducing the misranking problem, suggested by the discussion in 
Ref.(Irisarri et al 1981) and in Refs.(Stott et al 1974, Albuyeh et al 1982) consists of 
considering the summation over PI only over those terms regarded as the most 
significant for which the monitored variable is outside the limit. In so doing, the 
performance index includes only the actual violations in its calculation so preventing 
"near but within limit" conditions from masking the violated conditions. Otherwise a 
contingency, for instance, that results in a number of heavily loaded but not overloaded 
branches can end up with a PI equal or higher than that which produces a small number 
of overloads. For the cases which result in "near but within limit" conditions, the 
summation is carried out over all components detecting in this way the condition where 
many components are close to their capability. 
This measure, however, can only be implemented in those algorithms where the 
monitored variables are explicitly computed. Alternatively, the calculated variables can 
be substituted into a higher-order performance index to reduce false alarms. 
Misranking effects can still be somewhat reduced by partitioning the system 
(Mikolinnas et al 1981, EPRI 1982) into different subsets and performing a ranking on 
each of the subsets separately. The partitioning may be done by any of several rules: by 
voltage level, by areas, and by partitioning into lines and transformers. The removal of 
cases from the contingency ranking can be done by giving a zero weight to the 
component in the PI formula. For instance, lines and transformers are ranked separately 
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by setting w, for transformers and lines to zero in each turn. The masking is not 
completely eliminated but its effects are greatly reduced at the cost of a decrease in 
computing speed. 
For those algorithms which use matrix [BLl] the application of partitioning makes [BLl] 
no longer have the complete nodal susceptance structure of [Br] The terms for 
nonmonitored branches are absent from matrix [Bll] which may be singular. Of course 
for each set of monitored branches a different matrix [ Ba] and its derivatives (factors, 
sparse inverse) need to be calculated with a proportional increase in the overall work. 
Network partitioning achieves masking effect reduction by breaking up the summation 
of the PIinto several smaller summations to reduce the adverse effects of aggregation. 
The globality of PI is restricted to only the important subsets of the system. Because 
fewer elements are being monitored in each ranking, the corresponding PI is more 
sensitive to violations on these components. By combining the results obtained from 
several such rankings masking can be reduced, but not eliminated entirely. The 
additional work involved in ranking several partitions is the price incurred in reducing 
masking by these methods. However because the resulting ranking is more accurate a 
detailed study of an inactive contingency is less likely. 
As pointed out in Ref.(Mikolinnas et at 1981), the misranking phenomenon does not 
result from numerical inaccuracies but rather is inherent in the performance index itself. 
Therefore, even though the final value of PI can be very accurately calculated, 
rnisc1assification can still occur. 
Reference (Halpin 1982) shows the role of the weighting factors of PI's in the ranking 
of contingency selection algorithm. A method of calculating weighting factors using the 
concept of a security region has been presented for improving the effectiveness of the 
ranking process. This method can certainly eliminate the masking caused by 
contingencies resulting in a near, but within, operating limit condition, however the 
ranking produced by violations is still open to an interpretation that is system 
dependent. As mentioned above, this algorithm is not yet feasible in terms of speed. 
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3.2.6 Contingency Selection Based On Voltage-Reactive Generation Deviations 
It is widely recognised that voltage considerations need to be incorporated in the 
problem of contingency selection for an accurate evaluation of system security. An 
important result pointed out in Ref.(Albuyeh et al 1982) is that if the system is secure 
against overload problems it does not exempt the security analysis from voltage and 
reactive power disturbances. 
Reasonably efficient and reliable PI-ranking methods have been developed for ranking 
contingencies based on branch overloads, however the usefulness of these techniques is 
limited as contingencies that cause only voltage problems are overlooked. 
Several PI methods have been suggested and tested for detecting voltage problems, 
unfortunately they have been found less reliable in detecting voltage problems than in 
detecting branch flow problems. 
The voltage contingency analysis problem is a difficult task due to its highly non-linear 
nature and the absence of a reliable linear reactive power model has impeded attempts 
to develop satisfactory voltage PI-Ranking methods. Moreover most attempts to speed 
up the solution result in unsatisfactory levels of accuracy. 
3.2.6.1 Voltage Ranking Methods For Branch Outage 
Several attempts have been made to find a reliable contingency selection algorithm on 
the basis of voltage profile violations. The starting point for attempts at improving PI-
ranking methods sensitive to voltage problems is reported in Ref.(Ejebe et al 1979), 
unfortunately the method is found not reliable. 
As branch contingency algorithms efficiently used a DCLF-based formulation, an 
attempt to pursue a similar course of action for voltage contingency selection, i.e. a 
pure Q - V formulation, is mentioned in (Dabbaghchi et al 1986). The rankings obtained 
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however were unreliable with the conclusion that the decoupling principle of the real 
and reactive power related variables would not apply in this context. 
An approach is suggested in Ref(Albuyeh et al 1982) where the phase angles due to a 
branch outage are first updated before correcting the voltage magnitudes. This 
essentially implies one full iteration of the FDLF method (Stott et al 1974), starting 
from the base case solution. The method is sometimes referred as either lP-I Q method 
or linear load flow method. As an explicit simulation process the calculated variable 
(branch flows, bus voltage angle or bus voltage magnitude) can be substituted into a 
higher-order performance index mitigating false alarm effects. Besides, the PI's can be 
computed only over branches which are subjected to overloads or buses subjected to 
voltage and reactive violations or any other criterion. In short, the function PI does not 
need to be mathematically analytic. 
Ref(EPRI 1982-Appendix D) shows that one iteration of the FDLF provides enough 
information to reliably identify severe contingencies. By performing two iterations on a 
test-system no major improvement in accuracy was obtained. Stott in Ref(Stott 1974) 
also states that the FDLF method gives a very good approximate solution after the first 
one or two iterations. 
The discussion presented by Wollenberg in Ref(Albuyeh et a11982) points out that the 
reasons for going to this approach are mainly due to the lack of an accurate PI-Ranking 
method that includes voltage magnitude and reactive power flow violations. He 
believes that the method should produce better results than the other algorithms to 
predict the change in PI since each case is treated individually. 
Some researchers c1assity the lP-IQ method as a contingency screening method since 
it enjoys the flexibility found in the screening approaches. As we perceive it the lP-IQ 
is a PI-Ranking method for the reason that a PI formula is defined and as a result a 
ranking is obtained. 
Since bus voltage levels depend mainly on the reactive power production a composite 
voltage-reactive power performance index - PIvQ is defined in order to reflect the 
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reactive power capability constraints of the generators in the contingency selection for 
voltage analysis. A voltage performance index Plv would provide a good measure of 
the severity of abnormal voltages as long as the generating units remained within their 
reactive power limits. After a contingency, the excitation on the generators 
automatically changes to maintain the voltage profile of the system. The generator units 
in turn have a restricted production capability and it is possible to find some 
contingency cases in which some generator reactive powers are driven to their limits. 
In such cases the bus voltage at these generator buses deviate from their scheduled 
values. The resulting change in Plv due to these deviations may not be large enough to 
reflect the seriousness associated with reaching reactive power limits. It is therefore 
desirable that the performance index explicitly recognise reactive power limits and for 
this reason aPlvQ is given by Eq.3.85 
where 
( 3.85) 
is the voltage weighting factor, set to 1 
is the reactive power weighting factor, set to 1 
is the post-outage voltage magnitude at bus k 
is the voltage magnitude limit at bus k defined as V lim=(vkM +Vk') 12 
with V tM and V t standing for upper and lower limits on the voltage 
magnitude at bus k respectively 
Qt is the reactive power injection at bus k 
Qlim is the reactive power limit at bus k defined as Qlim = (Qr + Qr) 12 with Q:' 
and Q; standing for upper and lower limits on the injected reactive power 
into bus k, respectively 
A is the set ofbuses at which the voltage magnitude is either below a specified 
minimum, V tm, or above a specified maximum, V t 
r is the set of PV buses at which reactive power is either below a specified 
minimum, Q; or above a specified maximum, Q:' 
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To corroborate the usefulness of a composite PlvQ formula Chen and Bose (Chen et al 
1989) tested two separate PI 's for voltage and Q limit and they concluded that many 
cases ranked on top of the Q limit rank list did not result in any voltage problem, yet 
some cases with small Q limit violation did cause voltage problem when the Q limit 
restriction was applied. 
In the lP-IQ method the incremental voltage change caused by the outage of branch A. 
between the two terminal buses p and q (p<q) is expressed as 
with 
where 
Ab' 
Ab" 
( 3.86) 
( 3.87) 
( 3.88) 
( 3.89) 
is the fast decoupled nodal matrix for the P - (J model 
is the fast decoupled nodal matrix for the Q - V model 
is the post contingency voltage angle change 
is the post contingency voltage magnitude change 
are the real and reactive power mismatch given by the ACLF formulation 
is the change in susceptance of the P - (J model at branch A. 
is the change of susceptance of the Q - V model at branch A. 
is a (nPQ xl) sparse column vector with two nonzero entries of value +1 
and -1 corresponding to buses p and q, respectively. 
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I 
i 
" , 
rN 
N No Q Limiting With Q Limiting 
Consideration Consideration 
5 0.8 0.8 
6 1.0 0.83 
7 1.0 0.71 
8 1.0 0.87 
9 1.0 0.89 
10 1.0 0.9 
11 1.0 0.81 
12 1.0 0.83 
13 0.92 0.85 
14 0.93 0.86 
15 0.87 0.93 
16 0.94 0.94 
17 0.94 0.94 
18 0.89 0.94 
19 0.95 0.95 
20 0.95 0.95 
Tab.3.8 Capture Rates For The lP-IQ Method 
In the proposed technique t.Q is calculated after!!. is updated by the result of Eq.3.86 
using the first-half P - e iteration. The post voltage magnitude is calculated using the 
first-half Q-Viteration and then it is substituted into Eq.3.85. 
The capture rates for the lP-IQ method are compiled in Tab.3.8. The full FDLF is 
taken as the basis for comparison and the capture rates are shown when checked 
against load flow results generated with Q-Iimiting and without Q-limiting 
considerations. 
Most practical load flow programs contain adjustment facilities such as voltage controls 
to simulate features of real-life power systems. These features are important, however 
they nearly always increase the number of iterations for a solution compared with no 
adjustments. Because the lP-IQ method deals with the results of the first iteration, 
when the PI using this first iteration is compared with the PI obtained from a load flow 
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using adjustments the ranking provided by the lP-IQ method tend to be more 
questionable. 
Ranking PIMW PIVQ 
Position Outage Case Outage Case 
I I 15 
2 2 16 
3 6 3 
4 19 19 
5 18 13 
6 5 8 
7 22 I 
8 13 25 
9 17 6 
10 20 2 
Tab.3.9 Contingency Cases Ranked With The lP-IQ Method 
An important conclusion raised by the authors in (AJbuyeh et a1 1982) is the no-
correlation between the contingencies that causes overload and those which cause 
voltage problems. As stated by the authors "a ranking method sensitive to one is almost 
certain to miss contingencies that may be severe". This deduction is drawn from 
Tab.3.9 which shows rankings based on real power performance index and rankings 
based on the voltage-reactive power performance index with the lP-I Q method. 
Note that outage case 2 appears in a high position on one list and low on the other and 
outage case 15 appears at the top of one list and does not even appear on the other list. 
When the contingencies are evaluated cases analysed from one list have to be 
eliminated in the other to avoid repetion. 
The lP-IQ contingency selection method is of very easy implementation and great 
simplicity, it is one of the most widely used algorithms in the industry today. Some 
advantages of the method can be summarised as follows: 
(1) the method can accomplishes both ranking for overload and ranking for voltage 
problems 
(2) the PI formulas (PI MW and PI VIJ ) do not need to be analytical 
(3) the branches and buses whose constraints are violated can be pinpointed 
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(4) the method can incorporate some voltage controls that others cannot 
(5) the user can control accuracy at the expenses of running time by varying the 
number of iterations. 
The use of a non-iterative approach nevertheless represents a danger of missing 
deviations which are not apparent after only a single iteration and this can result in 
failure to identifY contingencies that actually cause voltage problems. In on-line 
applications the method is time consuming for large systems. 
Another ranking algorithm for voltage security monitoring, the VSEL method, was 
proposed by I.Dabbaghchi and G.Irisarri (Dabbaghchi et al 1986). The severity of bus 
voltage violations for a branch contingency is measured at the system load buses with 
no provision for handling generator MVAr limits and as such a PII' formula has been 
defined as 
'", 1 (V. _ v.SP )2 
PI" = L -OJvk k u! 
k=12 M';, 
( 3.90) 
where 
nPQ is the number ofPQ or load buses in the system 
Wv k is the weighting factor, set to I 
Vk is the post-outage voltage magnitude at bus k 
V S P is the rated voltage magnitude at bus k or is otherwise specified k 
IlVlim is the maximum amount of voltage deviation that can be tolerated at bus k 
k, Ilvlim=(vf -vt) 12 
The PI v in Eq.3 .90 can be rewritten in a vector form 
where 
PIv =~([Dolr -[DolrsPn[Dolr -[DolrsP) 
=~k[Dl]r -2rt [D1]rSP + (rSpnDl]t:SP } 
86 
( 3.91) 
( 3.92) 
and 
( 3.93) 
The reactive power mismatch at the load bus k is expressed as 
k e{PQ} ( 3.94) 
where Ok is the set of buses connected to bus k and {PQ} represents the set ofPQ or 
load buses in the system. 
A linearized reactive power mismatch model is developed and the resulting equation is 
substituted in theMV Ar-V coupling of the FDLF method in order to compute the post-
outage voltage magnitude. 
The Iinearization of (IlQk I Vk) assumes the following approximations 
i sin Ok! = Ok - Ot ( 3.9S.a) 
and 
COSOk/ = l-~(Ok -O/)(Ok -0/) ( 3.9S.b) 
= l-uk/(Ok -8/) 
where 
1 
Utt = "2(Ok - 8,) ( 3.9S.c) 
Substituting these approximations into Eq.3.94 yields 
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( 3.96) 
Eq.3.96 can be written in a closed fonn matrix notation as follows 
( 3.97) 
where 
Ko is a nonsparse vector computed for the set of npQ buses 
[Kd is a [npQ x (nb-I)] sparse matrix. 
The vector Ko and the matrix [K,] are generated for a system topologically equivalent 
to the current base case system, referred to as the "Reference Case". The elements of 
Ko and [Kd are defined as 
. (3.9S.a) 
and 
( 3.9S.b) 
( 3.9S.c) 
and 
( 3.9S.d) 
with superscript "R" referring to the reference system. 
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The coefficients Ko k and Kt (k,l) are system parameter and operating state dependent 
and when a permanent change in the network takes place or when the load condition 
has changed significantly (for instance, after an Economic Dispatch calculation) vector 
Ko and matrix [K,] need to be re-evaluated. 
If there is no topology change the validation of the reference case is tested by a norm 
threshold which evaluates how far the real-time state has deviated from the state for 
which Ko and [K,] were computed. The norm threshold is defined as 
( 3.99) 
with vectors ! R and ~ corresponding to the bus phase-angle for the reference case 
and the current state, respectively. The tolerance value, r, is system dependent 
determined experimentally but no basis for its choice is mentioned by the authors. If the 
norm value reaches the tolerance value a new reference case is required. The 
justification given for using the bus angle in the validation test is that the bus angles 
closely track the daily load curve and a norm value equal to or greater than r means 
that the load conditions have changed sufficiently to require a new set up. The 
validation test should be performed on an hourly basis or at the beginning of each 
contingency assessment cycle. 
When a branch contingency case occurs the reactive power mismatch is re-evaluated 
due to changes in bus angle and the loss of branch charging caused by the contingency, 
i.e. 
( 3.100) 
where superscript "A" represents the state when a switching operation takes place 
yielding in the outage of branch A which is between buses p and q. Based on the 
IMML, vector Ko and matrix [Kt] are compensated to reflect the change in the 
network, thus Eq.3.97 becomes 
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( 3.101) 
with 
( 3.102.a) 
( 3.102.b) 
( 3.102.c) 
where 
gA is the series conductance of branch A. 
hA is the series susceptance of branch A. 
v: ,V.R are the voltage magnitude at buses p and q in the reference system 
b"""b.". are the shunt susceptances of branch A. at the p and q side, respectively 
m" is a (npQxI) sparse column vector with +1 and -I at busp and q 
!A."'!A2 are (npQxI) sparse column vectors with one nonzero entry of value +1 
corresponding to buses p and q, respectively 
AA is a (npQxI) sparse column vector of at most two nonzero entries 
corresponding to buses p and q with values _V.R(gA +(TAb~) and 
The post-outage phase-angle vector ~). in Eq.3.IOI is evaluated by applying IMML to 
the DCLF equations or to the P - B coupling of the FDLF equations, i. e. 
( 3.103) 
which is included into Eq.3.101. 
The MV Ar-V coupling in the FDLF method is given by 
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( 3.104) 
and when branch A is outaged the vector .1.[ changes to 
( 3.105) 
with ~V A defined in Eq.3.89. 
The post-outage voltage change vector .1.[' is approximated to by one iteration of the 
FDLF method with the Iinearized model for .1.Q IV given by Eq.3.101 incorporated 
into Eq.3.105. The post-outage voltage magnitude then would be 
( 3.106) 
.1.[' = [B·rKo +bt[B·rmv + X'I[B·r~ll +X12[B'r~'2 +[B·r[KI~·-
179.e:,,[B .. nKIIBr11tt + [B·r A.!1!~~o -17910;,,[B·r A.~[Brm.­
n" • [B .. r!1!vm:,[B .. r Ko -17v .Bt[B·r!1!vm:,[B·r!1!v-
17v ,X'I[B"r!1!vm~[B'r~1 -n" ,X'2[B"r!1!vm:,[B'r~'2-
17v • [B·r !1!vm:,[B"nKI~ + 17v ,179.e:, • [B·r mvm:,[B"nKI][Br m. -
17v ,[8·r mvm:,[B"r A.!1!~~ + 17v .t17o .e:, • [B·r mvm~[B'r A.m~[Br m. 
( 3.107) 
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K~[B" nD,IB" r!!!v 
K~[B" nD,IB" r ~,t, 
K'[B"]-'[D lB,,]-'e 
__ 0 IlL _~2 
K~[B"nD,IB"nK,IBr1!!,t 
K~[B"nD,IB"rA,t 
m:,[B'J' [D,IB" t!!!v 
1tb[B" nD,IB" r ~,t, 
1tb[B'J' [D,][B" r~,t2 
1tb[B'T'[D,IB" f'[K,IBJ'm,t 
1tb[B" nD,KB·l' A,t 
~qB" nD,IB" r ~,t, 
~qB" nD, IB·l' ~<2 
~~,[B" r'[D,IB" r'[K,IB' r 1!!)' 
~~,[B" nD,IB·r A,t 
~~2[B"nD,IB"rf!)'2 
f!qB"nD,IB"nK,IBr m,t 
et [B"]-'[D. IB"]-' A 
-),2 , _,t 
~[B"nK,IB"nD,J[B"nK,J[Brm), 
m~[B"nK,l[B"nD,]4,t[B"r 
.it[B·J'[D,IB·J' .it 
1tb [B" r !!!v 
t [ ]-' !!!v B" ~,t, 
I [ ]-' !!!v B" ~)'2 
1tb[B·l' [K,][ Br 1!!.t 
1tb[B·J'.it 
m'[B,,]-'m = -< 
Tab.3.9 Off-Line Scalars 
When Eq.3.l06 and 3.107 are substituted into Ply (Eq.3.91) a number of scalar 
quantities result which can be computed off-line and stored, these scalars are compiled 
in Tab.3.9. 
Considering that the above scalar quantities correspond to the condition under branch 
A outaged and since there are nb, branches in the monitored system, twenty-eight 
vectors of size (n.,xl) are required for storage. They need to be re-evaluated upon the 
introduction of a new reference case or a permanent network change or on operator 
request. 
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rN 
N VSELMethod IP - IQ Method 
I 1.00 1.00 
5 0.80 1.00 
6 0.83 0.83 
7 0.71 0.86 
8 0.75 0.87 
9 0.78 0.98 
10 0.70 1.00 
11 0.82 0.91 
12 0.92 0.92 
13 0.85 0.92 
14 0.93 0.93 
IS 0.93 0.93 
16 0.87 1.00 
17 0.93 1.00 
18 0.83 1.00 
19 0.84 0.95 
20 0.85 0.95 
25 0.92 1.00 
30 0.87 1.00 
Tab.3.11 Capture Rates For VSELAnd lP-IQ Methods 
The effectiveness of the VSEL method was tested on the AEP EHV system, the real-
time base case used consisted of 91 branches and 81 buses including 20 generation 
buses. The ranking from an explicit full ACLF solution was obtained to give the base of 
comparison for the VSEL method accuracy. The performance index for IP - IQ 
method was also computed and the capture ratios for both methods are listed in 
Tab.3.11 according to the AC solution ranking. Figs.3.7 and 3.8 also show the 
effectiveness profile for VSEL and IP - IQ method, respectively. For this test 
condition the results for both methods are almost identical with no improvement in 
accuracy experienced by the VSEL method. However the proposed method is 
dependent on many approximating assumptions and it is not clear if the capture ratios 
stand for different. network configurations and loading scenarios, particularly heavy 
load condition when the non-linearity tend to be more critical. 
Although the VSEL method is claimed to be much faster than the IP - IQ method its 
computational speed is achieved at the cost of a great amount of off-line set up 
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computation. 
Using a different model for the reactive power mismatch and employing the sparse 
vector technique Y.Chen and A.Bose (Chen et al i989) improve the VSEL method, 
described above, by eliminating the off-line computation step without loss of ranking 
accuracy, the method will be referred as the Modified VSEL method. The increase in 
computational speed is mainly achieved by building a 4x4 block matrix which makes the 
computation of PI v very fast. 
The Plv formula is similar to that defined in Eq.3.90 except that all bus voltages in the 
system are monitored, i.e. high and low voltage limits are assigned for all the buses. For 
a contingency of branch A., between buses p and q (p<q), the Plv is then expressed in 
terms of post-outage voltage changes from base case voltages: 
n'-l(~' +AV~ _V SP ) Plv = L k k k 
k=l dz k 
( 3.108) 
and in matrix format 
Plv = (dE:,1, + XnD2](dE:A +x) 
=Plv + 2 (dE:,1,)t[D2] X + (dE:A)[D2]dE:A 
( 3.109) 
with 
( 3.110) 
( 3.111) 
where 
PI. is the PI value for the base case condition 
A[~ is the (nb-i) post-outage voltage change vector 
X is an (nb-I) vector as per Eq.3.lIO 
[Dz] is an [(nb -i) x (nb -1)] diagonal matrix whose element dk is 
dz (k) = AV:"" I ~21 (i)n 
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The linearized MV Ar-V model for branch A. outaged is defined as follows: 
( 3.112) 
where 
(AQIV)" isa (nb-I) column vector as per Eq.3.112 
mQ is a (nb -1) sparse column vector with only two nonzero entries -Q: 
and +Q: at bus location p and q. Q; refers to the base case reactive 
power flow at branch A-
[K] is a [(nb -1) x (nb -1)] matrix with the same sparsity structure of nodal 
admittance matrix and whose elements are: 
K{k,l} ;-r't( Gkl cosoki + Bkl senBki), I *k 
K{k,I};- L;K{k,I}, I *k 
lenk 
K is a (nb -1) sparse column vector of at most two nonzero entries 
corresponding to buses p and q with values k(p,q) and k(q,p) 
m ~ is a (nb -1) sparse column vector with + 1 and -1 at bus p and q 
A~ is a (nb-I) post-outage voltage angle change vector 
The reactive model includes all buses in the system (except the slack bus) but for the 
PV buses the corresponding rows in matrix [K] and locations in vector K and mQ (if 
any of the terminal buses of A. occurs to be PV) should be zeroed. 
The vector Afl has been defined in Eq.3.86 and it is rewritten below 
(3.113) 
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with Pb~ A standing for the base case real power flow in branch A.. 
Eqs.3.112 and 3.113 are substituted into Eq.3.86 yielding the approximated post-
outage voltage change given by 
( 3.114) 
with 
( 3. 115. a) 
( 3.llS.b) 
( 3.llS.c) 
t [ I-I XAA =!1J.1 B' mA ( 3.llS.d) 
t [ I-I Wo =m1 B' mQ ( 3.115.e) 
( 3.115.1) 
( 3.115.g) 
Matrix [B"] a (nPQ x nPQ) matrix, is assembled as a [(nb -1) x (n. -1)] matrix to 
conserve the same order of matrix [B'] for sake of computational programming 
simplicity, with a large diagonal element set at the corresponding PV buses. Vector 
nv )' in this case should conform to the dimension of its multipliers. 
Substituting Eq.3.114 into 3.109 yields 
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MIV = 4[D21x)t([B"r1 El +[ B'fl [Kl[Br1E2 )+ KHB,r1[D2l[B,rlKJ + 
V2([B,r1 [Kl[B,rJJ [D21([B'r~[Kl[ Br1}2 + 
2KH B,rl [ D2J[ B" r [Kl[ B' (E2 
( 3.116) 
Eq.3 .116 can be simplified by defining two vectors which are dependent on the base 
case data 
. and also the following matrices 
~. = [B·'t([D2JX) 
[ZI] = [B·t 
[Z,]=[B'r' 
[Z3J = [B·f'[KJ[B·t 
[Z.J = [B·r'[DJ[B·T' 
[Z5] = ([Bnr [KJ[BT')'[D2J{[Bn t[KJ[B' r') 
[Z.J = [Bnr' [D2 ][B'r'[KJ[Bf' 
then the final PIv formula can be expressed as: 
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( 3.117) 
( 3.lIS) 
( 3.l19.a) 
( 3.1I9.b) 
( 3.119.c) 
( 3.119.d) 
( 3.119.e) 
( 3.119.f) 
Vectors V, and [2 are the only variables in Eq.3.200 which change for different 
branch outage cases. Vectors !!.. and !!.i, and matrices [Z,] to [Z.1 are determined by 
the base case network topology and operating state, they need to be computed only 
once for each base case condition. The vector X and ft.. and ft... are recalculated each 
time the algorithm is executed and the computation requirement is basically 2 FIB 
substitutions. However in the absence of any permanent network topology change 
between runs a saving in computation time can be achieved by computing and storing 
matrices [Z,1-[Z.] Under such condition the change in the system operating state will 
determine the need for updating matrices [Z3]' [Zs] and [Z.] which are the only 
matrices dependent on the base case operating state. Following the same procedure 
implemented by the VSEL method's authors Chen and Bose define an index to indicate 
how much the present operating state has been driven from the previous condition as a 
consequence of load variation. Provided there is no network topology change matrix 
[K] is used as the sensor to reflect the shift in the operating point, so the index is 
defined as: 
M. 
k 
( 3.201) 
which is calculated at the beginning of each contingency assessment cycle. If the 
computed index reaches the r value matrices [Z3]'[ZS] and [Z.] are updated to reflect 
the new base case operating state. 
The value of r is system dependent and is pre-determined by experiments. For the 
system to be assessed a graph can be plotted relating the relative change in [K] matrix 
(Eq.3.201) and the maximum relative error in estimated post-outage voltage changes 
(Eq.3.114) caused by [K] matrix change versus the relative load increase. A value for r 
can be determined from such a figure. 
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The nonsparse matrices [Zd -[Z6] can be efficiently computed by assembling a 
4( nb - 1 )x4( nb - 1) block matrix, [G" ] with the same symbolic sparsity structure 
indices for all inner blocks. Matrix [G"] is defined as: 
B' _Kt 0 0 
[G"] = 0 B" -D2 0 ( 3.202) 
0 0 B" -K 
0 0 0 B' 
and its inverse is 
B·-1 (B,,-l KB·-1 )' (B·.-1 D2B,,-1 KB.-1) t (B,,-l KB·-1 )' D2 (B,,-l KB·-1 ) 
[G'T' = 0 B,,-l B,,-ID B,,-l B,,-l D B,,-l KB·-1 2 2 
0 0 B,,-l B,,-IKB·-1 
0 0 0 B·-1 
which is equivalent to 
Zl zt 3 zt 6 Zs 
[G'T' = 0 Z2 Z. Z6 ( 3.203) 0 0 Zl Z3 
0 0 0 Zl 
In order to obtain [G" r first the LDU factors of [G"] are computed in one 
procedure, then the individual sparse inverse matrices are calculated. The factors of 
[G"] contain the factors of all and only the matrices needed for M/v computation. 
The calculation of the inverse matrices is done efficiently by using only fast-forward 
and fast-backward substitutions. 
Owing to the structure of [G"] with the lower left-hand part zeroed and the diagonal 
elements given by [B'] and [B"] the computational effort found to factorize [G"] is 
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equivalent to about eight times the computation required for the factorisation of the 
scalar case (i.e. for matrix [B'] for instance), this means approximately 24 FIB 
substitutions if the factors of [B'] and [B"] are given. 
The storage allocation required for the sparse inverses [Z\]-[Z.] is nine arrays of 
dimension (nb -1) since matrices [Z3],[Z,] and [Z.] are non-symmetric in value and 
therefore need two vectors for each of them. 
In contrast to the VSEL method the set up procedure for this method is very much 
faster and it can be done on-line so an improvement in computational efficiency is 
achieved. It does not have to be repeated each cycle as long as there is no permanent 
network topology change or significant load variation. 
rN 
N Modified VSEL VSEL lP-IQ 
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 
7 1.00 0.86 1.00 
8 0.87 0.87 0.87 
9 0.89 0.78 1.00 
10 0.90 0.80 1.00 
11 0.91 0.91 0.91 
12 0.92 0.92 1.00 
13 0.85 0.92 1.00 
14 0.93 0.93 1.00 
15 0.93 0.93 1.00 
16 0.94 1.00 1.00 
17 0.94 0.94 1.00 
18 0.94 1.00 1.00 
19 0.89 0.95 1.00 
20 0.95 0.95 1.00 
25 0.96 0.96 0.93 
30 0.93 0.97 1.00 
Tab.3.12 Capture Rates Comparison For The Modified VSEL Method, 
The VSEL Method And The JP - 1 Q Method 
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Test results conducted on the ffiEE 118 bus test system for the IP -IQ method, the 
VSEL method and the improved VSEL method show that the capture ratios for all 
three when compared against the true AC ranking are very close. Tab.3.12 shows the 
capture rates and Figs.3.9-3.11 depict the effectiveness profile for the three methods. 
For the system tested the Modified VSEL method proved to be about four times faster 
than the IP - IQ method. The difference in accuracy between the IP - IQ method and 
the Modified VSEL and the VSEL method is a consequence of the approximate MV Ar 
model used in the last two methods. 
3.2.7 Generator Outage Ranking Methods Based On Branch Overload 
The effect of generator outages can be calculated on two bases. In one the utility has to 
prespecify whether it wants to monitor post-contingency "steady-state" conditions 
immediately after the outage when all generators in the electrically connected system 
contribute to the restoration of the lost power approximately in proportion to their 
inertia. The other basis represents a somewhat slower effect after the automatic 
controls (governor, Automatic Generation Control-AGe, economic dispatch) have 
responded. Depending on the decision, different participation factors are used to 
allocate the lost MW generation among the remaining units. The same applies to load 
outages, and network islanding involving reallocation of generation to restore the 
power balance. 
Formulas for generator or load contingency selection are not available as widely as for 
branch contingencies. In Ref.(Ejebe et al 1979, EPRI 1982) the gradient technique is 
used for ranking of generator outages according to the severity of branch overloads. 
The incremental change in PIMW for each generator outaged is computed using the 
A. - th component of vector ~t. defined below to account for the composite effects of 
the incremental changes in generation. The change in PIMW as power injection at bus 
A., P~ changes can be estimated from. 
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I 
and 
where 
BPI MIMW = -M~ 
BP~ 
flA = [B,r pA 
M~ is the A - th element of vector "'- P 
( 3.204) 
( 3.205) 
( 3.206) 
( 3.207) 
",-p is a (nb x I) column vector whose elements represent the response of the 
non-outaged generators, in accordance with a set of participation factors 
(whether based on system inertial response, governor slopes, AGe factor, 
generator spare capacity, incremental costs, etc.) 
81 is the A-th elementofan[(nb-I)xI] vector flA as per Eq.3.206 
pA is an [(nb -I)xI] vector built by adding for each branch i an injection of 
+ It~ I on the "from" bus and - p.~, on the "to" bus of branch i where 
bPJ]p-l P,'" _ 0), , u, 
b"-(lim)P Ph,' 
The Gradient Ranking method requires a DCLF solution to obtain the voltage angle 
displacement across branch i and an additional DCLF solution to evaluate vector flA In 
addition, the method does not restrict the exponent p to be equal to 2. 
Under the condition of a complete outage of a generating plant and a generation 
redistribution rule based on the allocation of the lost generation among the remaining 
generators in proportion to their normalised inertia the Gradient method was tested on 
a IO-bus CIGRE test system. The ranking is shown in Tab.3.l3 taken from Ref.(Ejebe 
et a11979) and the effectiveness profile shown in Fig.3.12. 
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DCLF Contingency Ranking 
Ordered Generator Index Ordered Generator 
Numbers PIMW Numbers 
3 1.6932 3 
7 0.7987 4 
4 0.6589 6 
6 0.6157 7 
5 0.4818 5 
1 0.3188 1 
2 0.1935 2 
. Tab.3.13 Comparative Ranking Based On The DCLF 
Solution And On The Gradient Method 
MIMW 
0.4699 
0.1683 
0.1442 
0.1418 
0.0386 
-0.3328 
-0.9597 
In Ref.(Vemuri et a11983) aPIMW formula has been defined to account forthe effect of 
generation outage and of single branch outage or vice versa. All a matter of fact the 
computational effort to include injection changes in the ACS proposed algorithm is 
equivalent to solving the network explicitly for each unit outaged, i.e. 1 FIB solution 
per unit outaged to compute the bus angle changes, rather than using a PI-Ranking 
algorithm. 
B.Stott, O.A1sac and F.L.A1varado (Stott et al 1985) derived a formula for an exact 
MI MW calculation for generator outages. The formula is 
with 
c=(/"p 
- -I 
Ij =U' PI 
U = [TJEf 
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where 
c is a scalar as per Eq.3.209.a which must be recalculated for each new base 
case system operating state 
8~ is the j - th element of vector ~A defined in Eq.3.71 
P I is an (nIX 1) column vector whose elements are the generator participation 
factors for the base case condition. The factors are nonzero only for the 
participating generator buses and their summation are unity. Generators 
operating on limits in the base case can be assigned as nonparticipating to 
guarantee that their MW limits are not violated following the contingency 
o' is a scalar as per Eq.3.209.b 
p 
o p is the amount of generation outaged at bus j (.5 p = p) 
o PI is the reduction in the participation factor of bus i (0 pI = s) 
r1 is a scalar as per Eq.3.209.c which must be recalculated for network topology 
changes 
Ut is the i - th element of U, an (nbx1) vector as per Eq.3.209.d which also 
must be recalculated for network topology changes 
Tu is the (i,i)th element ofthe sparse inverse matrix [T] defined in Eq.3.75. 
The most computational demanding variables to be evaluated in tlPI MW formula are 
the elements U, and T.,. The efficient scheme presented by Stott et al for calculating 
all the required network matrix factors and sparse inverses as for branch contingency 
ranking, described in section 3.2.4.2 and whose derived performance index formula is 
given by Eq.3.70, is extensive for unit contingency ranking. Recall that a (2x2) block 
matrix [G'] is assembled, then factorized followed by the evaluation of the sparse 
inverse matrix of [G']' The factors of [G'] contain the factors of[T] which are used 
to compute vector U (Eq.3.209.d) and the sparse inverse of [G'] contains the sparse 
inverse [T] whose element T., is required in tlPI MW' 
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The computational requirement for ranking generator contingencies is approximately of 
the same order as its counterpart for branch contingencies with an additional repeat 
solution to compute vector u. 
The calculation of M'I MW in Eq.3.208 is exact and as such the resulting ranking agrees 
with that given by the explicit calculation of the branch flows in the contingencies cases 
computed by a linear method and substituted in the base case API MW formula. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
The need for non-deterministic evaluation of system security has been recognised since 
at least the 1970's resulting in the development of the Automatic Contingency Selection 
(ACS) algorithms. The purpose of the ACS algorithm is to determine whether a 
contingency has an impact on power system security (such as constraint violation in 
post contingency operation), or not, in a computationally efficient manner. This 
strategy aims at eliminating the dependency on human judgement in the selection of 
contingencies that can contribute to the risk of the system security and also at speeding 
up the selection process enabling it to be carried out in a real-time environment. It 
constitutes an adaptive contingency processor since the number of cases selected for 
further analysis will vary depending upon system conditions. 
The ACS methods were divided into two groups: the fast screening methods and the 
ranking methods. In the fast screening methods the selection is accomplished by taking 
the set of contingencies through "filters" which consist of either a sequence of 
approximate network solutions progressively more complex (tighter filters) applied to 
the entire system or a pocket area of the total network within which a procedure for 
identification of security limit violations is applied assuming that the adverse 
contingency effects are confined to the subnetwork area. 
The contingency filter is the distinguishing element between the fast screening methods 
and the deterministic approaches, this results in the first being a faster way for selecting 
contingencies. 
111 
- -- ----------------------------------------
In the search for a fast and accurate method for real-time security assessment of power 
systems, fast screening methods have emerged as a promising alternative for 
contingency selection. 
Some relevant aspects of the approach can be summarised, as follows: 
(1) for each contingency case the methods adaptatively determine a subnetwork within 
which the adverse contingency effects are expected to propagate; 
(2) the search for component violations is restricted to the selected subnetwork, as a 
consequence savings in computer time is achieved; 
(3) the nature of a contingency is a direct result of the screening process; 
(4) the critical contingencies as well as the violated elements are identified. 
The ranking methods are different procedures to select contingencies. A system-wide 
scalar performance index based criterion is the distinguishing element between the fast 
screening methods and the ranking methods. The PI-Ranking methods are considered 
fast and give a good performance in terms of accuracy and computational efficiency 
especially in the case of those based on branch overloads. 
A characteristic of the PI Based Ranking methods is the measurement ofthe severity of 
contingencies relative to each other without actually calculating the post-contingency 
flows or voltages. As a consequence a stopping criterion needs to be defined to break 
the list of ranked contingencies into critical and noncritical contingencies. 
Various different stopping criteria have been discussed in this chapter. However, 
because of the misclassifications contained in the ranked list, it is not recommended to 
specity an absolute stopping point or threshold, instead the contingency analysis needs 
to be initiated from the top of the list until no limit violations are found on M 
consecutive outage cases. This criterion is based in the user's experience gained in using 
the selection algorithm on his system to set the number M of no-violation cases. 
Many improvements are still required to be made to the ranking approach, for instance 
a final ranked list free of misclassifications and the ability to deal efficiently with 
structural topology changes, simultaneous contingencies, secondary contingencies and 
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unit outage contingencies is needed. The non-linearity in the voltage-reactive network 
model and the representation of voltage-MVAr controls are the other factors to be 
overcome in order to develop a fast and accurate voltage-reactive contingency ranking 
algorithm. Improvements in accuracy and in the ability to model any number and type 
of contingencies would be welcomed as long as speed is not sacrificed. 
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Chapter Four 
BASIC ASPECTS OF PARALLEL PROCESSING 
4. INTRODUCTION 
The main driving force for the development of parallel computing systems has been 
scientific computing. Parallel computation is currently an area of intense research 
activity, motivated by a variety of factors. There has always been a need for the 
solution of very large computational problems. The availability of powerful parallel 
computers is generating interest in new types of problems that were not addressed in 
the past or problems whose solution is very much time consuming for real time 
applications. 
Recently, there has been increased interest in the real time security analysis of large and 
interconnected power systems using parallel processing. Contingency assessment 
demands a great deal of computing time and to be of any value for the system security 
it has to make use of modern computing hardware and efficient softwares. The main 
concerns are cost and speed, the hardware should not be prohibitively expensive, and 
the computation should terminate within an amount of time that is acceptable for the 
particular application. 
Work on parallel computation spans several broad areas, in particular parallel 
algorithm development and its application. The design of parallel algorithms here 
pursued is to parallelize a serial numerical algorithm, after modifications, concerned 
with the algorithm's potential for substantial speedup over its serial counterpart. 
In the sequel, it is presented an overview on parallel machines, their characteristics and 
classification, processor organisation, communication system and measures of 
parallelism. 
114 
4.1 PARALLEL COMPUTING SYSTEMS AND THEm CLASSIFICATION 
There are several issues related to parallelization that do not arise in a serial context. 
Roughly speaking, parallel computing systems consist of several processors that are 
located within a small distance of each other. Their main purpose is to execute jointly a 
computational task; communication between processors is reliable and predictable. The 
ultimate goal is to reduce the overall running time. The improvement of an individual 
processor performance has become increasingly difficult, since the speed of electronic 
circuits is limited by the speed of light. . The idea is therefore to have numerous 
processors working concurrently to solve a single problem. 
Traditional serial computers are characterised by the presence of a single locus of 
control that determines the next instruction to be executed. The data to be operated 
upon, during the execution of each instruction, are fetched from a global memory, one 
at time. Thus, only one instruction is executed at a time, while the speed of memory 
access and the speed of input-output devices can slow down the computation. The 
hardware of modem computers acts in a much more complex manner than indicated by 
this model. Thus, instructions can be pipelined, the CPU s can perform in parallel, or in 
vector mode, there can be cache memory, and so forth. 
The basic idea of a parallel computer is that a number of processors work in co-
operation on a single task. The motivation is that if it takes one processor an amount of 
time t to do a task, then p processors can do the task in time tip. Only for very special 
situations can this perfect "speedup" be achieved, however the goal is to devise 
algorithms that can take as much advantage as possible, for a given problem, of 
multiple processors. 
There are several parameters that can be used to describe or classifY a parallel computer 
(Bertsekas,D.P. et al 1989), as follows: 
(a) Type and number of processors: There are parallel computing systems with 
thousands of processors. Such systems are called massively parallel. A diametrically 
opposite option is coarse-grained parallelism, in which there is a small number of 
processors, say of the order of 10. 
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(b) Presence or absence of a global control mechanism: Parallel computers almost 
always have some centra1locus of control. There are two extremes, at one end the 
global control mechanism is only used to load a program and the data to the 
processors, and each processor is allowed to work on its own thereafter. At the 
other extreme, the control mechanism is used to instruct each processor what to do 
at each step. Intermediate situations are also conceivable. A related classification 
along these lines distinguishes between SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) 
and MIMD (Multiple Instruction Multiple Data) parallel computers. In a SIMD 
system all processors are under the control of a master processor and the individual 
processors all do the same instruction (or nothing) at a given time. MIMD system 
refers to the ability of different processors to execute different instructions at any 
given point in time. Traditional sequential computers fall into the SISD category 
(Single Instruction Single Data). 
(c) Synchronous vs. asynchronous operation: The distinction refers to the presence or 
absence of a common global clock used to synchronise the operation of the 
different processors. In a SIMD system, synchronisation of the individual 
processors is carried out by the master controller, but in a MIMD system other 
mechanisms must be used to ensure that the processors are doing their task in the 
correct order with the correct data. 
(d) Processor interconnections: A significant aspect of parallel computers is the 
mechanism by which processors exchange information. There are two extreme 
alternatives known as shared memory and message-passing architectures, and a 
variety of hybrid designs lying in between. The first alternative uses a global shared 
memory that can be accessed by all processors. Each processor can also have its 
own local memory for program code and intermediate results. The shared memory 
would then be used for data and results that are needed by more than one 
processor. All communication between individual processors is through the 
common memory. A major advantage of a shared memory system is potentially very 
rapid communication of data between processors. A serious disadvantage is that 
different processors may wish to use the common memory simultaneously, in which 
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case there will be a delay until the memory is free. This delay, caned contention 
time, can increase as the number of processors increases. A common approach for 
handling memory accesses is based on switching systems, the complexity of such 
switching systems has to increase with the number of processors. In the second 
major approach, there is no shared memory, but rather each processor has its own 
local memory. Communication between processors takes place by message passing, 
in which data or other information are transferred between processors. 
4.1.1 Interconnection Schemes 
Probably the most important and interesting aspect of parallel computers is how the 
individual processors communicate with one another. This is particularly important for 
systems in which the processors have only local memory, but it is also important for 
shared memory systems since the connection to the shared memory can be implemented 
by different communication schemes. The more common interconnection schemes are: 
completely connected, crossbar switch, bus and ring, ring network, mesh connection, 
hypercube, switching networks, hybrid schemes, clusters, and reconfigurable schemes. 
Each connection scheme has certain advantages and disadvantages as far as 
communication reliability and efficiency, and cost are concern. 
4.1.2 Communication Aspects Of Parallel Systems 
In many parallel algorithms and systems the time spent for interprocessor 
communication is a sizeable fraction of the total time needed to solve a problem. In this 
case it is said that the algorithm experiences substantial communication penalty or 
communication delays. 
Communication delays can be divided into four parts (Quinn, M.J. 1994); 
(a) Communication processing time: This is the time required to prepare information 
for transmission, i.e., assembling information in packets (group of bits of 
datalintermediate results), selecting a link on which to transmit each packet, moving 
the packets to the appropriate buffers, etc. 
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(b) Queuing time: Once information is assembled into packets for transmission on 
some communication link, it must wait in a queue prior to the start of its 
transmission for a number of reasons as for example, the link may be temporarily 
unavailable. In the case where the possibility of transmission errors is negligible, the 
queuing time includes the time for the packet retransmission needed to correct the 
errors. 
( c) Transmission time: This is the time required for transmission of all the bits of the 
packet. 
(d) Propagation time: This is the time between the end of transmission of the last bit 
of the packet at the transmitting processor, and the reception of the last bit of the 
packet at the receiving processor. 
Depending on the given system and algorithm, one or more of the above times may be 
negligible. For most systems, it is assumed that the processing and propagation time on 
a given link is constant for all packets, and the transmission time is proportional to the 
number of bits (length) of the packet. At the following a formula for the delay of a 
packet in crossing a link: 
D=P+RL+Q ( 4.1) 
where P is the processing and propagation time, R is the transmission time required for 
a single bit, L is the length of the packet in bits, and Q is the queuing time. 
In some systems, the transmission time RL is much larger than the processing and 
propagation time P, particularly when L includes a substantial number of overhead bits. 
In the great majority of presently existing systems, even when the packet does not 
contain much more than overhead, the sum P + RL is much larger than the time 
required to execute an elementary numerical operation. This means that if a parallel 
algorithm requires transmission of a packet for every few numerical operations it 
performs, the communication time is likely to dominate its execution time. 
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4.2 BASIC CONCEPTS AND MEASURES OF PARALLELISM 
Let a parallel system be of p processors. A general definition for the degree of 
parallelism of a numerical algorithm is the number of operations in the algorithm that 
can be done in parallel. 
If the algorithm does not exhibits a "perfect" parallelism but instead there is a good deal 
of parallelism in the problem itself the definition above should be modified. In order to 
have a parallel measure of an entire algorithm when each of its stages have differing 
degrees of parallelism the concept of the average degree of parallelism is defined. 
The average degree of parallelism of an algorithm is the total number of operations in 
the algorithm divided by the number of stages. For stages it meant the number of 
independent computation that can be done independently. 
Related to the degree of parallelism is the idea of granularity. Large-scale granularity 
means large tasks that can be performed independently in parallel. An example is the 
analysis of contingencies where each contingency is analysed independently of each 
other. Small-scale granularity means small tasks that can be performed in parallel; an 
example is the addition of two vectors where each task is the addition of two scalars. 
There are two other common measures of parallelism that are useful in computing serial 
and parallel algorithms. Speedup and efficiency measure the quality of a particular 
algorithm implementation. 
The speedup of a parallel algorithm is given by 
( 4.2) 
where Tp is the execution time using p processors and T* the time required by a single 
processor to execute the particular parallel algorithm being analysed (r*,. Tt) on the 
same parallel computer. 
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The speedup Sp is a measure of how a given algorithm compares with itself on one and 
p processors. The parallel algorithm however may not be the best algorithm on a single 
processor. A better measure of what is gained by parallel computation is when T* 
means the time required by the best possible serial (uniprocessor) algorithm for this 
problem. The optimal T* is unknown, even for seemingly simple computational 
problems, for this reason the previous definition is assumed. 
The ratio 
( 4.3) 
is called the efficiency of the algorithm, and essentially measures the fraction of time 
that a typical processor is usefully employed. In the case in which the algorithm has 
perfect speedup, Sp = p, then Ep = 1. For this to occur, the parallel algorithm should 
be such that no processor ever remains idle or does any unnecessary work. This ideal 
situation is practically unattainable. A more realistic objective is to aim at an efficiency 
that stays bounded away from zero, as the size of the problem and the number of 
processors increase. 
When speedup is measured based on TI/T p efficiency relates to how well a particular 
algorithm has been parallelized, but provides no information on the absolute merits of 
the algorithm. 
One goal in the development of parallel algorithms is to achieve as large a speedup is 
possible. Indeed, the ideal speedup is obtainable only for essentially trivial problems. 
The main factors that cause a degradation from perfect speedup are as follows: 
(a) Lack of a perfect degree of parallelism in the algorithm andlor lack of perfect load 
balancing; 
(b) Communication, contention, and synchronisation time. 
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In general, in a local memory system exchange of data between processors will be 
necessary at various times during an overall computation, and to the extent that 
processors are not doing useful computation during the communication, this constitutes 
an overhead that it should be minimised. In shared memory systems, there may be 
contention delays that play the same role as communication time: processors are idle or 
under-utilised while waiting to obtain the data necessary to continue. 
Synchronisation is necessary when certain parts of a computation must be completed 
before the overall computation can proceed. There are two aspects of synchronisation 
that contribute to overhead. The first is time required to do the synchronisation; usually 
this requires that all processors do certain checks. The second aspect is that some, or 
even almost all, processors may become idle, waiting for clearance to proceed with the 
computation. 
Although synchronisation, communication, and memory contention delays are quite 
different, their effect on the overall computation is the same: a delay while data are 
made ready to continue the computation. Therefore, these delay factors together are 
considered data ready time in order that the data necessary to continue the 
computation is ready in the proper storage locations. 
As aforementioned, the lack of a perfect degree of parallelism can result in different 
way. For most problems, there will be a mix of three different degrees of parallelism, 
which can be termed perfect, partial, and none, the latter being those portions of the 
algorithm that can use only a single processor. But even if there is a perfect degree of 
parallelism in the algorithm, it may be degraded by the problem of load balancing on a 
given parallel system. By load balancing it meant the assignment of tasks to the 
processors of the system so as to keep each processor doing useful work as much as 
possible. This assignment is sometimes called the mapping problem; that is, the 
problem and the algorithm is mapped onto the processors to achieve maximum load 
balancing. Note that an algorithm may have intrinsically a high degree of parallelism but 
load balancing on a particular system may be difficult. For example, if seventeen 
contingencies are mapped on a system of four processors, there is a mismatch between 
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the perfect degree of parallelism of the problem and the system on which it is 
implemented. 
Load balancing may be done either statically or dynamically. In static load balancing, 
tasks are assigned to processors at the beginning of a computation. In dynamic load 
balancing, tasks are assigned to processors as computation proceeds. In general, 
dynamic load balancing is more efficiently implemented on shared memory systems than 
on local memory systems since, on the latter, data transfers between local memories 
may also be required as part of a task assignment. 
The next section describes the computing platform characteristics where the parallel 
algorithm for contingency selection and analysis has been developed. 
4.3 mM AIX PARALLEL MACHINE 
The main application program implementing the ideas of this thesis has been developed 
on the mM 9076 SP1, a diskless workstation cluster. The high performance computing 
platform is at LNCC-Laborat6rio Nacional de Computa~iio Cientifica, Rio de laneiro-
Brazil. It has distributed memory architecture, 16 processors with a total of 2.0 
Gigaflops and 2 File Servers with 27 GB each. The characteristics of each processor 
are RISC/6000 370, AIX V3.2.5 operating system, 256 MB of RAM, 32KB of cache 
memory, 2GB of local disk (for pagination and temporary files) 62,5 MHz and 
performance of 125 Mflops (mM AIX Parallel Environment - Parallel Programming 
Reference & Operation and Use 1993). 
The SP1, a SPMD (Single Program, Multiple Data) I MIMD (Multiple Instruction, 
Multiple Data) parallel computer, supports parallel and serial programs on both 
interactive and batch mode. 
The message-passing communication among the processors can be either by local 
Ethernet network (10Mbps) or by the high performance switch (40 Mbytes/s) which 
allows simultaneously communication among the nodes. The later communication 
approach has been used during the application program development. 
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The application program is run using POE-Parallel Operating Environment which helps 
ease the transition from serial to parallel jobs by hiding many of the differences and 
allowing the using of standard AIX tools and techniques. In other words, POE allows 
to develop and run parallel programs using the same methods and mechanisms as it 
would for serial jobs. 
In order to execute a parallel program, it is needed to: 
(a) Compile the program 
As with a serial application before running a parallel program it must be compiled using 
the commands mpxlj or mpcc, for parallel applications written in FORTRAN and C 
programming languages respectively. 
The command line not only to compile but also to link the subroutines in the program is 
"mpxlf programj -lsp -0 program". The -lsp is a protocol flag for message passing and 
collective communication to be linked into the executable; -0 names the executable. 
The -g flag can be included on the mpxlflmpcc to produce an object file with symbol 
table references needed for symbolic debugging. 
(b) Set up the Execution Environment 
Before to execute a program the execution environment must be set up. When invoking 
the parallel program the number of task processors is specified by the command line 
''program -procs xx (xx is any number from 1 to 16). The nodes are allocated 
automatically since the 9076 SPI is configured with its high-performance switch 
feature. 
(c) Invoke the Executable 
In order to perform this step, it has to have an user account on, and be able to remotely 
login to, each of the processor nodes. This requires to have an .rhosts file set up in the 
home directory on the boot server (view machine). It may also enter all the nodes in the 
.rhost file. The executable file must be invoked from one of the 9076 SPl nodes. 
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The information above about SP I does not resume all the characteristics and features 
offered by this high performance platform, the purpose is to highlight those aspects 
which it has come about during the experience of applying parallel processing to 
contingency analysis. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Parallel processing is used to reduce the time needed to solve a problem of a fixed size. 
As far as the real time contingency analysis is concerned, as the system size tends to 
grow, parallel computers are used due to the increase of the size of the problem that 
must be solved in a narrow and fixed range of time. 
Contingency assessment algorithm increases the level of parallelism with the problem 
size, it is said to be a scaleable algorithm. Algorithm scability is a important feature 
because larger problems can be solved in the same amount of time if more processors 
are added in the process. The algorithm is also data parallel because every processor is 
responsible for a segment of the array representing the contingencies to be analysed. 
Each processor applies the same operation to its own portion of data set (SPMO). 
Generally speaking the operation referred is the building of an adaptive subsystem 
sensitive to the applied contingency and its analysis. The data parallel counterpart is 
control parallel which is achieved through the simultaneous application of different 
operations to different data elements. 
The total execution time of a parallel algorithm consists of two components: 
computation time and communication time. Computation time is inversely proportional 
to the number of processors used, whilst communication time increases with the 
number of processors used. In contingency analysis the level of communication 
exchange is low because the contingencies depend on the system base case output only. 
In a study mode for real-time power system operation the base case output is supplied 
by the on-line load flow function in the control centre. 
Contingency evaluation is an asynchronous algorithm in that the computation at each 
processor does not depend on the results of the computations of other processors but 
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each one works independently. The advantages are twofold: the communication 
penalty, and the overall execution time is reduced. 
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Cbapter Five 
5. INTRODUCTION 
AN INTEGRATED TECHNIQUE FOR CONTINGENCY 
EVALUATION USING PARALLEL PROCESSING 
An efficient and fast method for branch contingency assessment is described which 
uses parallel processing in order to speed up the outage analysis process. The proposed 
algorithm aims to be part of a security package of a real time power system simulator 
developed at LABSPOT-Laboratorio de Sistemas de Potencia at the Universidade 
Federal de Santa Catarina - UFSC in Brazil. The simulator has been developed for 
operator and dispatcher trainee working for the state electricity utility, CELESC1 -
Brazil. 
The method is an integrated contingency fast screening and analysis technique which 
takes advantage of the property that the effect of the majority of branch contingencies 
is confined to the neighbourhood of the outage. The outage evaluation is performed on 
all contingency cases mitigating the possibility of missing some contingencies which are 
critical. The contingencies are allocated among the parallel computer processors adding 
a fast analysis not possible otherwise. The speed up and efficiency of the algorithm is 
presented considering the various processors available in the mM 9076 SPl high 
performance computing platform described at Chapter IV. 
The algorithm has been tested on two systems, the IEEE 57-bus and the Brazilian 
Southern electric system with 749 buses and 1275 branches. The Brazilian system has 
both hydroelectric and thermoelectric plants, and the voltage ratings are 750, 500, 440, 
345, 230, and 138KV. 
In a real time operation environment the state estimation provides the current 
operating state of the power system. For the proposed implementation a load flow 
I CELESC - Centrais EMtricas de Santa Catarina S.A. 
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method is used instead in order to obtain the base case system conditions. The flow 
chart depicted in Fig.5.1 shows the steps considered to have the system state variables 
and the power flow in the branches for the base case situation (when no contingencies 
are considered). In the following sections a sequence of flow charts is presented giving 
at the end a general overview of the proposed method. In Appendix B the subroutines 
for the proposed method, written in FORTRAN, are presented. 
FAST DEOOUPLED 
LOAD FLOW 
END 
Fig.5.1 Flow Chart For The Base Case Network 
At first, an investigation of the network connectivity is carried out for detection of 
either, isles and isolated nodes. Next, the essential branches are pointed out. For 
essential branches it is meant those components whose outage cause a split in the 
original network, resulting in isles or isolated buses. Load balance evaluation and 
generation dispatch ought to be performed if the contingency of a essential branch is 
investigated and these procedures are not considered in this work. Therefore, the 
essential branches are not included in the list of possible contingencies. When the 
network of the base case system is not connected the contingency analysis is not carried 
out and the program is halted. 
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5.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD 
The computational effort in contingency analysis methods increases dramatically as the 
network size increases because the network solution time, the number of monitored 
elements, and the number of contingencies are each approximately proportional to the 
network size. 
An integrated contingency screening and analysis method for branch outage 
contingencies is proposed inspired on Pinto, D.P. and Pereira, J.L.R. ideas (pinto et al 
1994). The method takes advantage of the property that the adverse effect of the great 
majority of branch contingencies is confined to the neighbourhood of the outage. The 
further the network buses are from the contingency outage, the lesser sensitive to the 
contingency they are supposed to be. The main concern is to bring about a further 
enhancement on Pinto and Pereira's method in terms of speed whilst maintaining the 
same degree of accuracy. 
The method reduces the computational effort by solving only a determined sensitive 
subnetwork and monitoring only a limited number of elements for each contingency to 
identify cases causing limit violations. With this sort of approach the computational 
cost of analysing each contingency is affected very little by system size and the overall 
computational effort should be approximately proportional to the number of 
contingencies, which is in turn approximately proportional to the network size. 
In order to reduce the computational cost for the subnetwork analysis a prespecified 
number of bus layers around the contingency is established. The number of layers can 
be determined by the operator choice as a matter of the desirable accuracy for the 
analysis results. For a given contingency and a specified number of bus layers the 
algorithm searches adaptivelly for part of the whole system affected by the contingency. 
The searching starts at the end buses of the outaged branch and goes further to the next 
connected bus up to the specified neighbouring is reached. 
Pinto and Pereira use the compensation method based on the Inversion Matrix 
Modification Lemma - IMML to point out the buses whose voltage magnitude 
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variation is greater than a specified tolerance. A set of sensitive buses is built but there 
is no assurance of the connectivity of the resulting subnetwork. In order to guarantee 
the subnetwork connectivity either buses not appointed as sensitive should be included 
in the set, or buses in the set should be disregarded. A searching algorithm must be 
applied in order to guarantee both the existence of one subnetwork only and its 
connectivity. 
As it is very likely that the perturbation, as a result of the applied contingency, will 
affect those buses electrically connected and therefore near to one another, the IMML 
model can be omitted and the number of bus layers specified instead. 
5.1.1 Subnetwork Definition 
The original network is decomposed into subnetworks, namely: internal subnetwork, 
external subnetwork, and the boundary as depicted in Fig.5.2. The internal subnetwork 
contains all nodes directly affected by the contingency on which an ac load flow is 
carried out. The internal and external subnetworks are tied up by branches and their end 
buses form two sets of boundary nodes, named internal- and external- bus border set. 
The bus voltages in the external subnetwork are supposed to remain constant and 
equal to the base case values. 
Subtletwork 
out.ged 
branch 
Fig.5.2 Representation Of The Power Network Subdivision 
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The internal subnetwork is made up by concentric tiers of buses around the outage 
contingency. The number of tiers depends on the subnetwork connectivity and on the 
algorithm user choice. A number of at least three tiers has been tested. Since the 
branch outaged may lead to a split in the subnetwork, its connectivity is tested and if 
isles or isolated buses are detected the number of tiers are automatically increased until 
the connectivity is achieved. 
The flow chart in Fig.5.3 outlines the algorithm for the internal subnetwork building. It 
is worthwhile to note that the internal boundary bus set is not necessarily made by all 
the buses of the outmost tier but only by those connected to the external system. 
lNCREASE 
NUMBEIt 
OF11EItS 
th8 number of nodeJ in tha 
redMced IUbsystem 
Nil the number of nod ... of the 
whole system 
BUILDING 
ImERNAL'\ EXTERNAL 
BOUNDARY VECWRS 
Fig.S.3 Flow Chart For The Internal Subsystem Building 
There may be situations in which an outmost bus is the very end bus of a branch, or 
even it is connected to another outmost bus without external linking. 
5.1.2 Mathematical Model For The Subnetwork 
Let k be a generic bus of an electric system. The complex power, Sk' injected at bus k is 
defined as 
Sk=Pk+ jQk=Ek ~Y"'kiEi, k=J,2, ... ,nb 
ieQ 
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( S.l) 
· ..I where 
Pk 
Qk 
Ek 
Ykl 
is the net real power injection at bus k 
is the net reactive power injection at bus k 
is the complex voltage at bus k 
is the element of the admittance matrix, with node k connected to i 
The superscript "*,, denotes the complex conjugate, Cl the set of buses i adjacent to bus 
k, including the bus k itself, and nb the number of buses in the network. The subscripts 
"/(' and "t' denotes two buses of the system. The summation notation L implies i 
lE 0 
operations over the set of nodes adjacent to node k. 
Equation 5.1 represents the AC Load Flow·ACLF model and gives the complex power 
injection at bus k. A load flow method should be applied to solve numerically the above 
equation. 
Equation 5.1 can be rewritten as: 
( 5.2) 
where 
Ok is the set of nodes I adjacent to bus k whose voltages are re-evaluated 
a k is the set of nodes m adjacent to bus k whose voltages are constant and equal 
to the base case 
The first term on the right-hand side ofEq.5.2 represents the internal subnetwork. Note 
that it is similar to Eq.5.1 and therefore any of the well-known ACLF method can be 
used to solve the equation. 
The Fast Decoupled Load Flow-FDLF method has been chosen for its broad 
acceptance in the power industry and its application for either regular load flow studies 
and also contingency analysis due to its accuracy, simplicity and computational 
efficiency. The applied FDLF program, named NEWDES, was developed at 
LABSPOT-UFSC-Brazil and besides the features presented by the power industry 
Bigpowermode program, developed by Philadelphia Electric Company, NEWDES 
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l , takes into consideration the axes rotation technique useful for those systems with low 
XIR ratio. The iterative process in NEWDES (Medeiros, A.n.R. and Salgado, R.) is 
halted under two main situations, either the maximum number of iterations is reached 
or the magnitude of any power mismatching, in p.u., is bigger than 1000. In the last 
case, there is a strong evidence the maximum number of iterations will be reached. 
5.1.3 The Slack Bus Of The Subnetwork 
The selection of the slack bus plays an important role for the load flow convergence 
and it may lead to different sizes of the subnetwork. Four different strategies have been 
proposed and tested to select the slack bus for the reduced system. 
Recall that the bus voltages of the external subnetwork are kept constant and as matter 
of fact any of these buses is an eligible slack bus. Nevertheless, in order to guarantee 
the connectivity of the internal subnetwork, the slack bus can be chosen among the 
external boundary buses. However two aspects should be taken into account: 
(a) the size of the subnetwork should be independent on the order in which a certain 
contingency is analysed. The selected slack bus should be the same no matter the 
tested contingency position is in the list, in order to guarantee the same size for the 
subnetwork, and 
(b) the choice should fall on an electrically strong bus. 
Next the four strategies are described: 
I. The external boundary bus with the biggest driving point admittance. If the 
magnitude of the resulting admittance of the tie-branches is big the bus is 
considered strong since it is electrically near to the subnetwork. 
H. The external boundary bus with the highest number of adjacent tie-lines, and in case 
of drawing the selected bus should be that one with the biggest admittance. The 
reason behind such strategy is that the number of adjacent branches appoints to an 
electrically strong bus with a feasible high driving point admittance. 
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Ill. The slack bus of the base case system is searched first among the internal system 
buses and then in the external boundary bus set. If it is not found in none of the 
mentioned sets, the slack bus is selected based on strategy 1. 
IV. The slack bus selection is similar to the strategy III except that if another than the 
original slack bus is to be chosen the selection is based on strategy H. 
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Fig.S.4 The Slack Bus Selection 
When the slack bus is in the external border set the selected bus is then included as part 
of the internal subnetwork as well as the related adjacent branches. The internal bus set 
should be re-evaluated since the internal buses connected to the selected slack bus can 
be no longer boundary buses. Suppose that bus m in Fig.S.2 is the selected slack bus. 
The branches k-m and I-m are included in the internal subnetwork as well as bus m. Bus 
k is not any longer an internal boundary bus, however bus I is still an internal border 
bus since it is connected to the external subnetwork. 
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I Anyone of the above strategies insures the same slack bus for a given contingency and 
number of tiers, resulting in a subnetwork with the same number of buses and branches. 
Fig.5.4 presents the flow chart outlining the bus slack selection procedure for the 
internal subnetwork. 
When the slack bus for the internal subnetwork is not the same as that one of the base 
case, the voltage of the specified slack bus must be set equal to its base case value. 
Note that the current through the tie-branches are determined taking into consideration 
the base case voltage values whose angles are referred to the base case slack bus. Thus, 
the updated bus voltages should be referred also to the base case slack bus. 
5.1.4 The External System Influence 
The influence of the external onto the internal subnetwork is taking into account by 
considering constant current injection into the internal boundary buses. All 
aforementioned the bus voltages and therefore the power flow in the external 
subnetwork are assumed to be constant. However the power flow along the tie-lines 
changes, since one of the end buses are in the internal subnetwork with the bus voltage 
updated at each iteration. 
Suppose k is a bus border in the internal subnetwork. The second term on the right-
hand side of Eq.5.2 is defined as 
Pk' + jQt' = Ek rttm 
meak 
( 5.3) 
in which J km is the current flow between bus k and m. Eq.5.3 represents the power 
injection at bus k from the external system. 
The current injection I k' expressed as 
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( 5.4) 
where 
Ykm is the series admittance of branch km 
b kmo is the charging susceptance of the k leg of the equivalent n of the transmission 
line with the subscript" 0" denoting ground node 
a km is the voltage ratio when branch k - m is a transformer (when branch k - m is a 
transmission line akm= 1) 
is calculated using the base case voltage bus value for E k and Em. The power 
injection Pk' + jQk' is calculated using h' and the updated Ek value and then 
injected at the internal bus borders at each iteration. Thus the external network 
interacts with the internal subnetwork through the tie-lines, participating at the 
supplying of the subnetwork. 
When h' is calculated using the updated Ek bus voltage the load flow for the 
subnetwork results in convergence problems. 
The algorithm which considers Pk' and Qk' during the power flow evaluation for the 
subnetwork is 
iJ = 0 
LOOP i = 1, n° of buses in the internal subnetwork 
Evaluating the real power mismatch, M> 
IF (type of bus .eq. (PV or PQ)) THEN 
iJ = iJ + 1 
LOOP k = 1, nO ofinternal boundary buses 
nbusjn -t the set ofinternal bus borders 
IF (nbusjn (k) .eq. i) THEN 
M'(i/) = (P(i) + P'(k) - P calc(i») /V(i) 
END IF 
ENDLOOPk 
END IF 
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Evaluating the reactive power mismatch, AQ 
IF (type of bus .eq. PQ) THEN 
iJ = iJ + 1 
LOOP k = 1, n° of internal boundary buses 
IF (nbusJn (k) .eq. i) THEN 
AQ(i 1) = (Q(i) +Q'(k) - Qcalc(i») /V(i) 
END IF 
ENDLOOPk 
END IF 
ENDLOOPi 
Note that P calc and Q calc are compared to the net power injection which takes into 
account the power contribution from the external into the internal subnetwork. At the 
convergence the state variables have considered P k' and Q k" and also the generated 
reactive power at the PV buses (Q G = Q ca/c). 
If the selected slack bus is taken from the external boundary bus set, the power flow at 
the outgoing branches adjacent to the selected slack bus is constant (the end bus 
voltages and the branch parameters are constant) and it can be seen either as a load or a 
source depending on the flow direction. The power injection can be taken into 
consideration during the load balance calculation supplied by the slack bus. 
5.1.5 The Initial Conditions For The Subnetwork Load Flow 
Before the subnetwork load flow takes place the vectors of the whole system are 
reordered so that the first vector positions correspond to the internal subnetwork 
variables. 
The initial conditions for the subnetwork are specified with voltage magnitudes equal to 
the initial guessed value given to the whole system, and the voltage angles equal to the 
converged values of the base case system. 
If the subnetwork selected slack bus is not the same as that of the original system (see 
Criteria I and IT, item 5.1.3), the original slack bus is converted to PV type and the 
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calculated power generation is stored as the specified PG power for the converted PV 
bus. The specified voltage for the selected slack bus is equal to the corresponding base 
case value. At the end of each contingency analysis the conditions of the original 
system is restored. 
Fig.S.S The Initial Conditions To The Internal Subsystem 
5.1.6 The Subnetwork Load Flow Precision 
Two tolerances for the subnetwork load flow has been tested, the same as the one for 
the complete system: 10-3 , and 10-1. In addition to the tolerance test for the load flow 
solution another investigation is performed on the boundary bus set. There are two 
main reasons for such investigation: 
( a) to certify the load flow has converged to a feasible operating state; 
(b) to make sure the contingency effects is confined to the considered number of tiers. 
The accuracy of the local load flow can be carried out either on the internal- or the 
external-boundary buses. If either the real or the reactive power mismatch at the 
boundary buses is greater than a specified tolerance, the converged state variables 
(v, B) are considered not precise due to one of the reasons above. 
Suppose p~ and Q~ are the base case real and reactive power injection at the internal 
bus border k 
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P~=rea/(E~I/) 
Q~=jmag(E~I/) ( 5.5) 
where It' is defined in Eq.5.4, the superscript ''0'' denotes the base case value and the 
other variables and notation as defined previously. 
The real and reactive power variation at the internal boundary buses is then given by 
t.Pk = Pk' -P~ 
t.Qk = Qk' -QZ 
with Pk' and Qk' defined by Eq.5.3. 
( 5.6) 
As a matter of fact, the power flow evaluation at the tie-lines considers an electrically 
rigid external subnetwork and the tolerance equal to 10-1 gives a relaxation to such 
consideration. 
When the power mismatch in Eq.5.6 results bigger than the tolerance a relaxation to 
the number of tiers has been introduced. The number of tiers is increased in order to 
certity whether the perturbation has sprang beyond the frontier previously established. 
The internal subnetwork is expanded outwards until the subnetwork size becomes 
bigger than a specified percentage of the whole system. 
The load flow solution may result in three different sets of contingencies: 
(a) the uncertain contingencies whose load flow solution does not converge; 
(b) the critical contingencies, the load flow converge, the load flow solution is 
detected as precise, and the contingency leads to component constraint violation; 
( c) the non-critical contingencies, the load flow converge to a feasible operating value 
but there is no component constraint violation. 
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The flow chart depicted in Fig.S.6 shows the final procedures taken for the integrated 
contingency analysis accomplishment. 
COMPlmNGntE 
POWER MISMATCHING 
AT1lfE 
BOUNDARY BUSES 
CHECKING FOR ANY 
,.--No--j lNTERNAL COMPONENTSUBSYMM 
VlOLATION 
J "",,,,ne flow chart 
in Fig.S.S 
LOAD FLOW FOR 
'llfB WHOLE SYSTEM 
Fig.S.6 The Load Flow Considerations For The Internal Subsystem 
5.2 THE PARALLEL ALGORITHM SIMULATION 
The integrated contingency analysis algorithm has been implemented in three versions, 
a sequential version with the contingency branch entered by the keyboard, a sequential 
version to analyse a determined set of contingencies, and a parallel version with the 
contingencies distributed among the computer processors. The first two versions have 
been implemented and tested in a workstation SUN Sparc 1+ with 16 Mbytes of main 
memory, 300 Mbytes in disk, 2SMhz, and 28 Mips. The parallel version has been 
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implemented and tested in a high performance computational platform as described in 
Chapter 4. 
The system variables of the original system are broadcasted to the processors and the 
network branches distributed among them. Each processor will be in charge of 
processing a certain number of contingencies. If a single processor is indicated all 
contingencies will be analysed by one processor only, similar to its sequential 
counterpart. 
The following algorithm shows the contingency distribution among the processors: 
Definition of Variables 
nl is the number of the network branches 
numtask is the number of computer processors 
o _nproc = floot(n/) I floot(numtask) 
ka_nproc = int(o_nproc) 
b _nproc = nl- (numtask* ka _nproc) 
ktosk = toskid + 1, 0 So toskid So numtask -1 
IF (ktask .le. a_nproc) THEN 
ELSE 
nfrom = 1 + (ka _ nproc + 1). toskid 
nto = (ko_nproc+l).ktosk 
nfrom = 1 + (ko _nproco toskid) +b _ nproc 
nto = (ka _ nproco ktosk) + b _ nproc 
END IF 
Each bus in the base case system has a code number which is stored in two column 
vectors corresponding to the terminal end (from • to) of the network branches. Recall 
that the system variables are reordered for each contingency analysis. To be sure that 
each contingency will be evaluated and only once by the processor in charge of it, the 
original vectors with the end bus code are stored and broadcasted to the processors. 
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Note that the bus code position are swapped at each contingency but the two created 
vectors are unchangeable during the analysis process. Thus, as a certain contingency 
position is set to be analysed, a search for that position is carried out in the created 
vectors in order to guarantee the uniqueness of the contingency analysis. 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
An integrated screening and analysis method has been presented. The method can be 
applied in sequential computing mode but its great advantage is achieved when used in 
parallel mode. 
The method is selective, the nature of the contingency, whether critical or non-critical, 
and the system components with constraint violation are pointed out. With this 
approach both overloading and bus voltage violation followed by a branch contingency 
can be addressed. 
An Automatic Contingency Selection (ACS) can be applied beforehand the proposed 
method. The ACS algorithm should be able to handle overload and bus voltage 
violation and it can be used to 
(a) order the set of all possible contingencies; or 
(b) rank the contingencies according to their severity. 
In both cases, the contingencies are allocated among the processors. However if the 
contingencies are ranked by their severity in order to take more advantage of the 
ranking issue purpose, the contingencies should be distributed among the processors in 
a pipeline fashion. 
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Chapter Six 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
6. INTRODUCTION 
An integrated technique using parallel processing has been implemented based on 
selection and analysis of branch outage contingency. Tests on the IEEE 57-bus and the 
Brazilian Southern power electric system have been accomplished using the proposed 
technique. The results are compared to a full Fast Oecoupled Load Flow-FDLF 
solution for the entire system with an branch on outage in order to validate the 
proposed method. The speed up and the algorithm efficiency when using a 
multiprocessor computer is also presented. The data of the two systems are presented 
in Appendix C. 
The integrated contingency selection and analysis procedure is an adaptive technique 
resulting in different subnetworks for each contingency analysed. The method is 
selective since only the branches and buses in the subnetwork are monitored. As a 
result of a branch contingency the components with constraint violation, the type of 
violation and the magnitude of such violations are pointed out. When the load flow for 
the subnetwork is successful the results are postulated as if a load flow had been run 
for the entire system. 
The upper and lower limits for the bus voltage magnitude have been set at +5% and -
10% of the rating voltage, respectively. This voltage range constraint is applied to both, 
the base case system and when the system is under contingency. Conversely two 
different power flow limits are considered, i.e. for the system without and under 
contingency. 
A contingency may be classified as critical, non-critical or undefined. The critical 
contingencies are those resulting in bus voltage magnitude and/or loading constraint 
violation. The undefined contingencies are those whose subnetwork load flow do not 
142 
converge or the load flow precision is not achieved, and the non-critical ones are those 
otherwise. The set of undefined contingencies is evaluated by a full load flow for the 
whole system. 
When the subnetwork load flow converges but the power mismatching at any bus 
border is greater than a specified tolerance the subnetwork is increased of one tier until 
either the desirable precision is reached or the subnetwork size is 40% of the whole 
network. In the last case, the next contingency is called up. 
6.1 RESULTS FOR THE SEQUENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION 
In order to establish comparison with the load flow results for the whole system with 
one branch outaged the following condition has been assumed. The magnitude voltage 
deviation from the base case voltages is calculated to all buses in the subnetwork. 
where 
( 6.1) 
is the bus voltage magnitude deviation of bus k from its base case 
counterpart 
is the bus voltage magnitude at bus k 
is the base case bus voltage magnitude at bus k 
When 6. V k is greater than 2% the voltage constraint is checked for any violation. This 
procedure assures the constraint violation checking only on those buses on which the 
applied contingency has some sort of effect. The loading constraint checking does not 
rely on the voltage deviation constraint. 
The four strategies described in Chapter V to choose the slack bus for the sub network 
has been tested. Mnemonic words are given to the four strategies as at follows. 
Strategy (1), based on the higher admittance magnitude value, is named Adm and 
strategy (11), named Acfj, is based on the higher number of adjacent branches. Strategy 
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(Ill), termed Slack _ Adm, searches for the original slack bus and if it is not found the 
foremost strategy is assumed. Finally, strategy (IV) which is similar to the ultimate 
strategy, except that strategy (IT) is assumed, is termed Slack_AeJi. 
The four strategies have been applied on the IEEE-57 bus system. The base case 
system state operation has shown no bus voltage magnitude limit violation. Table 6.1 
presents the classification of the 79 possible contingencies on the IEEE system. The 
system has one essential branch whose outage would lead to an undefined contingency 
classification. Out of the 79 possible contingencies 18 would bring about a split in the 
subnetwork and consequently the load flow divergence. A routine to identifY isles and 
isolated buses is applied after the buses in the third neighbourhood has been considered 
at the subnetwork building. To make possible the contingency evaluation the number of 
tiers is incremented of two steps until the subnetwork connectivity is assured. 
A tolerance of 10-1 has been assumed for the subnetwork power flow. Table 6.1 
presents the classification of the contingencies, for the four slack bus selection criteria, 
given in absolute values and in p.u. with the number of possible contingencies as the 
base value. 
CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL UNDEFINED 
. p.u. p.u . p.u. 
Conventional FDLF 0.32 25 0.66 52 0.03 02 
Adm 0.33 26 0.62 49 0.05 04 
Adj 0.32 25 0.62 49 0.06 05 
Slack Adm 0.32 25 0.62 49 0.06 05 
Slack Adj 0.32 25 0.62 49 0.06 05 
Base Value. 79 
Tab.6.1 Contingency Classification For The IEEE 57-Bus 
The four strategies are similar in performance, so the next step is to look out for 
misclassification. When the load flow for the entire system, named Conventional FDLF, 
classifies the evaluated branch outage as critical and the proposed algorithm classifies it 
as non-critical, it comprises a missed contingency. Conversely the misclassification is 
known as false alarm. Table 6.2 presents the number of miss- and false-alarms which 
have been detected by the integrated technique. 
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MISSING FALSE ALARM 
% % 
Adm 03 12 06 12 
Adj 03 12 05 10 
Slack Adm 04 16 06 12 
Slack Adj 04 16 06 12 
. . .. Base Values: Critlcal=25 Non-Critlcal-52 
Tab.6.2 Misclassifications For The IEEE 57-Bus 
It has been observed that the missed cases in Adm and Ac(j schemes the violations took 
place on buses outside the internal subnetwork. These two strategies have been 
selected to be tested on the Southern Brazilian system. Because it is a very large system 
it is unlikely to have the original slack bus as part of the internal subnetwork or even 
among the external boundary buses for the great majority of the applied contingencies. 
The tested Brazilian system has 749 buses and 1275 branches. The number of essential 
branches is 244, the contingency of anyone of these branches would bring about isles or 
isolated bus. Therefore, the set size of possible contingencies is 1031. 
A summary for the Brazilian system test is shown in Tab.6.3 and important conclusions 
can be taken from. 
Conventional ADM ADI TOTAL FOR TIlE 
FDLF CRlT NC UNO CRlT NC UNO WHOLE SYSTEM 
CRlT 30 08 72 28 07 75 110 
NC 13 628 243 08 606 270 884 
UNO 04 
-
33 05 - 32 37 
Total 47 636 348 41 613 377 1031 
Subsvstem 
Tab.6.3 Summary Of The Test Results For The Brazilian System 
Notation: 
CRlT the contingencies classified as critical 
NC the contingencies classified as non-critical 
UNO the undefined contingencies 
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Table 6.4 shows the contingencies according to their classification, the rates given in 
p.u. are related to the total number of possible contingencies. 
CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL UNDEFINED 
Conventional FDLF 0.11 0.86 0.04 
Adm 0.05 0.62 0.34 
Adj 0.04 0.59 0.37 
Ba.so VaI... 1D31 
Tab.6.4 Contingency Classification For The Brazilian Southern System 
Most of the contingencies are non-critical i.e. about 86% with no violation on the bus 
voltages and on the branch loading. Actually no constraint violations occurred on the 
system loading. 
The number of critical, non-critical and undefined cases for the conventional FDLF, 
taken from Tab.6.3, is used as base values to establish comparison for the proposed 
algorithm validation. 
CRITICAL NON-ClUTICAL UNDEFINED 
Conventional FDLF 110 884 37 
At next, Table 6.5 gives the capture rates for the proposed algorithm. 
CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL UNDEFINED 
Conventional FDLF 1 1 1 
Adm 0.27 0.71 0.89 
Adi 0.25 0.69 0.87 
Tab.6.5 Capture Rates For The Integrated Algorithm 
The low rate of critical and non-critical contingencies detected by the algorithm occurs 
on account of the high rate of undefined contingencies. Note that as shown in Tab.6.3 
the number of undefined contingencies is about ten times as much as that one for the 
entire system load flow. The percentage of undefined contingencies which on the 
contrary would be classified respectively as critical and non-critical is shown in Tab.6.6. 
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When a critical contingency is classified by the algorithm as undefined the load flow 
which would be run for a reduced subnetwork is then accomplished for the entire 
system. The other situation, when a non-critical contingency is classified by the 
'. algorithm as undefined, is a waste of time for its assessment is all unnecessary. As a 
mater of fact the algorithm ended up evaluating approximately 31 % for Adm and 33% 
for Adj (see Tab.6.3) of the total number of applied contingencies which should have 
been avoided. 
Conventional UNDEANEDCONTINGENCffiS 
FDLF ADM AD] 
CRITICAL 65.46% 68.18% 
NON-CRITICAL 27.49% 30.54% 
. . .. Base Value. Cntical-110 Non-Critical-S84 
Tab.6.6 Rates Of Critical And Non-Critical Contingencies Classified As Undefined 
Table 6.7 summarises the number of missing and false alarms. It has been obselVed that 
the additional missed contingency for strategy Adm actually was detected as critical 
although the violated bus pointed out by the power flow for the entire system was not 
among those pointed out by the integrated technique. The violated bus was in the 
internal subnetwork but its limit violation was missed therefore the contingency was 
considered as misclassified. 
MISSING FALSE ALARM 
% % 
Adm 08 7.27 13 1.47 
Adi 07 6.36 08 0.90 
.. .. Base Values: Cntical=110 Non-Cntical-884 
Tab.6.7 Misclassifications For The Brazilian System 
In both strategies, Adm and Ad}, two missed contingencies had bus voltage violation on 
buses outside the internal subnetwork. When the number of tiers was increased such 
that the subnetwork encompassed the sensitive buses, the contingencies were detected 
as critical. It is worthy to note that for the two mentioned events when the number of 
tiers was set equal to three both strategies chose the same slack bus and the power flow 
converged with no need of relaxation for the number of tiers. When the number of tiers 
was set equal to four, strategy Ad} converged for the established number of tiers and 
the violation was detected. However, strategy Adm has chosen a different slack bus, 
based on its own criterion, and the power flow was considered not precise, although 
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the same system as that for strategy Aclj was represented. The number of tiers was 
automatically increased, stepping to five, the power flow converged and the bus 
violation pointed out. 
Additional tests have been performed on those cases which converged but have been 
considered not precise and as a consequence the number of tiers has been relaxed. The 
slack bus chosen for three tiers has been kept as the internal subnetwork is expanded 
outwards and the contingency classification investigated. The tests have been 
accomplished for the Adm strategy only. 
A number of 164 contingencies experienced relaxation out of 1031 cases in the 
Brazilian system. Table 6.8 and 6.9 show respectively the results when the slack bus is 
selected based on the Adm criterion (the selected slack bus may change as the tiers are 
added to), and when once the bus is selected for a subnetwork with three tiers it is kept 
the same even for the relaxed subnetwork. 
CONVENTIONAL ADM TOTAL FOR THE 
FDLF CRlT NC UNO CONVENTIONAL F DLF 
CRlT 01 
-
27 28 
NC 01 S9 74 134 
UNO 
- -
02 02 
TOTAL FOR 02 S9 103 164 
SUBNETWORK 
Tab.6.8 Contingency Classification For The Relaxed Cases 
Table 6.8 shows that about 38% of the relaxed contingencies are classified right and 
62% are misclassified. If the relaxation were not considered the number of undefined 
contingencies would rise from about 34% to 50% of the total number of possible 
contingencies. 
CONVENTIONAL ADM TOTAL FOR THE 
FDLF CRlT NC UNO CONVENTIONAL FDLF 
CRlT 05 
-
23 28 
Ne 
- 54 80 134 
UNO 
-
-
02 02 
TOTAL FOR 05 54 105 164 
SUBNETWORK 
Tab.6.9 Relaxed Contingency Classification With The Same Slack Bus 
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The void of false alarm and the smaller number non-critical cases in Tab.6.9 have been 
displaced to the set of undefined contingencies. 
The percentage of right classification is 37,195% and ofmisclassification 62.805% of 
the number of relaxed contingencies. Table 6.10 presents the rate of right classification 
for each category found for both considerations. 
CRITICAL NON-CRITICAL UNDEFINED 
Whole System 1 1 1 
Relax I 3.57% 44.03% 100.00% 
Relax II 17.86% 40.30% 100.00% 
Tab.6.10 Rates Of Right Classification For The Relaxed Contingencies 
Notation: 
Relax I relaxation procedure with the slack bus selected according to Adm 
criterion 
Relax II relaxation procedure with the slack bus kept constant 
The time for both procedures described above has been investigated. The CPU time for 
the second alternative, Relax II, has been about 4.363% greater than its counterpart. 
A tolerance of 10-3 has been tested on the IEEE 57-bus system and the capture rates 
compared to the results found to a tolerance of 10-1. 
CRmCAL NON-CRITICAL UNDEFINED 
Conventional FDLF I I 1 
Adm Tol-IO" 0.760 0.885 0.500 
Adm Tol-10" 0.600 0.923 1.000 
Tab.6.11 Capture Rates For The IEEE 57-Bus System 
The number of missing alarm is the same for both tolerances considered, the capture 
rates for the non-critical contingencies is better when the tolerance is made equal to 10' 
3 and the number of undefined cases has increased for Tol=10·3• 
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6.2 RESULTS FOR THE PARALLEL IMPLEMENTATION 
The contingency evaluation issue has a good deal of parallelism since the set of possible 
contingencies can be distributed among the available computer processors and each 
contingency analysed independently. A single instruction is loaded on all processors and 
the system data made available to them. 
In the SP I mM platform each processor has its own local memory and the 
communication between them takes place by message passing. The contingency 
evaluation is a self-contained problem as far as information exchange between 
processors are concerned. The overall system data is broadcasted from a specified node 
where the load flow for the base system has been run to the other processors. There is 
no influence of communication time or even contention time, particular of shared 
memory architectures, for the assessment of contingencies. Because each contingency 
depends on the base case results only, the problem solution is not affected by the 
synchronism time. 
Although each processor is in charge of approximately the same number of 
contingencies the processors may finish their tasks in different time. For each 
contingency a different subnetwork is built and a variety of issues determines the 
subnetwork size such as the number of tiers, the degree of the system connectivity 
around the contingency, and the chosen strategy to select the subnetwork slack bus. 
When an essential branch is detected among the set of branches sent to a given 
processor a next contingency is called up to be analysed. The subnetwork load flow 
result may indicate the subnetwork relaxation or even a more accurate analysis for the 
applied contingency which in both cases an additional time is required. All these 
mentioned aspects may bring about processors with the same number of contingencies 
to take longer to accomplish their task. 
Next the speed up and the efficiency of the proposed algorithm are presented in 
Tab.6.l2 and 6.13 for both electric systems, the IEEE 57-Bus and the Southern 
Brazilian system, using the sixteen processors of the SPl parallel computer. Relaxation, 
the Adm strategy and a tolerance of 10.1 have been considered for the given measures. 
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The speedup is measured by the rate between the execution time required by a single 
processor and the time using p processors. The efficiency, which gives the average of 
time that a processor is usefully employed, is measured by the ratio speedup and , 
number of processors. 
IEEE 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 
System 
Speed up 1.87 2.45 2.84 3.55 3.74 4.18 4.44 4.74 
Efficiency 0.93 0.61 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.30 
Tab.6.12 Speed up And Efficiency Measures For The IEEE 57-Bus System 
Brazilian 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 
System 
Speed up 1.51 2.77 3.21 4.10 4.59 6.38 6.56 7.12 
Efficiency 0.76 0.69 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.45 
Tab. 6. 13 Speed up And Efficiency Measures For The Brazilian System 
A graphic based on Tab.6.12 and 6.13 is depicted to show how the contingency 
evaluation problem can take benefit of a multiprocessor computer. The algorithm speed 
up increases with the number of processors and the system size, confirming the 
statement made at Chapter IV as the algorithm scability. 
Fig.6.1 Speed Up For The IEEE 57-Bus And The Brazilian System 
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Fig.6.2 Efficiency For The IEEE And The Brazilian System 
The processors are better occupied when the Brazilian system is analysed as illustrates 
Fig.6.2. 
The speed up performance can be improved by blocking any other processes that are 
not needed to run the program. When a time command is used time slices of 1I100th of 
a second is allocated to your program. On a busy system, the time command may 
allocate a time slice to the program or to system code used by the program, even 
though the time slice is pre-empted by an 110 event or an external interrupt. On a 
system with high 110 activity, such as one on a network or with terminals attached, 
these 110 events can result in significant distortions of the actual CPU time measured. 
By killing all networking processes, by physically disconnecting all connections to 
networks, terminals and pointing devices, the results of the time command are 
minimally distorted by 110 interrupts pre-empting the program's time slices. However it 
is almost impossible to take such measures in a system with hundreds of users in order 
to have the actual CPU time. Various time measurements have been taken so as to 
minimise the distortions brought up. 
152 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented the tests results performed on two systems when using an 
integrated algorithm for contingency evaluation. The proposed technique has been 
implemented successfully on sequential and parallel mode. 
The proposed algorithm aims to reduce the significant time necessary to assess all the 
possible contingencies by selecting part of the entire system as the system on which the 
contingency may have some effect. The buses and branches in the reduced system are 
monitored for any constraint violation. The Fast Decoupled Load Flow has been used 
for the subnetwork analysis. 
Four different strategies have been investigated to select the slack bus for the 
subnetwork. The capture rates has been obtained for the suggested strategies. The 
strategy that selects the slack bus based on the highest driving point admittance has 
shown a good performance. The capture rates and the rates of undefined contingencies 
for the appointed strategy are better then its counterpart. 
For the systems tested the method has classified as undefined a number of cases 
somewhat expressive. Some component violations detected by the algorithm have not 
been so by the load flow for the whole system with a branch outaged. It has been also 
observed that some buses sensitive to the contingency have not been encompassed by 
the criterion based on a specified number of tiers. 
The integrated technique is not free of misclassification and the number of miss and 
false alarms has increased as the system size grows. 
When the subnetwork load flow tolerance was set equal to that one for the whole 
system the number of undefined contingencies has risen, the number of false alarms 
halved, and the number of miss alarms has not changed. A more accurate load flow has 
taken longer for the number of iterations has increased. 
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When the contingency evaluation is carried out by various computer processors the 
time required for the assessment of a set of contingencies is reduced: The algorithm performance 
--- --,--, 
increases with the system size. As far as the contingency analysis is concerned the 
security analysis can take advantage of the time reduction as a result of a parallel 
processing. The algorithm accuracy can be improved on account of the resulting 
surplus time. Yet, functions other than contingency analysis but not least important for 
the system security can be added to the control centre as part of the real time analysis 
tools. 
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Chapter Seven 
CONCLUSIONS 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In attempting to fonnulate a solution to a problem, it is important to consider several 
approaches that might be used in order to choose the most appropriate. In this thesis a 
broad range of techniques relating to power system security analysis have been 
analysed. An integrated technique that selects and analyses concurrently branch outage 
contingencies has been developed. The proposed method has been successfully 
implemented on a sequential and parallel mode. A high perfonnance computing 
platfonn has been used to investigate the algorithm perfonnance and the application of 
multiprocessors for the security analysis purpose. 
Results for the actual Southern Brazilian system and an IEEE system have been 
obtained with the proposed technique and are compared with those obtained by the 
conventional ac load flow method. 
7.1 MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS 
The integrated contingency analysis technique takes all advantages of the nominated 
fast screening methods. The proposed method reduces the computational effort in 
contingency analysis by solving only a subset of the total network and monitoring only 
a limited number of elements for each contingency to identify cases causing limit 
violations. The subset is analysed by a full decoupled load flow solution and the 
presumed tolerance is \0.1 in order to speed up the time solution. The computational 
cost of analysing each contingency is affected very little by system size and the overall 
computational effort should be approximately proportional to the number of 
contingencies. Infonnation generated during the subnetwork solution are postulated as 
if a load flow had been run for the overall network. 
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The main method achievements are: 
1. The method is fast and therefore suitable for real-time applications. 
2. It can detect both overload and voltage problems. 
3. Its accomplishment is twofold in the sense it finds the magnitude violation of a 
component and the nature ofa contingency. 
4. The search for component violations is restricted to the selected subnetwork. 
S. The critical contingencies as weU as the violated elements are identified. 
6. A trade-off between the computational accuracy and computational effort can be 
controlled by the user as weU as the subnetwork size. 
7. The performance and efficiency of the method has been verified on large practical 
problems. 
8. The method can be used for contingency ranking with the results for the subsystem 
substituted into a performance index. 
9. As the monitored variables are explicitly computed the calculated variables can be 
substituted into a performance index with a higher order exponent to mitigate the 
effects of false alarms. 
10. As the number of processors increases the solution speeds up and a larger scope of 
contingencies can be simulated as a consequence. 
11. The speedup achievement in a multiprocessor machine improves for larger 
networks. 
12. The communication time between processors is small. 
The method limitations are 
1. A group of uncertain cases may result and additional time spent to determine the 
nature of these contingencies. 
2. The number of undefined contingencies is somewhat. large· 
3. Misc1assification may result for critical and non-critical contingencies. 
4. The methods is not sensitive to an overspreading of voltage problems. 
S. A systematic way for selecting the sensitive buses and therefore the subnetwork is 
required. 
6. Only branch contingencies have been considered. 
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7.2 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
1. To bring in the integrated algorithm to be part of the real-time power system 
simulator developed at LABSPOT - Laborat6rio de Sitemas de Potencia at Federal 
University of Santa Catarina (Brazil). 
2. To implement a real-time security active and reactive generation dispatching 
function as a control action for the critical contingencies. 
3. To investigate the application of artificial intelligence based tools, which includes 
expert systems, automated knowledge acquisition and verification, artificial neural 
networks, genetic algorithms, fuzzy logic, for addressing power system security 
analysis as an adjunct to the purely mathematical procedures. 
4. To develop parallel techniques to re-define the security region of a power system 
before changes on load demand, network configuration and external equivalents 
aiming its application in the real time mode. 
5. To exploit parallel processing for fault-level analysis. 
6. To apply parallel processing to bring together alternative control actions on account 
of contingency on network essential components. 
7. To investigate the parallel processing for multiple contingencies including generator 
and branch outages. 
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Appendix A 
APPROACHES TO STEADY-STATE SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
A.t. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of steady-state contingency analysis in both planning and operation 
systems is well recognised. In both instances performance and reliability of the system 
are judged in terms of criteria based on power flows and/or bus voltages. If a potential 
outage would result in security constraint violations then the system is said to be 
vulnerable, a condition which should be quickly detected and result in corrective 
operational actions or, in planning, system redesign. 
One problem of primary importance in power system operation is that of avoiding 
insecure operating conditions. Remember that these are operating conditions which 
may lead to interruption, or unacceptable service deterioration, to a significant number 
of customers. These situations may arise in the event of the system being affected by 
one or more contingencies the occurrence of some of which cannot, in practice, be 
avoided. The operations engineer has the responsibility of assessing the security of the 
system against a set of probable contingencies. 
The contingency analysis of a power system requires the evaluation of the effects of a 
large number of contingencies which may occur on the system. The purpose of this 
evaluation is to identifY those contingencies which cause out-of-limit conditions and to 
determine the extent of such violations. The analysis in real-time of the system can 
provide timely information about imminent problems. Often such analysis is initiated 
automatically on a periodic basis or on significantly system load or topology changes as 
well as on a request from the operations engineer. In principle, for any specific system 
and given set of contingencies, a full AC Load Flow (ACLF) program is run to estimate 
the current state and the post contingency system condition for all contingencies in the 
set. The ACLF model employs a full complex representation and solves for the real and 
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reactive power flows and the voltage magnitudes and phase-angles. The results are 
accurate but the length of computation has always been a problem. 
For a power system of average size it is generally accepted that the analysis of several 
hundred contingencies is required. This brute force approach becomes prohibitive due 
to the computational burden, it is also time consuming. In fact, contingency analysis is 
often the most time-consuming function in a Power System Control Centre with a 
significant and very unwelcome impact on computer sizing. 
To circumvent the difficulties two general approaches for performing steady-state 
security analysis have been devised to reduce the computing load: point-wise and 
region-wise approaches. The following section outlines the principles of these 
approaches. 
A.I.t Point-Wise And Region-Wise Approaches 
Point-wise methods test the system security at a given operating point to determine if 
the system can withstand the impact of each contingency. If the operating point 
changes (e.g. the load changes) the system security must be tested again. Basically, the 
point-wise approach determines if a particular operating point satisfies the set of 
constraints imposed by the generation and network operating limits. This involves 
performing a series of approximate load flow calculations to evaluate the security for 
each operating point following the set of postulated contingencies and checking if any 
security constraints are violated. 
The major effort is on developing efficient methods for updating the base case solution 
(when no contingencies are considered) in order to predict the solution under the 
contingency condition. 
A wide range of computational methods have been developed using the point-wise 
approach, some of these will be described below. 
A-2 
Region-wise methods are conceptually different from the point-wise methods. These 
approaches try to identifY the region defined by the set of all operational and security 
constraints on the static state variable space ! or control variable space !!. for which 
the system is secure. 
Instead of testing each contingency from a set separately, as is done in the point-wise 
approach, an infinite number of steady-state secure operating states is embodied in the 
security region giving an indication as to whether the system operating conditions 
locate the system in a secure region and how far the operating point is from the 
boundary of the security region. 
The steady-state security region is derived from mathematical relations given by a 
network model (e.g. ACLF, FDLF, or DCLF). When the security region is defined in 
the state space the following general notation is used to represent the security region 
where 
f is the set of state variables <!::,~ that satisfY all operational and security 
constraints 
! denotes the state variables. The state variable constraints of interest 
imposed on the network consist of those reflecting allowable variation in 
bus voltage magnitudes, i.e.V km :5; Vk :5; VkM,k E {s} U{PV} u{PQ} 
~ . denotes the output variables PGkok E {s};QGkok E {s}u{PV} and Pkl 
with k = I, ... ,nb and 1= k + I, .... ,nb 
b.W is a real valued vector function representing the output equations which 
consist of those equations associated with the output variables, !J.<!::,~ =:1: 
Table A.I summarises the output equations for the ACLF model. 
m, M are lower and upper limits on the variables. 
When a branch outage takes place the output equations b. change since some elements 
of the admittance matrix [y] change. As a consequence the security region f will also 
change for this type of outage. Note that although the operating point ! changes with 
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branch outages the bus voltage magnitude constraint set y"m :!>!:::!>!:: M is unaffected by 
line outages because this set represents explicit constraints on the bus voltage 
magnitudes. 
ym :1:: yM !leE 
p'm 
S 
Ps p'M s V k 2 .. Ji(Gkl COSOkl +Bk/ sinOkl),k E {s} len 
Q: Qs Qf'l 1/kLVJ(GklsinOkl-BklcosOkl).k E {s} len 
Qm 
-G ~G QM -G ¥k LVJ(GklsinOkl-Bk/coSOkl).k E {PV} fen 
m Pkl Pkl M Pkl V hkl-VkVJgkl cosOkl- VkVJbkl SinOkf. 
k=I •... ,nb, and/=k+l, ...• nb 
Tab.A.l Implicit Constraints And Output Equations For The ACLF Model 
When generator .. outageslload-demand changes are considered the set f remains 
unaffected because the output equations !l do not change ([Y] remains constant. only 
y. the control variables, change). 
Fig.A.l, taken from (Hatpin 1982), illustrates the mapping of the output variable 
constraints into the state space ~ via the output equation l!. under pre-contingency 
conditions, denoted by l!.0 and under the A-th branch outage, denoted by b.J... This 
figure shows the effect on the security region due to branch outage and generator 
outageslload demand changes. 
The security region f is affected only by branch outage contingencies but not by 
generator outageJIoad demand change contingencies. When the operating point is 
included in the region the system is said to be secure, otherwise it is insecure. 
For a security region defined on to the control space the following general notation is 
used to represent the security region 
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where 
N 
f 
is the set of control variables that satisfY all operational and security 
constraints 
denotes the control variables Pbk E {PV}u{PQ} and Qbk E {PQ} 
[Some Authors (Galiana et al 1980, Mescua et al 1980) consider the 
independent variables as control variables]. 
represents the network equations (load flow equations) that must be 
solved to obtain the state variables :!: given the control variables 
y.,[(f) = Y.. 
denotes the inverse load flow equations mapping the constraints from the 
state space :!: into the control space Y.,J -I (0 = :!:. 
denotes the mapping of the output variables constraints into the control 
space, t.U-I(y')] =,1::. 
The other variables were described when defining the security region f . 
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Fig.A'! Effect Of Contingencies On The Mapping Of The Output 
Variable Constraints Into The State Space 
(a) Under Transmission Line Outage 
(b) Under Generator OutageILoad Demand Change 
Note that to create the security region N the state and output variables constraints 
must be mapped into the control space as illustrated in Fig.A.2 (taken from (Halpin 
1982». 
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Fig.A2 Security Region Mlpped Into The Control Space 
For the reasons mentioned above the security region N changes when the effect of a 
branch contingency is considered. 
The major difficulty in the region-wise approach is related to the computational effort 
required to characterise the security region in such a way that testing the membership 
of a point in this set can be established in a much simpler manner by performing load 
flow studies. The number of constraints defining a security region in the operating 
space (! or!!) is normally very large even after deleting redundant constraints. In 
addition, the difficulty is increased by the change in the region, as demonstrated above, 
as the network configuration changes. Therefore, up to now the available methods 
based on the region-wise approach have not been considered attractive as a substitute 
for the simple and widely used point-wise based methods. 
A.2. STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS 
In the point-wise approach one procedure adopted is to separate the contingency 
analysis into five distinct stages (Stott et al 1987). The stages can be used off-line, in 
which case larger computation time can be devoted to derive results of excellent 
accuracy, or on-line in which case speed is of primary importance. The steps are: 
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(1) select a base case and prepare data for it; 
(2) contingency definition; 
(3) select contingencies; 
(4) evaluate selected contingencies; 
(5) interpret the simulation results for power system operators. 
Although the same basic algorithm is applied off-line and on-line some steps are 
performed in different ways. The base case values are obtained from full ACLF; in on-
line applications the current operating state of the power system is used as the base 
case. 
Contingency definition is the least time-consuming function. In order for the 
contingency evaluation to be effective, all reasonable outages which deal with all 
possible power system operating conditions must be tested. Many of the contingencies 
may have little significance in most operating conditions but occasionally they become 
extremely important. The list is reviewed infrequently and changes only slowly. A few 
contingencies may be entered by the power system operators in order to deal with 
specific concerns they have in response to short term changes in the power system but 
most of the list is static. The list is translated into electrical system changes, normally 
injection and/or branch outages. 
Contingency selection is the process which offers the greatest potential for 
computational saving. Its purpose is to shorten the original long list of contingencies by 
eliminating that vast majority of cases having no violations. The contingencies can be 
selected by performing a series of load flow runs on alternative system configurations 
but for a complete system security analysis a large number of solutions has to be 
obtained and therefore a simulation method which avoids the need for repeated load 
flow runs is desirable. Yet it may use an approximate power flow system model with 
appropriate computational techniques to give relatively rapid but limited-accuracy 
results. The vast amount of information derived from the approximate simulations are 
converted in single numbers by a Security or Performance Index which try to measure 
how much a specified outage violates security constraints. 
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Contingency evaluation using an exact AC power flow is then performed on the 
successive individual cases in decreasing order of severity. Numerical results from 
evaluation are screened to detect limit violations, which are made available to the 
power system operators. 
Contingency selection and evaluation may become merged into one process with a 
single set of simulations on the contingency list. This occur when the accuracy of the 
contingency selection method is fair enough or when fast selection cannot be performed 
reliably and a more accurate contingency evaluation-type model is needed (Stott et al 
1987). 
A.2.t Approximate Contingency Evaluation Technique For Selecting 
Contingencies 
Considerable research has been pursued into the development of efficient digital 
algorithms to reduce the time required for contingency selection and sometimes for 
contingency evaluation. The incentive to find such methods is a consequence of the 
increase in the number of buses required to properly represent a large interconnected 
system, the consequent increase in computer running time per case and the increase in 
the number of cases that must be investigated. 
In order to speed up this evaluation most of the previous work in this area has 
concentrated on bigger computers, faster solutions and simplified (Le. approximate) 
methods. Ideally, each contingency should be analysed by a full ACLF, but although 
this provides accurate results it is obviously more expensive in computational terms and 
is rarely feasible in a real-time environment. 
The permissible levels of approximation in contingency evaluation are very system-and 
case-dependent. Speed-versus-accuracy compromises are frequently based largely on 
engineering judgements and, sometimes on sheer expediency. However it is agreed that 
extremely accurate results are not necessary since the contingency case is only a 
possible situation, as such approximate formulations and solutions are adequate (and 
only balanced or positive-sequence changes are considered). 
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Using an approximate (where possible, linear) power system model with appropriate 
techniques is the procedure used so that a large amount of system contingencies can be 
analysed quickly off- and on-line. Some of these techniques are iterative whilst others 
are not. A representative survey of the approximate methods include (Debs et a11975): 
(a) Network Sensitivity Methods 
(b) Exact DC Outage Analysis 
(c) Z-Matrix Method 
(d) Fast Decoupled Load Flow 
( e) Iterative Linear Power Flow. 
Those contingencies derived from the above which are likely to lead to system 
insecurities are retained for a more detailed study. 
Contingency evaluation methods are able to take advantage of the sparsity techniques. 
Some of the above methods employ Inversion Matrix Modification Lemma-IMML 
(specific versions have been called 11 compensation ") along with sparse vector methods. 
The compensation techniques provide a rapid way to update the solution without 
reconstructing and refactorizing or inverting the new matrix that is created by the 
network change due to contingencies. 
A brief comment on each of the above methods is given below, the reader is directed to 
the references for more details. 
A.2.t.t Network Sensitivity Methods 
These methods are used to test the ability of the system to cany power without 
exceeding limit ratings after a contingency has occurred. 
The network sensitivity factors for the system are precomputed to provide real power 
flow changes due to network, generation, and load changes without making use ofload 
flow studies. 
In contingency terrns the sensitivity factor is the fraction of the power flow in one item 
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of equipment that is transferred to all other transmission branches when that equipment 
is removed. The effects of any contingency can then be calculated by using these 
sensitivity factors which can be derived in a variety of ways. 
Sensitivity factors and superposition were first used by Mac Arthur (Mac Arthur 1961) 
in evaluating the severity of either single contingency or multiple contingencies 
combined with interchange variations. The author uses the factors to superpose power 
flow on the basic power flows. Two cases are considered: one concerns changes in 
power flow corresponding to changes in generator output using generation shift 
factors and the other involves the redistribution of power flow following a branch 
outage using branch distribution shift factors. 
The generation shift factors are designated si;" and have the following definition 
where 
Al},r i 
si;" = M';.. 
si;" is the factor that represents the sensitivity of the flow on line i to a change 
in generation at bus A. 
i is the branch index 
A. is the bus index 
M'br i is the change in real power flow on branch i when a change in generation, 
M';.. occurs at bus A. 
M';.. is the change in generation at bus A. (I1P;.. = - P j ; P j is the 
generated before the outage). 
The computation for generator outages requIres the application of a generation 
redistribution function to allocate lost generation to the remaining generators. Different 
redistribution rules can be applied. If it is assumed that all generation lost would be 
made up by the reference generation then new power flow on each branch in the 
network can be calculated using a pre-calculated set of" s" factors as follows 
A·IO 
where 
Pbr ; denotes the flow on branch i after the generator on bus A. fails 
nO the flow before the failure 
rb, ; 
nbr the number of branches 
Suppose now that the loss of the generator on bus A. is compensated by the remaining 
generators in proportion to their maximum MW rating. Thus, the proportion of the 
generation pick up from unit k (k ~ A.) would be 
where 
~Um is the maximum MW rating for generator I 
hu is the proportionality factor for pickup on generating unit k when unit A. 
fails. 
Under the assumption that all the generators in the network participate in making up 
the loss, the flow on branch i is: 
Pbr ; = Pb~ ; + L.S;khUt:.P,t 
The evaluation of the effect of single line and transformer outages on a comprehensive 
basis where every line of the system is opened, one at a time, was developed by EI-
Abiad et al (EI-Abiad et al1963). 
The branch distribution shift factors are used in a similar way and applied to the testing 
for overloads when transmission branches are dropped. By definition, the distribution 
factors are given by 
where 
d;,t is the branch distribution shift factor when monitoring branch i after an 
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outage on branch A 
APbr i is the change in real flow on branch; 
p,o is the original flow on branch A before it was dropped. hr j 
The flow on branch j with branch A out is then 
with the branch distribution shift factor defined as 
where 
o p,o Phr j, br A. 
Pbr I 
MA. 
118 A. 
O/A. 
are the pre-outage flows on branches; and A respectively 
is the flow on branch; with branch A out 
is the change in susceptance of branch A 
is a scalar defined as 118)" = (M i 1 + X).,A.)-1 
is a scalar denoted by Kronecker delta, 
0;;.,=0, for ;>"A 
l,fori=A 
X lA. is a scalar defined as X;;., = mf[ Br r 1 m ).,; X).,A. is defined in similar 
m. 
-/ 
way 
is a (nb -1)xl] incidence column vector; the position referring to the 
slack bus is discarded 
is a (nb -1)x(nb -1)] inverse of the reduced susceptance matrix. 
Thus following a single-branch outage the flow change in any other branch is given by 
its distribution factor multiplied by the pre-contingency flow in the outaged branch. 
Ref.(Limmer 1969) discusses a method for evaluating mUltiple contingencies by 
computing distribution factors for the mUltiple line outage cases from single outage 
distribution factors. 
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Using the generator and branch outage procedure described above, a digital computer 
program can be made to perform a contingency analysis study. An outage flow Pbr I on 
each branch can be checked against its limit and those exceeding their limit reported to 
the operations personnel. 
The derivations of sa and diJ., are obtained from the incremental version 
(IlB = -{Brrl llP) of the DC Load Flow-DCLF where all assumptions established for 
the DCLF method are applied in the Network Sensitivity Methods. (See Ref.(Wood et 
aI 1984) for a well explained and clear description for calculating the network 
sensitivity factors on which this short review is based). The factors are calculated as a 
function only of the original bus susceptance matrix terms and branch susceptances. 
Since it is a Brrl matrix method the system size is limited to the Brrl matrix which 
can be retained in the computer memory. The method is not selective and determines 
the flow in every branch for every outage. 
The Network Sensitivity Methods are a very fast way of determining the effect of 
system changes but the accuracy is not particularly high since linearity is assumed at the 
modelling stage. They have the advantage of allowing a large number of calculations to 
be carried out in the initial phase and then a simple calculation gives the results of 
system changes. The disadvantage is that a large number of factors must be stored. This 
will probably necessitate some secondary (auxiliary) memory (e.g. magnetic tape) to 
save and retrieve the factors. Moreover the periodic updating (for permanent network 
change), storing and retrieving of the large set of sensitivity factors imposes a 
computational burden. The use of sensitivity factors is declining. 
A.2.1.2 Exact DC Outage Analysis 
The DC Load Flow Outage technique involves a fast, simple and non-iterative 
computer algorithm for assessing branch real flows resulting from any combination of 
network or bus real changes. The method is based on the DC Load Flow-DCLF 
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equations and its accuracy depends upon the validity of the simplitying assumptions 
made to simplity the standard AC Load Flow equations. 
The result of applying the mentioned assumptions is a linear approximate model 
which represents the flow through the branches between buses k and 1 with Bkl 
representing the element k -I of the susceptance matrix. 
Writing the above equation in matrix form (Baughman et al 1970, Schweppe et al 
1970) 
is the vector of branch flows 
is a (nbrxnbr) diagonal branch susceptance matrix with the (i, i)th element 
(referred to branch i ) equal to B kl 
is the number of branches in the network 
is the inverse of the reduced susceptance matrix (this does not mean that an 
explicit inverse is used instead of the factors of Br]) 
P is the vector of bus real powers 
[Ar] is the reduced bus-branch incidence matrix A] with the row corresponding 
to the slack bus removed. Its dimension is (nb -1)xnbr] and the elements 
are: 
Akl = ifbus k is the origin of branch i 
Aki = - ifbus k is the end of branch i 
Aki = 0 otherwise; 
t denotes transpose matrix. 
The incidence matrix gives a one-to-one correspondence between the buses and the 
branches of the network. The input bus-branch connectivity data may be established by 
a connection analysis program which is activated by a change of circuit breaker status. 
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An evaluation for generationlload pattern change or transmission branch change based 
on equation for Ebr is now presented. 
(a) Evaluation of Generation-Load Pattern Changes 
In order to evaluate generationlload pattern changes (in the absence of network 
changes) equation for Ebr is used, this is repeated below 
Outages involving bus powers affect only the vector P and for any generation/load 
pattern the new branch flow vector P by can be computed. 
The solution for the generator unit outage in general requires the application of a 
generator allocation function to spread the lost generation over the remaining 
generators. 
(b) Evaluation of Network Changes 
The effect of network changes, assuming a given generator dispatch, can be simulated 
by using a compensation technique avoiding the need to reform and refactorise the 
network matrix for each branch-outage case (single or multiple contingencies), by 
retaining the matrix factors of the base case solution throughout. Compensation for 
these changes has to be included in each repeat solution as long as the base case 
remains the same. 
The general equation describing the compensation (A1sac et al 1983) for the network 
change is defined as 
Matrix A] represents a general matrix rather than the bus-branch incidence matrix. For 
any single network change represents the susceptance of the branch A which is 
between buses p and q whose state, open or closed, is to be changed. If the switching 
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operation is a branch removal the sign of f.t is negative; if a connection then the sign is 
positive. 
If either the bus p or q of the outaged branch is the slack bus the respective position in 
the vector m A. is set to zero remembering that, for a single modification, matrix M] 
becomes a single vector m A: 
If simultaneous contingencies are to be considered the vector m A. is replaced by the 
matrix M] whose dimension is (nb -l)xm]. Note that if m is made equal to the 
number of branches in the system the matrix M] becomes the bus-branch incidence 
matrix Arl 
The scalar (or matrix, for mUltiple contingencies) T/ must be calculated for each single 
(or group) contingency considered. If T/ is zero (or singular) a split network is 
indicated. 
Although this scheme avoids the retriangulation of the network matrices, it is faster for 
only, at most, three simultaneously-outaged branches (Stott et al1974). 
When the susceptance of a branch network is modified the matrix Bbr] defined in 
P br changes to 
where the superscript "0" means a condition before the outage, and ~ A. is the nbr 
column vector with "+ 1 " in the A-th position and "0" elsewhere. 
The new branch flows given by P br can be calculated using the compensation technique 
and equation [Bbr] to replace Brrl and Bbr ] respectively. 
If the branch flows before the outage are known, the vector P in equation for fbr is 
replaced by 
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.1 
and then 
Similarly the modified matrix Br] given by the compensation method and also 
equation for [Bbr ] can be substituted in the last Ebr to give the new branch flows in the 
system. 
The simplicity resulting from the linearity of the model and the rapid solution speed 
makes the DC Load Flow Outage method an attractive technique for contingency 
evaluation. Iterative calculations, as in load flow programs, are not needed for 
contingency checking. 
Nevertheless the DC Load Flow technique accuracy is too dubious for use on most 
power system and, in addition, it does not provide any information regarding bus 
voltage magnitude which is a critical factor in assessing contingencies. 
A.2.1.3 Z-Matrix Method 
• Z-Matrix methods make use of the bus impedance matrix associated with the base 
case system and the system modified by either branch removals or additions. T?is is 
: the method due to Brown (Brown 1985) and does seem to lead to correct concluslOns. 
The fundamental approach to contingency analysis using the matrix is to inject a 
fictitious current into one of the buses associated with the element to be removed of 
such value that the current flow through the element equals the base case flow; all other 
bus currents are set equal to zero. 
Assume that an outage of the branch p - q is to be investigated and that the base case 
system flows and voItages are available. A fictitious injection Ip is injected at bus p such· 
that it creates a current flow Ipq equal to the base case current I~q through the branch 
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p - q. This condition will be met if the difference in voltage across the two buses is 
equal to the voltage difference given by the base case solution. 
The current vector!.. given by [0 .•. OIpO .•. 0]' with a single nonzero element at position p 
is multiplied by the base case nodal matrix [2"] and made equal to the known voltage 
vector 
~I l r~ 
I 
j 
the [ZO] matrix is computed using any of the Z-matrix building algorithms. 
The equations of interest are those related to V p and Vq 
Vp =Z~plp 
Yq =Z~Ip 
The voltage difference across the branch p - q is obtained by subtracting Vp - Vq , 
resulting alp current value 
This is the value for I p which creates a base case current flow I~q through the branch 
p - q before it was dropped. This current will create throughout the system a current 
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flow pattern that will change in the same manner as the current flow pattern in the AC 
load flow solution when the element in question is removed. 
The current flows in all the other elements due to the injection of [p are now 
calculated. 
The voltage vector above can be written as 
Vk ZO kp 
V, Z,~ 
The injection of the current [pinto bus p win cause a current flow hi given by 
in which Zbr kl are branch impedance data available in the computer library. Although 
these currents have no real significance in the system being studied the change in their 
values produced by removing a branch are accurate. 
The next step is to remove branch p - q and calculate the new current flow pattern [' kl 
in the new system. Once the new currents are available the increment of current picked 
up by the branches k -I when branch p - q is removed can be determined 
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this means that, for k -/ = P - q, 
1'pq = 0 
Mpq =-I~q 
When the branch p - q is removed the current that had been flowing in it must now 
find alternative paths. This produces new voltage differences across the branches, as 
indicated next, in which the impedance matrix has been modified to compensate for the 
removed branch. Calculating the current flow pattern l' kl in the modified network [Z] 
requires only that the predetermined injection current I p above be injected, as before, 
into the modified network. The voltages that result from this injection can be used to 
determine the required flows: 
V'I 
J 
Therefore 
where I'pq = O. 
r~ 
I: 
I 
=[Z p = 
o 
l: 
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Zip 
J 
The modified network Izl matrix is determined using either the compensation 
technique, or the building algorithm, or another appropriate method (Takahashi et aI 
1973, Tinney et a11971, 8tott et a11986, Tinney et aI 1971, Enns et aI 1982 and Chan 
et aI 1985) whose procedures avoid the need to rebuild the entire impedance matrix. In 
networks characterised by passive, bilateral elements that are not magnetically coupled, 
the algorithm for removing and adding elements is straightforward. To remove a branch 
with impedance Zbr pq, it is only necessary to add, in parallel with the branch to be 
removed, a branch whose impedance is the negative of the original branch data, - Zbr pq 
Thus, branch removal algorithms are identical to branch addition algorithms (Brown 
1985). 
Substituting hI and l'kl into 6.1 kl the increment of current transferred to the branches 
IS 
The pre-contingency branch flows can be computed from the voltages obtained from 
the library record 
The current flow after the removal of branch p - q is 
The branch power flow S = P + jQ is obtained by mUltiplying the new current flow by 
the appropriate bus voltages obtained from the base case power flow. 
If multiple contingencies are to be considered, the same basic procedure is used except 
that a set of fictitious currents must be injected into the system creating in the branches 
to be removed a current flow equal to their base case flow values. Further, the [ZO] 
matrix must be modified appropriately to reflect the removal of the branches. Upon 
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injecting the bus currents into the original and modified system the desired changes in 
current flow can be obtained. 
In the interest of computer speed and reduction in computer memory requirement, 
Brown in Ref.(Brown 1985) proposes a method in which only selected axes of matrix 
[Z] are considered in the assembly of the matrix. As a consequence a rectangular [Z] 
matrix results with the rows corresponding to the buses at the ends of branches to be 
removed ("key" branches) as well as the buses at the ends of branches to be monitored 
(branches that tend to overload); the columns correspond to the branches to be 
removed. In this procedure, as soon as all branches have been connected to a bus the 
corresponding column of [Z] matrix is discarded provided that the bus is not a terminus 
of a branch to be removed. The row corresponding to the bus is discarded unless the 
bus is a terminus of a key or a monitored branch. 
The reduced matrix is stored and further reduction is obtained by extracting from the 
stored matrix only the required rows and columns related to the key branches to 
determine the value of the currents to be injected into one bus of each of the branches 
to be removed. The process is carried out in a similar way to that described above. The 
monitored branches are represented by the subscript "k - /" and the key branches are 
represented by the "p - q" subscript; the modification of the [Z] matrix to account for 
the change in the branch network is made on the complete matrix. 
The advantage of Brown's method is that a very large system can be studied at a 
reasonable speed; however it requires a great deal of experience by the person in charge 
of the security study to point out the critical branches that are likely to cause other 
branches to become overloaded and the limiting branches that have a tendency to 
become overloaded ifthe system is being operated abnormally. 
A.2.1.4 Fast Decoupled Load Flow 
In the past, considerably more emphasis has been placed on branch flows than on bus 
voltages. This has given rise to the very extensive use of Iinearised active-power 
models. 
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The use of an active-power model involves the assumption that voltages and reactive 
flows change very little after a contingency and that the latter are relatively small. 
In some power systems, particularly those where active-power transfers are limited by 
voltage drops, emphasis on contingent voltage monitoring is an important aspect to be 
considered from the realistic and accurate point of view of system security assessment. 
Numerical methods are generally at their most efficient when they take advantage of the 
physical properties of the system being solved. 
An inherent characteristic of electrical power transmission systems operating in the 
steady state is the strong interdependence between active powers and bus voltage 
angles on the one hand and between reactive powers and voltage magnitudes on the 
other. The coupling between the MW --' B and the MVAr - V components of the 
problem is relatively weak (Stott 1972). Thus, in the load-flow problem there has been 
a trend towards decoupling (solving separately) the P - () and Q - V problems. 
Contrary to the active-power model, the MV ArN oltage component is rarel)' acceptable 
as a stand-alone linearised model for the large perturbations caused by contingencies. It 
is necessary to evaluate the MVAr - V counterpart using the post-contingency voltage 
angles obtained from the active-power model. 
Considering the Newton method in its polar co-ordinate version, half of the elements of 
the Iacobian matrix represents the weak coupling with relatively small numerical values. 
These elements may be neglected. Mathematically the decoupling principle is as follows 
where 
E= i for the full Newton-Raphson method (Tinney et a11967a) 
E= 0 for the decoupled Newton algorithm 
and 
1lE., IlQ are vectors of real and reactive power mismatches 
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I1(L 11[ are vectors of corrections to voltage angles and magnitudes 
If the submatrices [N] and [J] are neglected and the left-hand side of the resulting 
equations are divided by the voltage magnitude V the following decoupled equations 
result 
I1P E = [H' ]I1fl. 
I1Q 
[ = [L' ]11[ 
[H'] and [L'] are sparse and, although symmetric in structure, are asymmetric in value 
and are both functions of Vand (). They must be calculated and triangulated for every 
iteration. 
The components of the Jacobian submatrices [H'] and [L'] are given as follows 
H'kl = Vt(Gkl sinBkl - Bkl COSBk1 ) 
lfkk=-Qk 1Vk -VkBkk 
L'kl = Gkl sinBkl- Bkl COSBkl 
L'kk = Qk /V[ - Bkk 
Further simplification can be obtained by assuming that the elements of the lacobian-
like matrix are constant with the elements containing only the network admittances. 
The following approximations are necessary (Stort et al 1974): 
( a) cos B kl approaches 1; 
(b) IBkll is much greater than IGkl sin Bkll 
( c) the shunt reactances are much larger than the series reactances, this results in 
IBkklv[» Qk· 
These simplifications lead to the Decoupled Load Flow-DLF equations 
I1P = [B'][V]M 
E 
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6.f..Q = [B OO ]6.f.. 
where [V] is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero elements correspond to the voltage 
magnitudes at the PQ buses. 
A number of refinements are possible: 
(a) omit from [B'] in ArJT!.. those network elements that predominantly affect MVAr 
flow, e.g. shunt reactances and off-nominal in-phase transformer taps. Neglect also 
the series resistances and put all the terms on the RHS to 1.0 pu; 
(b) omit from [BOO] in A gjE any effects due to phase shifting transformers. 
The resulting Fast Decoupled Load Flow-FDLF equations are then 
6.P 
-==[B']M f.. -
6.
v
Q 
= [BOO ]Af.. 
Due to the approximations made in arriving at the above equations, the quadratic 
convergence of the Newton-Raphson method is degraded although the convergence of 
the FDLF is still geometric. 
It should be noted that the decoupled methods introduce approximations only into the 
Jacobian matrix since the mismatches AP and AQ are obtained from the ACLF model 
using the difference between specified and calculated values. 
The matrices [B'] and [BOO] are dimensionally different and are of order 
(nb -1) and npQ respectively, where nb is the number ofbuses in the system and npQ 
is the number of PQ type buses, i.e. those where P and Q are known. [BOO] is 
symmetric in both position and value and so also is [B'] if phase shifters are absent or 
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accounted for by alternative means 1 . In fact, the method has been found to work just as 
well if phase shifters are left out of[B'] (Stott 1974). Consequently [B'] and [B"] are 
always symmetrical.', . The elements of the matrices are constant and need to be 
evaluated and triangulated only once per solution or for a particular network. 
[B'] and [B"] are real and sparse matrices resulting in storage computer economy and a 
high speed of solution provided the sparsity feature described earlier is taken into 
account. Both matrices can be triangularised using the same ordering regardless of the 
bus types and speed is sacrificed for simplicity of programming. In practice the [B"] 
matrix is assembled by considering all PV buses as being of the PQ type and then 
increasing, by a large amount, the magnitude of the driving point elements 
corresponding to the PV buses. The large diagonal is used to mask out the effects of 
the lower-diagonal terms. This artifice is equivalent to the addition of a large shunt 
susceptance to the PV type buses making the voltage magnitudes at these buses 
insensitive to any l'l.Q perturbations. Thus the components of the l'l.E vector 
corresponding to the PV buses are nulls and therefore the voltage magnitudes at these 
buses are constants. In order that the components of AE at the PQ buses shall not be 
affected by this artifice, the components of AQ corresponding to the PV buses must 
obviously be zero since at these buses the reactive power injection is not specified 
(Monticelli 1983). 
The solution to the complete problem is achieved, with a considerable reduction in 
computer time, by an iterative strategy consisting of solving A () to update 'fl and then 
solving for AE to update Y using the most up-to-date values of Vand () available. As 
soon as either the real or the reactive power has converged within a specified tolerance 
that part of the iteration is discontinued and the iteration process continues with the 
remaining part. 
The FDLF method is commonly accepted in the power industry and finds considerable 
application both for regular load flow studies and also for contingency analysis due to 
its accuracy, simplicity and computational efficiency. 
I The tap adjustments can be accountedfor either in the matrix or in the RHS vector, in the latter case 
the matrix is not asymmetric. 
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The most difficult problem with voltage contingency calculations is posed by the local 
voltage controls where the reactive power system injection limits at generator buses are 
taken into account. This question is important because a contingency that appears to 
cause severe voltage problems may really be within easy local control, however the 
calculation of the control effects always imposes a severe time penalty. Reactive power 
limit adjustments pose the greatest algorithmic problem in constant matrix methods. 
Recently published strategies (Chang et al 1988) have been proposed to account for 
adjustments in the FDLF method and are reported to adjust the solutions without 
substantial increase in the number of iterations and computational time. To take into 
consideration the switching of bus types the factor updating or partial refactorization 
methods (Benett 1965, Housos et al1982 and Chan et al 1985) are called for with both 
methods considered to be equally efficient. 
When a modification to the network topology is involved the basic equations of the 
FDLF model are written in such way that the coefficient matrices, [B'] and [B' '] can be 
used to modifY the vectors for At!.. and AI:: relative to their values before the 
contingency. According to the authors (Stott et al 1974) the transmission branch 
outages can be simulated by removing only the series transmission elements from the 
matrices [B'] and [B"]. The shunt elements such as line charging, reactors, and 
capacitors can remain in [B"] without noticeably affecting convergence. 
The efficient handling of branch contingencies is carried out using the sparse network 
compensation techniques. In this case a matrix [11e] is formed to account for the 
change in the AB vector and [77v] for the AI:: vector. Matrix [,u] contains the line or 
nominal transformer series admittance modifications. Two matrices [Me] and [Mv] 
are defined for the couplings P - 0 and Q - V, respectively. 
The dimensions of [Me] and [Mv] are compatible with the dimensions of the 
respective matrices. These matrices are dimensionally equal if the above suggestion of 
considering the same order for [Me] and (Mv] matrices is adopted. When one of the 
end buses connecting the branch to be removed is either a PV or a slack type the 
corresponding position in the vectors m 0 / lJJv (each vector m represents a removed 
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branch and the set forms the matrix [M]) is set to zero; however if both buses are PV 
or even slack-PV, then [B"] requires no alteration. 
For transmission line outage representation the vectors me and mv are defined as 
above. However if a transformer is involved then the nonzero elements of mV are akl 
(the off-nominal turns ratio referred to bus I) for element k and -1 for element 
I, for k < I, in order to take into account the shunt branches of the transformer 
equivalent circuit. This modification brings about the removal of the equivalent IT for 
the off-nominal tap ratio transformer (Schweppe et al 1970). 
Partial Factorization methods can also be used instead of compensation methods when 
the network matrix is modified. 
Outages involving generator/load units affect only the vector of bus powers. For a 
generator outage the vector t1P is characterised as the response of the non-outaged 
generators in accordance with a set of participating factors. The changes are reflected 
on the scheduled MV values of the remaining and participating generators (those 
operating at their capacity limit can be assigned as non-participating). If the generator 
outage simulates the loss of a complete generating plant, the voltage magnitude at the 
generator node is no longer fixed and the node converted to a PQ bus. 
A.2.1.S Iterative Linear Power Flow 
The Iterative Linear Power Flow-ILPF method involves a linearised ACLF solution 
which includes reactive and real power calculations resulting in another modified 
decoupled AC algorithm. 
As a complement to a standard AC power flow program, the ILPF can be used to scan 
a large set of possibilities to determine those that require exact solutions and detailed 
outputs. As such it can be used for assessment of the system security. 
Peterson et al (peterson et al 1972) made the following substitutions in the system 
defining: 
A-28 
(a) sinOkl by Okl + sinOkl- Okland 
(b) COSOkl by 1 + cosOkl-
Both substitutions are used in the real power equation but only the second in that for 
reactive power. 
As a result the real and reactive power equations can be written, after some 
manipulation, as follows 
Al§t= P(E!D 
Cl!:: = Q(E~) 
For reasons of stability the angular difference of the voltage at the end of a transmission 
branch is usually small; therefore, the sine and cosine functions on the RHS of the 
equations above can be expanded using a Taylor series terminating after the second 
term without affecting adversely the results of the calculation, at least within the 
accuracy required in a contingency analysis 
. Ofl 
smOkl = Okl-(j 
Oft 
COSOkl = 1-2 
After performing the substitutions and rearranging, the system of equations for real and 
reactive power becomes 
Al§t= P'+P' 
Cl!:: = Q'+Q' 
This illustrates the final decoupling of the real and reactive power equations. The 
dimension of the A] matrix is (nb -1) and that of C] is n PQ A similar procedure to 
that described in the preceding section may be used in order to triangulate matrices 
A] and [Cl by considering them to have the same dimension. 
The coefficient matrices A] and [C] are triangulated only once for a complete set of 
contingency outages. In this method the branch outages are catered for by modification 
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of the A] and [C] matrices whilst changes in the generation schedule are treated by 
modification of the P and Q vectors. 
The modifications in the matrices A] and [Cl to reflect the branch change can be made 
without resorting to retriangularisation by applying the sparse compensation technique. 
When using the ILPF technique for outage simulation and security monitoring the 
iteration scheme used to obtain the solution consists of two iterations of the real power 
equation followed by one of the equation for reactive power, this is carried out until 
convergence is obtained. 
A.2.1.6 Further Readings 
For the sake of completeness it seems to be pertinent to mention some other 
competitive methods for outage simulation. 
The "Fast Linear Contingency Analysis" (Enns et al 1982) has been proposed for 
handling branch outages and generationlload changes and their impact on branch flows. 
The method is based on an incremental real power model (IlP = [B]IlQ) and uses the 
compensation technique to account for branch outages. For a small number of outaged 
branches the compensation method makes use of the factors of B'] However, if all or 
even a large number of branches are to be removed (one by one) and the effects 
monitored for all the remaining branches the network is best compensated using the 
explicit inverse matrix (Tinney et al 1971, Enns et al 1982) as far as the number of 
arithmetic operation and computation time are concerned. The advantage can be lost if 
there is not sufficient primary memory to store the inverse matrix. The authors (Enns et 
al 1982) suggest a forced ordering approach to reduce the size of the matrix to be 
inverted. The ordering approach is said to cause a little degradation in the sparsity of 
B'] and consists of two groups of buses, retained group and all others. The two 
groups are ordered independently using Tinney's scheme 2 (Tinney et al 1967b) with 
the retained buses forced to be last. Only the submatrix corresponding to the retained 
buses is of interest to be inverted. 
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The explicit inverse is used for generator outage simulation whenever the generation 
loss is supplied by the slack generator. When the lost power is distributed among few 
other participating generators the triangular factors of B'] are found best appropriate. 
The method does not include reactive power considerations and consequently does not 
eliminate the need for AC solutions. 
The fast approximate AC techniques FDLF and ILPF described at sections A.2.1.4 and 
5, respectively, have been based on linearisation of the first order power load flow 
equations. However, the development of load flow methods which include the second 
order of the Taylor-series expansion of the power flow equations in Cartesian co-
ordinates has removed the need to perform outage simulation using an approximate 
linearised method. 
The second-order rectangular co-ordinates based methods (Iwamoto et al 1978, Roy 
1978) are capable of yielding to an exact solution since they are derived from the full 
Taylor-series expansion leading to an exact mathematical model with terms up to the 
second-order derivatives only. The rectangular approaches are generally considered 
superior than the polar version because the polar form introduces trigonometric 
functions and in the rectangular form terms beyond the second-order derivatives do not 
exist, for the second-order terms are constant. In addition, the Iacobian matrix and the 
matrix of second derivatives are constant and need to be computed only once. 
Improvements to reduce the size of the Iacobian matrix are suggested in Ref.(Adams et 
al 1981) making it to the same size as that used for the Newton-Raphson method in 
polar co-ordinates (Tinney et al 1967a) whilst in (Roy et al 1983) the memory 
requirement is comparable to the FDLF (Stott et aI1974). 
Branch outage can be simulated by introducing hypothetical nodal power injections at 
the branch terminating nodes in the form of a revised loading profile. The power 
injections are initially set equal to the pre-contingency power flow of the outaged 
branch. A new state is obtained for the new loading profile and the injected power is 
recalculated until the difference between the power injections of state k and k+ 1 is less 
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than a predetermined tolerance. It is worthy to note that the reduced Iacobian matrix is 
inverted once and is then used for all cases of outage. 
The advantage of the outlined method is in the potential for fast and exact outage 
simulation. In addition, the Jacobian matrix and its inverse, which are constant, can be 
evaluated off-line, performing only the fast iterative procedure on-line. 
Another promising alternative for outage simulation, as well as for conventional load 
flows, is the super decoupled technique (Haley et a11985, Iasmon et a11987). 
A.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS 
These methods for predicting the effect of each postulated contingency on the system 
performance are well-established analytical techniques. As an explicit simulation 
process the methods outlined have the inherent advantage of flexibility. Individual 
branch overloads and bus voltage violations can be pin-pointed. Alternatively, the 
calculated branch flows (or bus voltage angles) and the bus voltage magnitudes can be 
substituted into a nonanalytic security index or even, for instance, into a higher-order 
index in order to emphasise the overload over the heavy loaded branches. Security 
Indices have been criticised because they do not give operators specific information 
about the nature of the security problem. 
In spite of recent improvements in computational speed and efficiency the large number 
of cases to be analysed is still time consuming and usually most of the contingencies 
considered do not pose any threat to system security. However reducing the number by 
considering only a subset of contingencies selected on the basis of the personal 
experience of the engineer is likely to be unsatisfactory and lead to the possibility of 
omitting critical cases. 
The selection of those contingencies to be studied by the on-line security analysis 
programme should be based on the current operating conditions and disregard operator 
experience, they should be adaptive and the use of a fixed list based on off-line studies 
should be avoided. These considerations suggest the need for a computational efficient 
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algorithm which is able to identifY those contingencies which result in constraint 
violations without the need to perform extensive simulations. 
A-33 
Appendix B 
program project 
A LIST OF THE SOFTWARE OF THE INTEGRATED 
CONTINGENCY EVALUATION METHOD 
ImpllcK double precision (a-l1,o-z) 
parameter(kbr=600,kll=I500,kbl=400) 
c parameter (kbr=400,kII=580,kbI=200) 
c 
c 
common Antgrsl mb,ndadj,njcb 
dimension nsb(klQ,neb(kll) ,gl(klQ ,bl(kll) ,bO(kll),nremot(kii), 
• nblqtap(kll),nfrom(kll),nto(kli),lap(kll),tapmln(kli), 
• tapmax(kli),nt(kll),>d(kll),~(kli),npar(kll), 
tnorm(kll),temer(kll) 
dimension narco(kll),nos(klQ 
dimension angbase(kbr),vbase(kbr),nbarra(kbr) 
dimension yg(kbr),yb(kbr),bp(kbr),cp(kbr) ,bq(kbr),cq(kbr), vrn(kbr), 
• ntlp(kbr) ,nbar(kbr) ,yb2(kbr) ,Ibpqv(kbr),npos(kbr), 
• v(kbr),deKa(kbr),theta(kbr),e(kbr),fv(kbr), 
p(kbr),q(kbr),pcalc(kbr),qcalc(kbr),lb(kbr) ,pg(kbr), 
pd(kbr),qd(kbr),qg(kbr),qreat(kbr),qmin{kbr),qmax(kbr), • 
vspec(kbr),lpv(kbr),qqmin(kbr),qqmax(kbr) 
dimension nshunt(kbI),nbus In(kbl),nbus _ out(kbl), 
• nesenc(kbr),amod-y(kbl),pJn(kbl),cUn(kbI), 
• delv(kbr),nfroml (kll),ntol (kIi),nparl (kll) 
dimension C(T(kbr+kll»,d(T(I<br+kll»,t(2'(kbr+kll», 
• u(T(kbr+kll»,Kbl(T(kbr+kll»,Kb2(T(kbr+kli», 
• 
• 
bl (T(kbr+kli»,b2(T(kbr+kll)),lnbl (T(kbr+kll)), 
Inb2(T(kbr+kll»,nsbl (T(kbr+kli»,nsb2(T(kbr+kli», , 
nobl(T(kbr+kll»,nob2(T(kbr+kll»,kdjcy(T(kbr+kii», 
nlncd(T(kbr+kll»,lncd(T(kbr+kll»,lcol(T(kbr+kli», 
Itag(T(I<br+kII»,1nxt(2'(kbr+kll»,Icob(T(kbr+kli», 
nab(T(kbr+kll»,lnxb(T(kbr+kli»,ce(T(kbr+kli», 
bb(T(kbr+kli»,ba(T(kbr+kii» 
dimension dz(kbr+l ),npbl (kbr+l ),npb2(kbr+l ),Icbl (kbr+l), 
• nadjcy(kbr+1),lcb2(kbr+l) 
dimension Inul(kbr+kll) 
complex"16 coUn(kbQ,adm_out(kbI),s_ex(kbQ 
complex"16 el ,ainj,adm,aux 
character"80 tJtulo 
character"12 output 
character" 12 anom(kbr) 
e>dernals_vrnax 
Integer taskld,allgrp,80urce,nbuf( 4) 
c - deflnlcao das unldades de entrada e salda 
c 
call mp_envlron (numtask,laskld) 
klask = laskld + 1 
If(klaskJe.9)then 
wrHe(output,1 )klask 
else 
wrHe( output,2)klask 
end If 
1 fonnatCsalda' ,11 ,'.our) 
2 fonnatCsalda',12,'.ouf) 
c 
open(untt=lr, file='sulsud.dad' ,status='oler) 
open(untt=ktask,file=output,status='unknown') 
c-
c 
c 
source:ll 0 
If(taskld.eq.source )then 
c -IeRura dos dados de entrada 
c 
call1elabg (n,nl,maxtt,Rerpa,lgauss,tot,lpv,nsb,neb,no, 
• mbml,npv,ndxjcb,.,fv,qmln,qmax,p,q,gl,bl,bO, 
• detta,pg,qg,pd,qd,vspec,11 nO,lb,tap,nt,xI. 
• nfrom,nto,ntlp,anom,nbar.tapmin,tapmax, 
• tftulo,fatac,angle,lmprl,lmet,tsom, 
* vm,nremot,qreat,r1,npar,tnorm,temer, 
• ntapflx,ltertap,errotap,amort, 
• bp,cp,bq,cq,ibpqv,qqmin,qqmax,ksh,nshunt,ktask) 
c 
c - constantes de Impressao 
c 
c Iprfor = 0 I mforst 
c Ipreen = 0 I conex 
c Iprsai = 0 t salda 
c iprctg = 0 I cntg 
c Iprbou = 0 t bounding 
c iprsub • 0 I sub_set 
c Iprbor = 0 I border 
c Iprch = 0 I choose_s 
c Iprbln = 0 I bordeUn 
c Iprinj = 0 Ilnjecao 
c Iprsh = 0 I shuntin 
c Iprswa = 0 I swap 
kcont = 0 
nlnl = 0 
nln =0 
nout :11 0 
do l=l,nl 
nareo(i) = I 
end do 
do l=l,n 
nbarrs(l) = I 
end do 
kb =n 
nllne = nl-ksh Ideve ser mantldo devido conex 
Iprfor = 0 
call mforst (n,nl,kb,nllne,nsb,neb,nc,narco,nos,lcomp. 
nbarrs,nbar ,Iprfor,ktask) 
Ipreon' 0 
Iprsal = 0 
call conex (n,nbar,anom,nline,nsb,neb,narco,nc,nos, 
• Icomp,nesenc,nce,lpreon,lprsai,ktask) 
• 
call parallel (nfrom,nto,xt,ri,bO,nsb,neb,nt,gl,bl,tap, 
tapmax,tapmln,nremot,npar,nl,ksh,nshunt, 
nce,nesenc) 
• 
• 
call newdesl (n,nl,maxit,Rerpa,lgauss,tol,lpv,nsb,neb,nO, 
• mbm1,npv,e,fv,qmin,qmax,p,q,gl,bl,bO,delta, 
pg,qg,pd,qd,vspec,ll nO,lb,tap,nt,xI,ntlp, 
anom,nbar,tapmln,tapmax,titulo,angle,lmp~, 
Imet,lsom,vm,nremot,ntapflX,Rerlap,enotap, 
amort,bp,cp,bq,cq,ibpqv,nad)cy,kd)cy,nincd, 
Incd,lnul,Rbl ,Inbl ,Icbl ,nsbl ,yg,lcoI,~ag, 
Inxt,yb,nbl ,nobl ,npbl ,t,u,v,theta,kcont,nin, 
nbus_in,corJn,adm_out,lcomp,nc,pJn,lLln. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
kcond,ldverg,kmaxit,ktask) 
teste de vlolacao de restricoes do caso base 
• 
kftout = 0 
W(kllout.ne.O)lhen 
call1flout (nl,nadjcy,kdjcY,nincd,nsb,neb,tnorm, 
nfrom,nto,t,u) 
dol:=:1,n 
If(lb(I).eq.2)then 
W(v(Q.gt.l.05dO)then 
wrlte(Iw,28)nbar(l) 
wrlte(· ,28)nbar(l) 
end If 
If(v(I).UOd-l~hen 
wrlte(Iw,29)nbar(l) 
wrlte(" ,29)nbar(l) 
end If 
end If 
end do 
end If 
tempo I"iclal de processamento 
ti· mclockO 
annazenando valores do caso base 
dol=l,n 
angbase(l) = deRa(l) 
vbase(i) = v(l) 
end do 
pslack = pg(nO) 
qslack = qg(nO) 
11nO_8 = lInO 
dol=l,nl 
nfroml (I) = nfrom(l) 
ntol (I) = nlo(l) 
nparl (I) = npar(l) 
end do 
end If c _________ _ 
caU mp_task_query(nbuf,4,3) 
allgrp = nbuf(4) 
msglen = 4·20 
call mp_beast (Inulo,msglen,source,allgpr) 
msglen=4 
call mp_beast (nl,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (n,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (Imet,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (igauss,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (maxit,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (~erpa,msglen,source,.lIgpr) 
call mp_beast (isom,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (ntapflX,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (Re~p,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (Imp~,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (kcont,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (ninl ,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp beast (nout,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp:beast (nO,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (ilnO_s,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (ksh,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (nce,rnsglen,source,aUgpr) 
msglen=S 
call mp_beast (errotap,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp beast (amort,msglen,source,aHgpr) 
call mp:beest (fatac,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (angle,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (pslack,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (qslack,msglen,source,allgpr) 
msglen = 4·ksh 
call mp_beest (nshunt,msglen,source,allgpr) 
msgktn = 4*nce 
caU mp_beest (nesenc,msglen,source,allgpr) 
msglen = 4·nl 
call mp_beast (narco,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caN mp beest (nsb,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp:beast (neb,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beest (nfrom,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (nto,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (nt,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (nremot,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (npar,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beest (nfroml ,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp beest (ntol ,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp:beest (nparl,msglen,source,allgpr) 
msglen = S·nl 
call mp beest (gl,meglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp:beest (bl,meglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (bO,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (xI,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp beest (rt,meglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp:beest (tap,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (tapmln,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beest (tapmax,msglen,source,allgpr) 
msglenc 4*n 
call mp_beest (nbarra,meglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beest (nbar,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
call mp_beast (ib,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
call mp_beast (ntlp,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (lbpqV,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
msglen = 4"3"n 
caU mp_beast (anom,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
msglen = 8*n 
caN mp_beast (e,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
caU mp_beast (lv,msglen,sourca,aUgpr) 
call mp_beast (vm,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
caU mp_beast (v,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
caU mp_beast (qqmln,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (qqmax,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (p,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (q,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (pg,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (qg,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (pd,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (qd,msglen,sourca,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (bp,msglen,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (cp,msgten,source,allgpr) 
caU mp_beast (bq,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (cq,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (vbase,msglen,source,allgpr) 
call mp_beast (angbase,msglen,source,aUgpr) 
dlstrlbul contadores de clrcunos entre prccessadores 
Iprctg· 0 
call cntg (ktask,nl,numtask,tasidd,kde,kate,nfroml ,ntol, 
• ksh,lprctg) 
write(ktask:)'kde kate' 
write(ktask,I23)kde,kate 
do 11= kde,kate 
kppl • nfroml (11) 
kqql = ntol (11) 
npl • nparl (11) 
• 
If(kqql ,eq.O)goto 11 
doj=l,nl 
If(nfromO).eq.kppl .and. ntoO).eq.kqql .and. 
nparO).eq.npl)then 
kcont· j 
If(npl.eq.O)then 
do k=1,nce 
W(kcont.eq.nesenc(k»goto 11 
end do 
end if 
write(ktask,21)kppl,kqql 
write(',21)kppl,kqql 
If(npl.ne.O)write(ktask,30)npl 
• transformattao de c6dlgo de barra em contador de barra 
kpp • nsb(kcont) 
kqq • neb(kcont) 
golo 12 
endW 
end do 
12 continue 
• 
17 
• 
• 
nrefax.=-= 0 
em bounding Inlcla-se a formaC8o de urn novo "barra 
Iprbou' 0 
IpMlb=O 
Iprtor = 0 
nvz • 3 lvalor a ser lido 
kvz = nyz Idetermlna 0 no. de anels clrcunvizinhos a 
!contingencia 
call bounding (n,nl,narco,kpp,kqq,nsb,neb,nfrom,nto, 
kcont,kb,nbarra,nbar,Jad,nc,lcomp,nos, 
kvz,lprbou,lprsub,lprfor,ktask) 
writer,7)kvz 
write(ktask,7)kvz 
If(nc.ne.l.and.lcomp.ne.O)then 
write(',4)nc,lcomp 
write(ktask,4)nc,lcomp 
goto 11 
elsa If(nc.ne.l )then 
write(',5)nc 
write(ktask,5)nc 
goto 11 
else If(lcomp.no.O)then 
write(ktask,3)lcomp 
o 
o 
o 
o 
goto II 
end II 
call start (nlnl ,notJl,nbusJn,nbus_out,coUn,s_ex, 
adm_out,pjn,cUn) 
II(kb.tt.n)lhen 
Iprbor' 0 
call border (kb,nbarra,nbar,nl,lad,nsb,neb,narco,kcont, 
nbusjn,nbus_out,nln,notJl,lprbor,ktask) 
elss 
write(ktask,24) 
write(O,24) 
goto 11 
endW 
nin1 ill nin I 0 valor podera ser alterado em borderJ" 
I 0 valor Inlcial sera usado em start 
lesta nbout apos relaxacao no subslstema 
II(nrelax .ne. 0) then 
1=0 
do wIlile(l.tt.kb) 
1=1+1 
il(nbar_nbout .eq. nbar(nbarra(i)})then 
nbotJ! = nbarra(i) 
write(ktask,o), mantem slack de ant .. da relaxacao' 
goto14 
endW 
end do 
write(ktask, .)' erro na busca da slack do sistema relaxado' 
end II 
testa barra slack do caso base no sUbsistema 
1-0 
do wIllle(l.tt.kb) 
'-1+1 
H(no.eq.nbarra(l»then 
nbout III nO 
write(O :),slack In bounding' 
goto14 
end II 
end do 
Iprch • 0 
call choose_si (nl,lad,kcont,nO,narco,nsb,neb,gl,bl,nln,nout, 
o nbusjn,nbus_out,nbar,amod-Y,nbout,lprch,ktask) 
o 
o 
II(noulne.O)then 
Iprbln = 0 
call borderjn (n,nl,kb,lad,nbus_out,nbusJn,nin,nsb,neb, 
nfrom,nto,narco,nbarra,nbar,nbout,iprbin, 
ktask) 
end II 
14 continue 
o 
o 
Injecao de torrente nas barras de fronteira Intema 
Iprin) = D 
11(lprin).ne.O .and. nin.ne.O)write(ktask,22) 
do 1=1 ,nln 
11 • nbusjn(l) 
aln) " cmplx(O.dO,O.dO) 
Injecao de corrent. constante 
" 
" 
call1njecao (1,lad,nl,narco,kcont,nsb,neb,vbase,angbase, 
vbase,angbase,gl,bl,bO,nt,tap,nbusJn,ainj) 
corJn(l) = dconjg(alnj) 
11(lprtnj.ne.O)then 
write(ldask,1 O)nbar(nbus In(I)),cor In(l) 
end II 
Injecao de potencla para valor .. de tensao de base 
angl • angbase(lI) 
el = vbase(lI)"cmplx(dcos(angl),dsln(angl» 
8_ex(I). el"corJn(l) 
end do 
Iprsh • 0 
call shunUn (nl,lad,narco,nsb,neb,nlrom,nto,nbarra,kb,ksh, 
nshunt,kshJn,lprsh,ldask) 
write(ktask,6)kb,lad 
write(",6)kb,lad 
renumera os vetores 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Iprswa= 0 
call swap (n,nl,anom,e,fv,qqmln,qqmax,p,q,pg,qg,pd,qd, 
Ib,ntlp,nbar,vm,bp,cp,bq,cq,nO,kslack,pslack, 
nsb,neb,n!rom,nto,gl,bl,bO,\ap,nt,x1,~,tapmln, 
tapmax,nremot,npar,nbarra,narco,vbase,angbase, 
nce,nesenc,ksh,nshunt,nbusJn,nbus_out,nln,nout, 
nbout,tnorm,temer,lprswa,ktask) 
call parallel (n!rom,nto,xI,rt,bO,nsb,neb,nt,gl,bl,tap,tapmax, 
• tapmin,nremot,npar,lad,ksh,nshunt,nce,nesenc) 
call1nlclo (kb,nbus_out,qqmln,qqmax,pslack,lb,npv,lpv, 
• vspec,e,fv,qmln,qmax,pg,pd,nO,ltlp1,itip2, 
nbout,11 nO,vrn,angbase,ntip,p,q,qg,qd,pnbout, 
qnbout,pgnbout,qgnbout,vbase,v) " " 
a~erando a \clerancla para !dl! do sub-slstema 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
tol-l.Od-l 
call delcon (kb,kb,lad,njcb,mb,mbml,ndxjcb,ndadj,lad) 
call newdesl (kb,lad,maxit,~erpa,lgauss,tol,lpv,nsb,neb,nO, 
mbm1,npv,e,fv,qmin,qmax,p,q,gl,bJ,bO,delta, 
pg,qg,pd,qd,vspec,llnO,lb,tap,nt,xI,ntlp, 
anom,nbar,tapmin,tapmax,\nulo,angle,lmp~, 
ImeI,lsom,vrn,nremot,ntapfix,~ertap,errotap, 
arnort,bp,cp,bq,cq,lbpqv,nadjcY,kdjcY,nincd, 
Incd,lnul,ftbl ,Inbl ,Icbl ,nsbl ,yg,lcol,ftag, 
lnxt,yb,nb1 ,noM ,npb1 ,t,u,v,theta,kcont,nln, 
nbus_in,corJn,adm_out,icomp,nc,pJn,Q..,in, 
kcond,ldverg,kmaxit,ldask) 
II (ldverg.eq.l .or. kcond.eq.l ,or.kmaxit.eq.l) goto 15 
Iprext = 0 
IIQprext.ne.O)then 
write(ldask,1 01) 
write(",101 ) 
dol = 1,nln 
write(ldask,I00)nbar(nbusJn(I»,pJn(I)"I00.dO, 
q.Jn(I)"I00.dO 
writer,1 OO)nbar(nbusJn(I»,pJn(I)"1 OO.dO, 
q.Jn(I)"I00.dO 
end do 
end II 
injecao potencia com corrente constante e igual ao caso base 
do 1=1,nin 
5_ex(l) = 5_ex(l) - cmplxHUn(I),.qJn(l)) 
write(· ,23)nbar(II),a"",o _ ex(l) 
wrlte(ktaok,23)nbar(II),aux,o _ eX{I) 
end do 
teste da precisao do fluxo dO sUbslstema 
lolr • I.Od-5 
loll = I.Od-5 
1011 =1.d-l 
do 1=1,nln 
01 = daba(dreal(s_ex(I») 
s2 = daba(dlmag(s_ex(l))) 
11(51.gt.lolr)lolr = 51 
11(52.gt.loli)lolI = .2 
end do 
11(lotr.gt.loI1 )Ihen 
wrlte{· ,8)kpp1 ,kqq1 
wrlte(ktask,8)kppl,kqq1 
endn 
11(lolI.gt.1011 )Ihen 
wrlte(·,9)kppl,kqq1 
wrlte{ktask,9)kppl,kqql 
end W 
teste de violacao de restneoes 
11(lotr.le.loI1 .and. loll.le.loll )Ihen 
testando erro de tensao em relacao ao caso base 
• 
do 1=1,kb 
deN(l) = (v(l) - vbase(I))·1 OO.dOJvbase{l) 
end do 
do 1=1,kb 
1I{Ib{I).eq.2 .and. daba{delV{I)).gt.2.dO)lhen 
II{v{I).gt.l.05dO)lhen 
wrlte(ktask,26)nbar(l) 
wrlte{· ,26)nbar{l) 
endn 
II{v{I).ft.9.Od.1 )Ihen 
wrlte{ktask,29)nbar{l) 
write(· ,29)nbar{l) 
end II 
end 1I 
end do 
call1nout (lad,nadjcy,kdjcy,nlncd,nsb,neb,lemer, 
nfrom,nto,t,u,lodask) 
end 1I 
15 continue 
* retomando condicoes de barra alterada em iniclo 
nO. kslack 
lb{nO) = 0 
ntIp{nO)' 2 
pg{nO) = pslack 
p{nO) = pg{nO) - pd{nO) 
qg{nO) = qslack 
q{nO) • qg{nO) - qd{nO) 
11nO=llnO_s 
II(ttlpl.eq.2)mb = mb - 1 lac~ntado 
Ib(nbout) = ttlpl 
ntlp(nbout) = ttip2 
pg(nbout)= pgnbout 
qg(nbout)= qgnbout 
p(nbout) = pnbout 
q(nbout)· qnbout 
* aumentando 0 l"Iumero de tiers 
• 
krelax = 1 
II(krelax.ne.O)then 
II(tolr.gt.toll .or. toll.gt.toll)then 
talr • 1.0d-5 
toll • 1.()d-5 
11(t<b.tt.nint(0.4·n)~hen 
kvt:l kvz + 1 
do 1=I,n! 
W(nfromO).eq.kppl .and. ntoO).eq.kqql .and. 
nparO)·eq·npl)then 
... mantendo a mesma barra stack do sUbslstema original 
e nrelax= 1 
nbar _nbout • nbar(nbout) 
kcont =] 
kpp = nsb(kcont) 
kqq = neb(kcont) 
goto17 
endW 
end do 
write(ktask,98) 
stop 
endW 
end 1I 
endW 
11 endda 
• tempo final de processamento 
tf· melockO 
tt=tf-fl 
write(ktask,27)taskld ,tt 
write(',27)taskld,tt 
3 lonnat(l: subslstema com ',14: barra(s) lsolad.(s),,/) 
4 lonnat(l: subslsterna com',l4: IIh.(s) e ',14, 
• , barra(s) Isaladas',I) 
5 lormat(l: subslstema com ',14: IIhas',I) 
6 lannat(lI: subslsterna completo: kb= ',14: Iad= ',14,/) 
7 10nnat(lI: nO.do aneis clrcunviZinhos a contlngenela =',13,/) 
8 10nnat(lI: solucaa IdW nao precisa para subsistema ',I, 
• • v\oIacao na componente ativa' J. 
... • contingencla no circuito ',i4,' - ',14) 
9 10nnat(lI: solucao Idll nao preclsa para subsistema'l, 
... • v\obJcao na componente reativa' ,', 
... • contingencia no circulto ',14,' - ',14) 
10 lonnat(I2x,14,4x,2f10.4) 
21 format(II,' 0 circuito entre as barras ',14: e ',14, 
... • sofreu contingencia',/) 
22 10nnat(lI: In]ecao de corrente na. barras de lronteira Intema', 
* ',10'1.: cod.barra',6X: corrente') 
23 lonnat(i4,4110.5) 
24 format(lI: *nao existem barras de fronteira* - 'I. 
• , IdW Igual 80 case base') 
25 10nnat(lI: tempo maxima de processamento -> ',110.5) 
27 10rrnat(lI: tempo de processamento no no' ,13: -> ',110.3) 
28 10nnat(lI: avervottage at bus ',14) 
29 10nnat(lI: undervonBgo at bus ',14) 
30 lormat( - "par =',il,1) 
98 forrnat(ll,' erro para encontrar kcont em relax',1) 
99 fonnat(",' erm-I na relaxacao',/) 
100 fonnat(5x,13,lx,f9.4,2J(,f9.4) 
101 format(I/,' contrlbulcao do sistema externo sobre 0 Intemo'. 
.. 1I.5lC:nbar',3x,·pJn',7x,'q..Jn') 
end 
***** .......... ***.*** .................................................. . 
subroutine mfolSt (n,nl,I<II,lad,na,nb,ne,k,kverte,icomp,nbarra, 
• nbar,lprfor,ldask) 
••••• 010 ......... • ....... •• •••••• ••• •••••• •• ...... •• •••••• • •••••••••••••••• 
parameter(kbr=800,ldl= 1500,1<111=400) 
c parameter (1<IIr=4OO,kll=580,1<II1=200) 
parameter (1r=3,1w--4) 
c 
Integer kedge(ldl),kcomp(ldl) 
dimension kr),kverte('),na('),nb(') 
dimension nbarra('),nbar(") 
c-
c 
If (Iprfor .ne. 0) then 
wrlte(ktask,3)1<II,lad 
3 format(/f n =- • ,13,5x,' "I = ',t3l) 
end If 
call forst (kb,lad,ft,na,nb,n,nI,keclge,kverte,nc,nbarra) 
If(lprfor.ne.O)then 
wrlte(ldask, 10) nc 
wrlter,10) nc 
10 fonnat(II,' Numero de Component .. do grafo da rede =',14,1) 
endW 
lcomp=O 
do 1=1,1<11 
11 = nbanra(i) 
If (kverte(lI) .eq. 0) then 
lcamp = icomp+1 
kcomp(lcomp) = 11 
end If 
end do 
W (lprfor .ne. 0) then 
wrlte(ldask,18) Icomp 
18 format(/,' Numero de Ver1iceslsolados = ',13) 
end I! 
If Qcomp .ne. 0 .and. Iprfor .ne. 0) then 
wrlte(ldask.12) 
wrlte(ldask, 13)(I<comp(i),nbar(kcomp(i» ,1=1 ,Icomp) 
end If 
do 1=1,nc 
If (Iprfor .ne. 0) then 
wrlte(ldask.22) I 
wrlte(klask,29) 
endW 
Icompl=O 
dOJ=I.kb 
II = nbarraO) 
W (kverte(Jj) .eq. I) then 
lcompl • lcompl +1 
kcornp(lcompl) = II 
end If 
end do 
If (Iprfor .ne. 0) then 
wrlte(ldask,13) (kcomp(k),nbar(kcomp(k»,k=I.lcompl) 
wrlte(klask,26) 
end If 
• 
• 
Icompl=O 
do 1.1 ,lad 
ll' ftO) 
11 (kedge(jj) .eq. I) then 
lcompl = Icampl+l 
kcomp(lccmpl) = II 
end II 
end do 
It (Iprfor .ne. 0) Ihen 
write(ktask,24)(kcomp(k),na(kccmp(k»,nb(kcomp(k», 
k=1 ,Icompl) 
write(ktask,25) 
write(ktask,24)(kccmp(k),nbar(na(kcomp(k»), 
nbar(nb(kcomp(k))),k=I,lcompl ) 
end It 
end do 
12 tormat(jl: Vertices lsolados - Contadores X Codlgo de Bana' ,I) 
13 tonmal(6(14,' - ',14,' f» 
22 format(II,' componen1.e ',14/,' *** •• ****.** ... Jf) 
24 lonmal(4(14,' f,14,' - ',14,')'» 
25 lonmal(l,' Arestas - Contador X Codlgo de Barra via Nbaf,/) 
26 lonmat(jl: Areslas'.I) 
2Q lonmal(, Vertices - Conlador X Codlgo de Bana',/) 
return 
end 
******.*** •••••• ** •• * ••••••• *.* •••••••••••••••• **** ••••••• _H __ H_ .... __ 
subroutine forst (kb,lad,ft,nf,nh,n,ne,kedge,ltverte,nc,nbarra) 
••••••••• --....... __ •••••••• -_ ••• -** •••• _ •• -......... -_ ••• ***-**** •• ** 
dimension nbana(') 
dimension Itverte('),nt(,),nh(,),ft(') 
Inleger kedge(') 
C 
c-
C 
dol = 1,ne 
kedge(1) = 0 
end do 
do 1=1," 
ltverte(l) = 0 
end do 
ne=O 
m -0 
kk=O 
10 kk=kk+l 
k=ft(kk) 
nvl = nl(k) 
I • Itverle(nvl) 
11 (1.1 •. 0) go 10 39 
nv2 = nh(k) 
I = kVerte(nv2) 
11 0 .le. 0) go 10 36 
11(1-1)21, SO,18 
18 111=1 
I =1 
I =111 
21 dol=l,kb 
11 = nbana(l) 
II «ltverte(lI) -Il .eq. 0) then 
kVerte(lI) = I 
else If «ltverte(11) -Il .g!. 0) then 
kverIe(lI) = kverte(ll) • I 
end il 
end do 
dol=I,lad 
11- n~) 
il «kedge(lI) • D .eq. 0) Ihen 
kedge(IQ = I 
else W «kedge(lI) • j) .g!. 0) Ihen 
kedge(lI) = kedge(lI) • I 
endW 
end do 
nc-nc-1 
kedge(k) = I 
go 10 49 
36 kedge(k) = I 
kverte(nv2) = I 
go 10 49 
39 nv2 = nh(k) 
j = kverte(nv2) 
ilO .le. 0) go 10 45 
kedge(k) = i 
kverte(nvl) = j 
golD 49 
4S nc=nc+1 
kedge(k) = ne 
kverte(nvl) = ne 
kverte(nv2) = ne 
49 m=m+1 
50 II(m .eq. (kb-I) .or. kk .eq.lad) relum 
go 10 10 
end 
••••• _ ..... _** ..... *** ........ ** .................................... . 
subroUtine cone. (nb,nbarra,nomebar ,nI,nl,n! ,apllnha,c, 
• nos,icomp,nesenc,nee,lprcon,lprsal,ktask) 
........................................................................ 
parameter(kbr=600,kll=I500,kbl=400) 
C parameter (kbr=400,kll=580,kbl=200) 
eharacte .. t2 nomebar(kbr) 
dimension ni('),nl(') 
dimension nesenc(") 
dimension nos('),nbarra(kbr) 
Inleger aplinha(klQ 
Inleger aponta(kbr), vectad(1 O'kbr) ,ka(kbr),nad 
Integer c 
• sequAncla de subrotinas utilizadas na an4lise da 
• conectivldade e da essencialldade de urn area 
11(lprcon.ne.O)lhen 
wrlte(klask,6)nl 
wrlte(klask,7)(aplinha(k),k=1 ,nl) 
end I1 
nad =0 
nee =0 
ape =0 
don=t,nb 
call adjacent(n,nl,nf,aplinha,aponta,vectad,ka,nad, 
nl) 
end do 
if(lprcon.ne.O)lhen 
write(ld.sI<.8) 
write(ld.sk.9)(vecl.d(n).n=l.n.d) 
write(ldask.12) 
write(ld.sk.13)(n •• ponta(n).ka(n).n=l.nb) 
end If 
do k=l.nl 
kk=aplinh.(k) 
call essencla(k.kk.nb.ni.nf.aponta.vectad.ka. 
'" nce,nesenc,nl) 
end do 
If(lprsal.ne.O)lhen 
° 
call &alda (nb,nl,nl,nf,nbarra,nomebar,Bplinha,nos, 
c,nce,nesenc,ktask) 
endW 
c:-------
If(c.ne.l.and.lcomp.ne.O)lhen 
write(°,4)c.lcomp 
write(ld.sk.4)c.lcomp 
slop 
elsa If(c.ne.l)lhen 
write(°.5)c 
write(ldask.5)c 
stop 
else W(lcomp.ne.O)lhen 
write(ldask.3)lcomp 
stop 
endW 
3 form.I(I: caSO base com '.14: barra(s) lsol.d.(s),./) 
4 format(/,' caso base desconexo com',14,' IIha(s) e ',14, 
° • barra(s) lsol.d •• ·,I) 
5 format(/,' caso base desconexo corn ',14,'llhas',1) 
6 formal(1I4x:dimensllo do vetor apllnha prox ='.1311 
• 4x:vetor .plinha·/) 
7 formal(10(3x.12)) 
8 formal(/I3x.'Vetor vectad'/) 
9 formal(/l0(3x.14)) 
12 fonnat(/13x,'nb' ,3x,'aponta' ,3x,'ka') 
13 formal(3x.14.3x.14,4x.14) 
retum 
end 
................................................................................ 
subroutine adjacent (n.nl.nf.aplinh •• aponl •• vectad.ka.n.d. 
* prox) 
.......................... _ ....... *** .................................. . 
dimension ni(").nf(O) 
Integer .pllnh.(O).aponta("). vect.d(O).ka(O) .nad.prox 
o 
° form.9Ao do lista encadeado de n6s .djacenl .. 
° 
apanla(n)=n.d+l 
do J=I.prox 
ll=·plinhafj) 
If(n.eq.ni(ll»lhen 
do I=aponta(n).nad 
If(nf(JJ).eq.vectad(l))golo 302 Ino caso de circuno em 
Ip.ralelo. 0 n6 final repelldo nao enlra na 
Iforma~ao de vectad. A excludo do loop acarreta 
tlrabalho adiclonal na rotlna essencla 
end do 
nad=nad+1 
vectad(nad)=nfOJ) 
else 
if(n.eq.nfOJ)lhen 
do I=aponta(n),nad 
If(nIOJ).eq.vectad(l»goto 302 
end do 
nad=nad+1 
vectad(nad)=niOJ) 
end If 
end If 
302 end do 
ka(n)=nad-aponla(n)+1 
return 
end 
subroutine essencia (k,kk,nb,ni,nf,aponta, vectad,ka,nce, 
'" nesenc,prox) 
*** ............. _._ ........... *** ..................................... .. 
parameter(kbr=800,k11=1500,kbl=400) 
c parameter (kbr=400,k1I=580,kbl=200) 
• 
dimension nesenc(·) 
dimension ni("),nf(·) 
Integer marcado(kbr),pl1ha(kbr) 
Integer aponta(·),vectad(·),ka(·) 
Integer I,nol 
Integer prox 
logical sal 
• anll11se da essenclalldade (algorilmo do busca em profundldade) 
• 
do 1=I,prox 
If(1.ne.k)lhen 
If(nl(k).eq.nl(I).and.nf(k).eq.nf(I»retum 
U(nl(k).eq.nf(i).and.nf(k).eq.ni(i»retum 
end If 
end do 
U(ka(nl(kk».ge.2.and.ka(nf(kk».ge.2)then 
do 1=I,nb 
marcado{Q=O 
enddo 
1=1 
marcado(ni(kk»=1 
marcado(nf(kk»=1 
pilha(I)=ni(kk) 
sal=.false. 
do whl1e( .not.sal) 
509 no! • pUha(t) 
ndel = aponla(noi) 
nalel = ndel +ka(noi)-I 
do j=ndel ,natel 
IfO·ne.O)lhen 
If(marcado(vectadO»·eq.O)lhen 
marcado(vectadO))=1 
1=1+1 
pllha(I)=vectadO) 
goto 5Cl9 
else 
If(vectadO).eq.nf(kk»lhen 
If(pllha(I).ne.ni(kk»relum 
end If 
end If 
endU 
end do 
1=1-1 
If(t.eq.1 )Ihen 
nde2 = aponta(pilha(l» 
nate2 = nde2+ka(pilha(I»-1 
do l=nde2,nate2 
il(l.ne.O)then 
if(marcado(vectad(I».ne.l )goto 509 
end il 
end do 
sai=.true, 
endW 
end do 
endW 
nce=nce+1 
nesenc(nce)=kk larmozena vaior de apllnh. 
rerum 
end 
.**.-............................................................ . 
subroutine saida (nb,ni,nl,nl,nbana,nomebar,aplinha,nos, 
.. c,nce,nesenc,ktask) 
........................................................................... 
parameter (1r=3,1w--4) 
characte ... 12 nomebar(") 
dimension nbana("),nos(") 
dimension nesenc(*) 
dimension nl("),nl(") 
Integer aplinh.(") 
integera,e 
.. eomec;a,ndo a Imprimir 
" 
" 
write(ktask,300) 
write(ktasI<,305)nb,nl 
write(ktask,310)e 
write(ldask,320) 
do 1'I,nb 
write(ktask,340)I,nbana(I),nomebar(I),nOs(l) 
end do 
do)=I,e 
1d=O 
write(ktask,350») 
do 1=I,nl 
lI=apllnha(l) 
noJnlelal=ni(lI) 
il(nos(noJnlclal).eq.j)then 
wrlte(ktask,390)II,ni(II),nl(ll) 
endW 
1d=Id+l 
end do 
W(kt.eq.O)then 
write(ktask,440) 
end II 
end do 
wrlte(ktask,450) 
" .. Iela dos .. _uft.dos d. anallse da essenclalldade do arco 
" 
K(nce.eq.O)then 
W(e.eq.l )then 
write(ktask,600) 
else 
write(ktask,610)e 
endff 
else 
" 
W(e.eq.l )then 
write(ktask,620) 
do 1=1 ,nee 
a=nesene(Q 
wrlte(ktask,640)a,nbana(ni(a»,nomebar(ni(a», 
nbana(nl(a»,nomebar(nl(a» 
end do 
" 
" 
wrlte(kIask,650) 
else 
wrlte(ktask,660) 
do 1=I,e 
wrlte(ktask,670)1 
nee=O 
do j=l,nee 
a=nesenem 
noJnlelal=nl(a) 
If(nos(noJnlelal).eq.l)then 
wrlte(kIask,640)a,nbarra(nl(a»,nomebar(nl(a», 
nbarra(nf(a»,nomebar(nf(a» 
ncc=ncc+1 
end if 
end do 
If(ncc.g\.O)then 
wrlte(ktask,690)1 
endW 
end do 
end if 
end if 
'" formatas de salda 
" 
300 formal(II,6x,'resultado da anAlise da conectivldade. da esseneial 
"ldade',1I,18x,'algortlmo da busca em profundidade'//,a80) 
305 formal(l/,5x:numero de OIls (barres) • ',14,3x,'nllrnetO de areos (I 
"Inhas) .',14) 
310 format(/,6x,'o numero de componentes cone .. s de 9 e Igual a ',i4) 
320 format(/12x,'n 6 s do 9 r a f o·/12x ... ····***········· ..... ·,) 
340 format(Bx,'n6(',i4,') /barra ',14: ',a17/ = ',14) 
360 format(II,2x:arcos do grafo perteneent ... A componente cone .. nume 
-ro ·,\4,1,2x:*··············· .. •• .... ·•· ........ •··••··• ... ·•·••••· ...... 
•••••••• 1) 
390 format(6x:arco(',14,) ','barra ',14: a barra ',14) 
440 formal(6x:n a 0 ex Is t • m) 
450 formal(/,' ') 
600 formal(/,6x:nao eximem Iinhas IndlspenSllvels A conectMdade,' 
" /,4x,'a rede anallzada apresenta um grafo fortemente conexo') 
610 format(/,6x,'nao existem IlnhaslndlspenSllvels A eonectMdade.' 
*.I.4x,'as ',14.' componentes conexas da f10resta do grafo da rede 
.. ,1,4x,'anallzada, do fortemente conexas') 
620 format(/, 15x:. grafo da rede anallzada e conexo.'1I1OX,'as linhas 
" IndlspenSllveis a conectMdade .aa:' //,2x,'arcollinha' ,4x:extre 
*mldade iniciar,5x,'extremidade finar,/,2x,· .. •• ...... " 
'" 4x, .. ••••••••••••••••••••• ,5x, , ••••••••••••••••••• ') 
640 forrnat(5x,I4,8x,I4,2x,aI7,5x,I4,2x,al7) 
650 format(/,6x,'contingAnclas conslstlndo na perda demas linhas sao 
"'graves.') 
660 forrnat(11 x,'o grafo da rede anallzada nao <I conexo.') 
670 format(1I15x,'linhH essenciais da area',14,1II,2x:arcollinha',4x 
·,'exlremidade Inlciar,5x,'extremidade finar J/2x: ••• "" •••• 
-,4x,"""'··········-·-.5x,'············"···"·') 
690 format(/,Bx,'a componente conexa',14: nao' fortemente cone .. ') 
retum 
end 
.................................................... ** ••••••••••••• * •••• *. 
subroutine parallel (nfrom,nto,lM,bO,nsb,neb,nt,gl,bl,tap, 
" tapmax,tapmln,nremot,npar,nlin,ksh,nshunt, 
• nce,nesenc) 
•••••• _ ....... * ••••••••• * ••• ** ... * ..... ** ••••• * •• * ••••• * •••••••••••••• 
Impllc~ double precision (a-h,o-z) 
dimension nfrom("),nto(") ,nremot(i,tap("),tapmax(") ,tapmin("), 
" rl("),ld("),bOr),nsb("),neb("),nt("),gl("),blr), 
" npar(") 
dimension nshuntr),nesenc(") 
c 
c - BuscafTroca de Llnhas paralelao nos dodos 
c 
nPtr= 0 
do while ( nPtr .ne. nlln ) 
, 
, 
nPtr = nPl' + t 
doK=(nPtr+t ),nKn 
nexit = 0 
If ( nfrom ( nPl,) .eq. nfrom ( 11 ) ) nex~ • ne~ + t 
W ( nfrom ( nPl, ) .eq. nlo (11» nexlt • ne~ • t 
If (nto (nPtr) .eq. nfrom ( 11 ) ) nex~ • ne~ + t 
If(nto (nPlr).eq.nto (Ii»ne.~=ne~+t 
If (ne~ .eq. 2) then 
nPtr = nptr + 1 
If ( nPlr .ne. 11 ) then 
call trocaa ( nPlr,K,nfrom,nto,.l,~,bO,tap,tapmax, 
tapmln,nremat,nsb,neb,nt,gl,bl,npar, 
ksh,nshunt,nlln,nce,nesenc) 
end If 
end If 
end do 
end do 
return 
end 
."' .............. _ •••• ** ................. ** ........................... -
subroutine I,ocaa ( Indlcl ,lndic2,nfrom,nto,ld,~,bO,tap,tapmax, 
'" tapmtn,nremot,nsb,neb,nt,gI,bI,npar, 
'" ksh,nshunt,nl,nce,nesenc) 
.................................... --............................... . 
Impllc~ double precision (a-h,o-z) 
dimension nfrom('),ntor),nremot('),tap('),tapmax('),tapmin('), 
, ~('),xI('),bO('),nsb('),neb('),nt('),gl('),bl('), 
, npar(') 
dimension nshunt('),nesenc(') 
c 
c-
c 
nde = nfrom (Indict) 
npara = nto (indict) 
x = ld (Indict) 
= ~ (indict) 
b = bO (Indict) 
tapt = tap (indict) 
tmax = tapmax (Indict) 
Imln = tapmin (indict) 
nbean • nremat (Indict) 
ns • nsb (Indict) 
nf = neb (Indict) 
kt = nt (indict) 
99 • 91 (Indicl) 
bb = bl (indict) 
np = npa' (Indict) 
nfrom (Indict) = nfrom (indic2) 
nto (Indict) = nlo (indlc2) 
ld (indict) = xl Qndic2) 
~ (Indict) • ~ (Indic2) 
bO (indict) = bO (Indlc2) 
tap (Indict) = lap (indlc2) 
lapmax (indict) = tapmax (Indic2) 
lapmin (Indict) = lapmin (indic2) 
nremat (Indict) = nremat (Indlc2) 
91 (Indict) = 91 (indlc2) 
bI (Indict) • bl (lndic2) 
nt (Indict) = nl (indic2) 
nsb (Indict) = nsb (indic2) 
nob (Indict) = neb (indIc2) 
npar (Indict) = npar (Indic2) 
nfrom (IndIc2) = nde 
nto (Indlc2) = npara 
ld (Indlc2) • x 
r1 (Indic2) = ,
bO (Indlc2) = b 
tap (Indic2) = tapt 
tapmax (Indic2) = tmax 
tapmin (Indic2) = tmln 
nremot (Indic2) = nbcon 
nsb (Indic2) = ns 
neb (Indic2) = nl 
gl (Indlc2) = gg 
bl (Indlc2) = bb 
nt (Indic2) = Id 
npar (Indic2)' np 
do k=1,ksh 
do 1=I,nI 
II(nshunt(k) .eq.lndlcl )then 
nshunt(k)=lndic2 
goto13 
end II 
end do 
13 end do 
do k=1 ,nee 
do 1=I,nl 
II(nesenc(k).eq.lndlcl )then 
nesenc(k)=indic2 
goto15 
end 1I 
end do 
15 end do 
retum 
end 
........................ _*** ............ _ ............................... .. 
subroutine cntg (ktask,nl,numtask,taskld,kde,kate,nfroml ,ntol, 
, ksh,lprctgl) 
...................... _ ............ *********_ ....................... -....... . 
c 
Impllctt double precision (a-h,o-z) 
dimension nfroml (,),ntol (') 
Integer taskld 
c-
c 
enp = float(nl-ksh)lfloat(numtask) 
lenp = Int(enp) 
renp = (nl-ksh) - (numtask'lenp) 
il(ktask.le.renp)then 
kde • 1 + (Ienp+l)'taskld 
kate • (ienp+l )'ktask 
else 
kde • 1 + (Ienp'taskid) + renp 
kate = (Ienp'ldask) + renp 
endil 
if(lprctgl.ne.O)then 
write(ktask,10)kde,kate 
c write(ktask, 12)kde,kate 
write(ktask, 14)(nfroml (k),ntol (k),k=kde,kate) 
end II 
10 10rmat(lI,' IImttes de sub-divlsao dos circunos:', 
.. 14: ... ',\4,11,' nfrom' ,3x,' nto',l) 
12 format(I4,' ... ',14,11,' nfrom',3x,' nto',/) 
14 format(1x,14,5x,14) 
retum 
end 
.................................................................................................................................................................. 
subroutine bounding (n,nl,nareo,kpp,kqq,nsb,neb,nfrom,nto,kcont, 
.. kb,nbarra,nbar,lad,nc,icomp,nos,kvz, 
• Iprbou,lprsub,lprfor,ktask) 
................................. _ .................................................................................................................................... .. 
c 
c - urn novo vetor nbarra ~ fOlTTlado 
c 
Implicn double precision (a-h,crz) 
parameter(kbr=800,kll=I500,kbl=400) 
c parameter (kbr=400,kll=580,kbl=200) 
parameter(Ir=3,1w=4) 
dimension narco('),nsb("),neb('),nfrom("),nto(') 
dimension nbarra(kbr),nbar(,,),nos(') 
nbarra(l) = kpp I Inlclalizar com pp e qq evno repeticao de 
nbarra(2) = kqq I barra em nbarra em caso de clrcu~os paralelos 
I que sofrem contingencia 
kb=2 
do 1=1 ,nl 
11' nareo(l) 
If(lI.eq.kCOnt .or. neb(II).eq.O)goto 10 lellmlna clrcu~ 
!shunts 
I1 • nSb(lI) 
12 = neb(lI) 
If(ll.eq.kpp .or. II.eq.kqq)then 
do 1=I,kb 
If(12.eq.nbarraOl)goto 10 
end do 
kb = kb+l 
nbarra(kb) = 12 
else W(12.eq.kpp.or.l2.eq.kqq)then 
do j=l,kb 
If(ll.eq.nbarraOl)goto 10 
end do 
kb = kb+1 
nbarra(kb) = 11 
end If 
10 end do 
nde = 1 
nate == kb 
1=2 
15 do while(Ue.kvz) 
do 1=I,nl 
11. narco(l) 
if(ll.eq.kcont .or. neb(II).eq.O)goto 22 I elimlna clrcu~os 
I shunts 
11 = nsb(lI) 
12 = neb(lI) 
If(ll.ne.kpp.and.l2.ne.kpp .and. 
II.ne.kqq.and.l2.ne.kqq)then I ellmlna circunos 
I de la.vizinhan~a 
do k=nde,nate 
Id< • nbarra(k) 
if(l1.eq.kk)then 
do 1=I,kb 
If(12.eq.nbarraO»goto 22 
end do 
kb == kb+1 
nbarra(kb) = 12 
else If(12.eq.ld<)then 
do j=l,kb 
if(ll.eq.nbarraO»goto 22 
enddQ 
kb = kb+1 
nbarra(kb) = I1 
end If 
end do 
end ~ 
22 enddo 
nde = nate+1 
nate = kb 
I = I + 1 
end do 
can sub_set (nl,nsb,neb,nfrom,nto,nbarra,kb,naroo,kcont, 
* nbar,lad,lplSub) 
call mforst (n,nl,kb,lad,nsb,neb,nc,narco,nos,icomp,nbarra, 
* nbar,lprfor,ktask) 
II(nc.gt.l .0r.icomp.ne.O)then 
II(kb.l.n)then 
kvz=kvz+2 
g0t015 
else 
write(ktask,24) 
24 format(ll; subslstema nao oonexo',1) 
retum 
* 
endW 
end If 
acrescentar outras barras 
nate = kb 
If(nate.l.n)then 
J=nate 
do 1=I,n 
do k=1,nate 
W(l.eq.nbarra(k»goto 14 
end do 
)=)+1 
nbarraQ)=1 
14 end do 
end~ 
If(lprbou.ne.Ojthen 
wrlte(ktask,l7)kvz 
write(fdask, 18)(nbarra(k) ,nbar(nbarra(k» ,k=1 ,kb) 
If«kb+l).tt.n)write(ktask, 19) 
write(ktask, 18)(nbarra(k),nbar(nbarra(k)), k=(kb+ 1 ) ,n) 
end If 
If(lprsub.ne.O)then 
write(ktask,27)kb,lad 
write(ktask,29) 
write(ktask,30)(narco(I),nfrom(narco(Q),nto(narco(I»,I=I,lad) 
write(ktask,20) 
write(ktask,30)(narco(I),nbar(nsb(narco(I»),nbar(neb(narco(I») 
• ,1=1.lad) 
write(ktask,31 ) 
write(ktask,30)(narco(l) ,nfrom(nareo(l) ),nto(n.rco(I», 
• 1=lad+l ,nl) 
write(ktask,32) 
write(ktask,30)(narco(l) ,nbar(nsb(narco(I») ,nbar(neb(narco(I») 
,1=lad+l,nl) 
endW 
17 format(II,' conjunto de barras ate a',13,'a. vlzlnhanca -' I 
• , contador x codigo de barra',I) 
18 format(6(14;. ',14; f) 
19 formal(ll; outras barras do slstema • contador x codlgo', 
• • de barra',f) 
20 format(lI; arcos do subalstema via nba~) 
27 formal(l/; kb ",14,4x;lad =',14) 
29 format(lI; votor arco do sul>-slstema',1) 
30 format(4(14; c,l4; • ',14;)') 
31 format(lI; clrcuitos do resta do slstoma',1) 
32 format(l/; clrcuttas do resta do slstema via nban 
retum 
end 
subroutine sub_set (nl,nsb,neb,nfrom,nto,nbarra,komg,nareo,koont, 
, nbar,nlln,lprsub) 
**** ............. _ .................................................................. _ ............. .. 
Impllcft double precision (a-h,o-z) 
parameter(Ir=3,1w=4) 
dimension nbarra('),nbar(') 
dimension nsb('),neb\'),nfrom('),nto('),narco(') 
nlln-O 
do I-l,komg 
lI=nbarra(l) 
do 1=1,nl 
lI=nareo(l) 
IfQl.eq.koont .or. nto(Ii).eq.O)goto 20 
If(lI.eq.nsb(iI»then 
do kzl,komg 
If(nbarra(k).eq.neb(ii»then 
If(n1ln.eq.O)then 
nlln=nlin+1 
gotol0 
end If 
do m=1,nlln 
If(lI.eq.narco(m»goto 20 
end do 
nlin=nlin+1 
10 kaux--narCO\nlin) 
nareo(nlin)=1I 
narco(I)=kaux 
goto 20 
end If 
end do 
else If(lI.eq.neb(Ii»then 
dokzl,komg 
If(nbarra(k).eq.nsb(II»then 
If(nlln.eq.O)then 
nlin=nlln+l 
goto 11 
end If 
do m-l,nlln 
IfQl.eq.narco(m»goto 20 
end do 
nlin=nlin+1 
11 kaux=narco(nlin) 
narco(nlln)=1I 
narco(l)=kaux 
goto 20 
end If 
end do 
end If 
20 end do 
end do 
return 
end 
........................................................................................ 
subroutine start (nin,nout,nbusJn,nbus_out,coUn,s_ex,adm_out, 
, p-,n,~ln) 
...................................................................... _ ........... ... 
Impllcft double preclslon'(a-h,o-z) 
parameter(ir=3,1w=4) 
dimension nbus-,n('),nbus_out('),p-,n('),~in(') 
compleX-IS coUn('),s_ex('),adm_out(') 
" 
" 
" 
" 
barras de fronteira Interna e injecao de corrente nas barras 
de fronteira Intema 
do I-I ,nln 
nbusjn(l) = 0 
cor In(l) = O.dO 
s_ox(i) = O.dO 
adm_out(l) = O.dO 
pjn(l) • O.dO 
'Lin(l) ·O.dO 
end do 
barras de fronteira externa e injecao de potencia nas barras 
de fronteira externa 
c 
do 1=I,nout 
nbus_out(l) • 0 
s_eX(l) = 0 
end do 
"in =0 
nout = 0 
return 
end 
..... ******* ...... - .......................................................... . 
subroutine border (kb,nbarra,nbar,nl,lad,nsb,neb,narco,kcont, 
.. nbusJ",nbus_out,nin,nout,iprbor,ktask) 
.................... ** •••••••••• *** ......... ** ••••••• ** •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
c 
Impllctt double precision (a-h,o-z) 
parameter(Ir-3,1w=4) 
dimension nbarra("),nbar(") 
dimension nbus inr),nbus out(") 
dimension nsb(,,),neb("),narco(") 
c-
c 
nln = 0 Inln e nout ja fcram zeradas em start 
nout·O 
do 1=1,1<b 
do 8 k=(lad+l ),nl 
kk=narco(k) 
If(kk.eq.kcont .or. neb(kk).eq.O)goto 8 
If(nbarra(Q.eq.nsb(kk»then 
do Ij=1 ,nln 
If(nbarra(I).eq.nbusjn(lj))got04 
end do 
nlnz:nin+1 
nbusjn(nln)=nbarra(l) 
4 continue 
do Ij=1 ,nout 
If(neb(kk).eq.nbus_out(lj))got08 
end do 
nout=nout+1 
nbus _ out(nout)=neb(kk) 
else If(nbarra(I).eq.neb(kk»then 
do Ij=1 ,nln 
If(nbarra(I).eq.nbusjn(lj))got06 
end do 
0In=01"+1 
nbusjn(nln)=nbarra(l) 
6 continue 
do ij=l,nout 
If(nsb(\(\().eq.nbus_out(Ij)goto a 
end do 
nout=nout+l 
nbus_<>ut(nout)=nsb(\(\() 
endW 
a end do 
end do 
If(lprbor.ne.O)then 
write(ldask,24) 
write(ldask,1 )(nbusjn(I),nbar(nbusjn(i)),I=1 ,nln) 
write(ldask,29) 
write(ldask. 1 )(nbus _ <>ut(I),nbar(nbus _ out(i)),I=1 ,nout) 
12 end W 
1 format(6(14: - "i4: f» 
24 format(lI: barras de fronteira Interna - contador x codigo', 
'de barra') 
26 format(lI: °nao existem barras de fronteirao,,1~ 
29 format(I/,' barras de fronteira externa - contador x codigo', 
.. , de barra') 
return 
end 
.............. - .............................................................. . 
subroutine choose_51 (nl,lad,kcont,nO,narco,nsb,neb,gl,bl,nin, 
.. nout,nbusJn,nbus_out,nbar,amoct'y,nbout, 
° Iprch,ktask) 
..... ****._._ ........................................................ *** ••••• 
° 
Implictt double precision (a-h,D-z) 
parameter(Ir=3,tw--4) 
dimension nbus_out(O),nbusjn(O),amod.,Y(O) 
dimension narco(O),nsb(O),neb(O),gl(O),bl(") 
dimension nbar(O) 
selecao da barra slack original no vetor FE 
1=0 
do whlle(l.tt.nout) 
1=1+1 
if(nO.eq.nbus_out(i»then 
nbout = nO 
write(° ,orslack in fe veclof 
retum 
endff 
end do 
do j=l,nout 
D = nbus_<>uto) 
yy=O.dO 
do 141=(lad+l),nl 
I1 = narco(i) 
if(kcont.eq.li .or. neb(li).eq.O)goto 14 
if(nsb(Ii).eq.D .or. neb(iI).eq.D)then 
do k=1,nln 
\(\( = nbusjn(k) 
W(nsb(iI).eq.\(\( .or. neb(ii).eq.\(\()then 
yy = dsqrt(gl(W02 + bl(ii)002) + yy 
goto14 
end If 
end do 
endW 
14 end do 
amod.,YO) = yy 
end do 
r-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----
, escolhendo a barra de major admitancia 
mmax=O.dO 
lmax=O 
do l=l,nout 
If(amod"y(I).gt.mmax)then 
mmax = amod..Y(1) 
Imax:1 
endW 
end do 
nbout = nbus_out(imax) 
If(lprch.ne.O)then 
write(ktask,16)nbout,nbar(nbout),amod"y(lmax) 
end If 
16 format(l/: barra de feld. a ser fe~a slack - " 
, 
, 
c 
c 
• 'contador x codlgo .> ',14,' • '.14/. 
, modulo da adm~ancla -> ',d18.12 ) 
escolhendo a barra de major incidencia 
em caso de empate prevalece a de maior admitancia 
call Choose_52 (nl,lad,kcont,narco,nsb,neb,nout,nbus_out, 
, nbar,gl,bl,nin,nbus-,n,amod'y,nbout,lprch,ktask) 
return 
end 
••••• ** ................................................................... ** •••••••• 
subroutine choosa_s2 (nI,lad,kcont,narco,nsb,neb,nout,nbus_out, 
• nbar,gl,bl,nln,nbusJn,amod,J,nbout,lprch, 
ktask) 
.................................................................................... 
Impllc~ double precision (a-h,D-z) 
parameter(Ir=3,1w--4) 
dimension n bus _ out('),nbus -'n('),amod 'y(') 
dimension narco('),nsb(') ,neb('),gl(') ,bl(') 
dimension nbaW) 
kka = 0 
imax=O 
do l=l,nout 
nad=O 
ii = nbus_out(i) 
do 1=(lad+l),nl 
II = nareaO) 
if(kcont.eq.U .Dr. neb(IJ).eq.O)goto 10 
If(ll.eq.nsb(jj) .or. II.eq.neb(IJ»then 
do k=l,nin 
kk=nbus-'n(k) 
If(nsb(IJ).eq.kk .or. neb(IJ).eq.kk)then 
nad=nad+1 
gotol0 
end If 
end do 
end If 
10 enddo 
If(nad.gt.kka)then 
kka = nad 
nbout = 11 
Imax =1 
else if(nad.eq.kka)then 
If(amod"y(I).gt.amod'y(lmax»then 
kka = nad 
nbout = II 
Imax =1 
end If 
end If 
end do 
If(1preh.ne.O)lhen 
write(klask,18)nboUl,nbar(nbout),kka,amocl..,y(imax) 
end If 
18 format(lI; barra de fext. a ser fe~a slack· " 
.. 'contadorx codlgo -> ',14,' - ',i4/,' no. de', 
, clrcuilos adjacent ... > ',14/, 
.. • modulo da admitancia -> ',d18.12) 
return 
end 
................................................................................... 
subroutine bordeUn (n,nl,kb,I.d,nbus_out,nbu.jn,nln,nsb,neb, 
.. nfrom,nto,narco,nbarra,nbar,nbout,iprbin, 
. klask) 
••••••• **** ...................................................................... . 
palllmeter(Ir=3,1w=4) 
palllmeter(kbr=800,kll=I500,kbl=400) 
c parameter (kbr=400,kll=580,kbl=200) 
c 
dimension nbus_out('),nbusjn(') 
dimension nbarra('),nbar(') 
dimension narco('),nsb(') ,neb('),nfrom(') ,nlo(') 
dimension kauxjn(kbl) 
c-
c 
, 
write(klask,29) 
alterando a posk;ao da barra feita slack em nbarra 
do I=(kb+l),n 
If(nberra(l).eq.nbout)then 
kaux = nbarra(kb+l) 
nbarra(kb+l) = nbout 
nbarra(l) = kaux 
kb == kb+1 
90t0 10 
end If 
end do 
write(klask,30) 
stop 
10 If(lprbin.ne.O)then 
, 
, 
write(klask,16) 
write(klask,8)(nbarra(i),nbar(nbarra(i) ),i=1 ,kb) 
end If 
inclusao em area dos circuitos conectados a barra teita 
slack lnclulda em nbarra cuja outra eldremidade pertence ao 
conjunto bus_In 
do 141=(lad+l ),nl 
11 = narco(l) 
If(neb(II).eq.O)goto 14 
If(nsb(li).eq.nboUl. or. neb(1I).eq.nboUl}lhen 
do k=1,nln 
kk • nbusjn(k) 
If(nsb(II).eq.kk .or. neb(ii).eq.kk)lhen 
kaux= narco(Iad+l) 
narco(Iad+l) = 11 
nareo(I) = kaux 
lad R lad+1 
901014 
end If 
end do la saida por este do implica que 0 extremo do 
end if Iclrcuito em analise e' agora urna nova barra fe 
14 end do Isendo nbout uma barra fl 
criacao de "letOf' aUXiliar corn as novas barras fi 
11 =0 
do 171=(1ad+l),nl 
I1 = narco(l) 
If(neb(iO.eq.O)gata 17 
do k=1.nin 
Id<. nbus_ln(k) 
If(nsb(II).eq.1d< .ar. neb(II).eq.ld<)then 
do j=1 ,11 
If(1d< .eq. kauxJnfj))gata 17 
end do 
11 = 11 + 1 
kauxJn(ll) = Id< 
gota17 
endW 
end do la saida por este do implica que 0 extremo do 
Icircuito em analise e' agora urna nova barra te 
17 end do lsenda nbout uma barra fi 
nln=ll 
do t=1,ntn 
nbuaJn(l) = kauxJn(i) 
end do 
if(lprbin.ne.O)then 
write(ldask,18) 
write(ldask,24)(narea(i),nfram(narco(i»,nta(narea(i», 
1=1 ,lad) 
write(ldask,2O) 
If(nin.eq. O)wTite(lw, 12) 
write(ldask,8)(nbusJn(i),nbar(nbusJn(I»,I=I,nln) 
endW 
8 farmat(6(14,' - ',14,' f)) 
12 farmatC " velar d. frantelra Intema nula "') 
16 farmat(!,' berras do sub-slstema :cantadores x codiga') 
18 farmat(!,' areas do sub-slstema',/) 
20 farmat(!,' velar barras de frontolra Intema reduzlda: cantador)( 
ft " codigo') 
24 farmat(4(14,' C,14,' - ',14,')'» 
29 format(l/,' Inclusao de bem de frontelra extema e areos') 
30 farmat(l/,' erra 1 na rotin. bordeUn',/) 
retum 
end 
.ftftftftft.ft __ •••••••••••• _ ••• ······,..············,..········ ••••••••••••••••• "' •••• 
subroutine injecaa (1,lad,nl,narco,kcont,nsb,neb,vbase,angbase, 
" vrnod,vang,gl,bl,bO,nt,tap,nbusJn,sum) 
ft •••••••••••••••• ft._ft1OiIoilo ....... iIo .. __ .iIo •• iIo_iIo.iIo .. iIoilo.iIo ....................... . 
Impliclldoubl1> precision (a-h,o-%) 
parameter(Ir=3,1w=4) 
dimension narco("),gl("),bl("),bO("),nt("),tap("),neb("),nsb(") 
dimension vbase(") ,angbase("), vrnod("), vang(") 
dimension nbus_in(") 
cample .. t 6 sum,et ,e2,cpl 
do 8 k=(lad+l ),nl 
Id< = narca(k) 
If(ld<.eq.kcant .ar. neb(Id<).eq.O)gata 8 
If(nbuaJn(l).eq.nsb(Id<»then 
cpI = cmplx(gl(Id<),bl(kk)) 
angl = vang(nsb(kk)) 
ong2 = ongbase(neb(ld<» 
el = vrnod(nsb(Id<»"cmplx(dcos(angl ),dsin(angl» 
e2 = vbese(neb(kk»"cmplx(dCOS(ang2),dsin(ang2» 
if(nt(kk).eq.O)then ! trata-se de liMa 
sum = el·cpl-e2"cpl+el·cmpb«O.OdO,bO(kl<)) + sum 
else W(nt(kk).eq.nbusJn(I»)then ! trala-s. de tap 
I do lado d. busJn(l) 
t = 1.OdOllap(kk) 
sum III e1 ·cpl*r-*2-e2*cpl*t + sum 
else ! trata-se d. lap do lado oposto a busJn(l) 
t • 1.OdOnap(kl<) 
sum = -e2*cpl*t+e1*cpl + sum 
end If 
else If(nbusJn(I).eq.neb(kk»)then 
cpl = cmpb«gl(kl<),bl(kl<») 
angl = angbase(neb(kl<» 
ang2 = vang(nsb(kl<» 
el = vbase(neb(kl<))"cmpb«dcos(angl),dsln(angl)) 
e2 = vmod(nsb(kl<»"cmpb«dcos(ang2),dsln(ang2» 
II(nt(kk).eq.O)then 
sum = el·cpl-e2·cpl+el·cmpb«O.dO,bO(kk» + sum 
else If(nt(kl<).eq.nbusJn(l»then 
t = 1.OdOnap(kl<) 
sum = e1·cpl·t··2-e2*cpl~ + sum 
else 
t = 1.OdOllap(kk) 
sum = -e2*cp'*t+e1*cpl + sum 
end II 
end II 
8 end do 
retum 
end 
..................................................................... ** •••••••••••• 
subroutine s-huntin (nl,ladjnarco,nsb,neb,nfTom,nto,nbarra,kb,ksh, 
• nshunt,kshJn,lprsh,ktask) 
••••• 010 .............................. ** •••• ** •••••••• ** •••••••••••••••••••••••••• * •• 
Impllcn double precision (a-h,o-z) 
parameter(Ir=3,1w--4) 
dimension nshunW) 
dimension nbana(') 
dimension nsb(') ,neW),narco(') ,nlrom('),nto(') 
11«lad+ksh).H.nl)then 
11(lprah.ne.O)then 
write(ktask,l ) 
end II 
kshJn=O 
do 1=I,ksh 
11 = nshunt(l) 
dok=I,1<I> 
II(nbanra(k).eq.nsb(II»then 
do j=(I.d+l ),nl 
II(narcoO).eq.li)goto 11 
end do 
11 
10 
• 
• 
lad-tad+1 
kaux = narea(Iad) 
narco(lad) = narco(j) 
narcoO) = kaux 
kshJn = kshJn.l 
gotol0 
end If 
end do 
end do 
IfQprsh.ne.O)then 
write(ktask,24)(narco(i) ,nfrom(narco(i)), nlo(nareo(i)), 
!:I,lad) 
write(ktask,25)ksh In 
write(ktask,26l 
write(ktask,24)(narea(I),nfrom(narco(i)),nto(narco(l)), 
1=(lad>1 ),nl) 
end if 
end If 
fonnat(ll: clrcUito. x codigo de baml do sub-sistem. Incluindo', 
• , elementos shunts',/) 
24 lonnat(4(14: f,14: - ',14,))) 
25 fonnat(lI: no.elementos shunts Incluidos no subsistema ',14) 
26 lormat(tl: clrcuttos do resto do slstema - codigo de barra' ,I) 
return 
end 
.* .................. *** ........................... "' ................................... _ .. ... 
subroUllne swap (n,nl,anom,e,fv,qqmin,qqmax,p,q,PQ,qg,pd,qd, 
.. Ib,ntlp,nbar,Ym,bp,cp,bq,cq,nO,kslack,pslack, 
"" nsb,neb,ntrom,nto,gl,bl,bO,tap,nt,xt,rt,tapmin, 
.. tapmax,nremot,npar,nbarra,nareo,vbase,angbase, 
.. nce,nesenc,ksh,nshunt,nbusJn,nbus_out,nin,nout, 
.. nboUt,tnorm,temer,lprswa,ktask) 
............................... _ ........ " ... _."' ......................... **,. ..... . 
• 
• 
5 
ImplicK double precision (a-h,,,"z) 
paremeter(Ir=3,iw=4) 
character"12 anom('),lmp 
dimension e('),fvr),qqmin('),qqmax('),p('),q('),pg(,,), 
• qgr),pd('),qd('),lb('),nlip('),nbar('), vm('), 
Vbase('),angbase('),bp('),cp('),bq('),cq('), 
nbarre(') , 
dimension nsb('),neb('),nlrom('),nlo('),gl('),bl('),bO('),npar('), 
, tap(·),nlr),xlr),~(·),tapmin('),tapmax(·),nremot(·), 
, narco('),tnorm('),temer(') 
dimension neseno('),nshunt('),nbus_In('),nbus_oUl(') 
renumera.ao dos contadores de banas nos vetores: 
nsb,neb,nl,nremot,busJn,bus_ouI 
do ""I,n! 
dol=1," 
If(nsb(k).eq.nbarra(I))tI1en 
nsb(k)' .j 
gol05 
end II 
end do 
end do 
do k=I,nl 
do 1==1 ,n 
If(neb(k).eq.nbarra(I))tI1en 
neb(k)= .j 
90107 
end If 
7 
9 
11 
19 
21 
• 
end do 
end do 
dok=1,nl 
If(nt(k).eq.O)goto 9 
do 1=1," 
If(nt(k).eq.nbana(I»then 
nt(k)" -l 
got09 
end if 
enddo 
end do 
do k=1,nl 
If(nremot(k).eq.O)goto 11 
do 1=1," 
If(labs(nremot(k».eq.nbana(i»then 
If(nremot(k).gt.O)then 
nremot(k)=1 
else 
nremot(k)=-l 
end if 
gotoll 
end If 
enddo 
end do 
dok=l,nln 
do 1=I,n 
if(nbusJn(k).eq.nbarra(i»then 
nbusJn(k)' -l 
goto19 
end if 
end do 
end do 
do k=1,nout 
kk· nbus_out(k) 
do 1=I,n 
If(kk.eq.nbarra(l) )Ihen 
nbUs_out(k) =-l 
got021 
end If 
end do 
end do 
desfazendo sinal dos vetores 
do k=1 ,nl 
nsb(k) • -nsb(k) 
neb(k) = -neb(k) 
nt(k) = -nl(k) 
end do 
do k=1,nln 
nbusJn(k) = -nbUsJn(k) 
end do 
do k=1 ,nout 
nbus_out(k) = -nbus_out(k) 
end do 
renumeracao da barra slack 
1=1 
dowhlle(i.ie.n) 
If(nO.eq.nbarra(I»lhen 
nO=1 
1= n+1 
end If 
1=1+1 
end do 
kslack = nO 
• 
renumeracao da barra a ser feita slack 
1=1 
do whlle(Ue.n) 
If(nbout.eq.nbarra(I»then 
nbout = I 
1= n+1 
endW 
1=1+1 
end do 
renumeracao de barras 
1=1 
do whileQ.ne.n) 
1=1 
do whlleO.le.n) 
If(l.eq.nbarraO»then 
11 • nbarra(l) 
kaux = Ib(l) 
1b(1) = Ib(lI) 
Ib(II)= kaux 
tmp=anom(l) 
anom(l) = anom(ii) 
anom(ii) = tmp 
aux = e(l) 
0(1) = e(ii) 
e(II)' aux 
aux· fv(l) 
fv(l) • fv(lI) 
fv(lI) = BUX 
aux = qqmin(l) 
qqmln(l) = qqmln(lI) 
qqmln(li) = aux 
aux' qqmax(l) 
qqmax(l) = qqmax(iI) 
qqmax(ii) = aux 
aux' p(l) 
p(l) = p(iI) 
p(lI) = aux 
aux = q(l) 
q(l) = q(ii) 
q(iI) = aux 
aux' pg(l) 
pg(l) = pg(ii) 
pg(ii) = aux 
a\IX. qg(i) 
qg(l) = qg(ii) 
qg(li) = aux 
aux = pd(l) 
pd(l) = pd(lI) 
pd(ii) = BUX 
aux· qd(l) 
qd(1) • qd(iI) 
qd(ll) = BUX 
kaux = ntlp(l) 
ntip(l) • ntlp(lI) 
ntlp(lI) = kaux 
kaux = nbar(l) 
nbar(i) = nbar(ii) 
nbar(iI) = kaux 
aux' vm(i) 
vm(i) = vm(ii) 
vm(ii) = aux 
aux = bp(i) 
bp(l) = bp(iI) 
bp(li) = aux 
aux. cp(l) 
Cp(l) = cp(ii) 
cp(lI) = aux 
aux = bq(i) 
bq(l) = bq(ii) 
bq(lI) = aux 
aux = cq(i) 
cq(i) = cq(ii) 
cq(lI) = aux 
aux = \/base(i) 
\/base(l) = vbase(ii) 
vbase(li) • aUX 
aux = angbase(i) 
angbase(i) = angbase(ii) 
angbase(ii) = aux 
nbarraO) = 11 
nbarra(i) = I 
gotol0 
end if 
J=J+l 
end do 
10 1=1+1 
end do 
* renumeracao dos clrcuitos nos vetores strunt e esenc 
do k=1,ksh 
dol=l,nl 
If(nshunt(k).eq.narcc(i»then 
nstlunt(k)= ~ 
goto13 
endK 
end do 
13 end do 
do k=1,nce 
do 1=I,nl 
If(nesenc(k).eq.narcc(i»then 
nesenc(k)= ~ 
9oto15 
end If 
end do 
15 end do 
* desfazendo sinal de veteres 
do k=l,ksh 
nshunt(k) = -nshunt(k) 
end do 
do k=1,nce 
nesenc(k) = -nesenc(k) 
end do 
* renumeracao de clrcultos 
1=1 
do while(l.ne.nl) 
ii=narco(l) 
1=1 
do whiieO.ie.nl) 
If(l.eq.narcoO»then 
kaux • nsb(l) 
nSb(l) = nsb(lI) 
nsb(ii) = kaux 
kaux = neb(l) 
neb(l) = neb(ii) 
neb(li) = kaux 
kaux • nfrom(i) 
nfrom(l) = nfrom(ii) 
nfrom(lI) • kaux 
kaux • nto(l) 
nto(l) = nto(lI) 
nto(lI) = kaux 
aux' gl(i) 
gl(l) • gl(ii) 
gl(ii) = aux 
aux = bl(l) 
bl(l) • bl(ii) 
bl(lI) = aux 
aux. bO(l) 
bO(l) = bO(i1) 
bO(ll) = aux 
aux = tap(l) 
tap(l) = tap(i1) 
tap(ll) = aux 
kaux = nt(l) 
nt(l) = nt(ii) 
nt(i1)' kaux 
aux' xi(l) 
xi(Q = xi(ii) 
xi(lI) = aux 
aux'ri(l) 
ri(l) • ri(ii) 
ri(i1) • aux 
aux = tapmln(l) 
tapmln(l) = tapmin(ii) 
tapmin(ii) • aux 
aux. tapmax(i) 
tapmax(l) = tapmax(ii) 
tapmax(lI) = aux 
aux • tnorm(l) 
tnorm(i) = tnorrn(ii) 
tnorrn(li) = aux 
aux • temer(l) 
temer(l) • temer(i1) 
temer(ll) • aux 
kaux = nremot(l) 
nremot(i) = nremot(ii) 
nremot(ii) = kaux 
kaux • npar(l) 
npar(l) = npar(ii) 
npar(ll) = kaux 
nareaO) = 11 
narea(l) = I 
goto17 
end If 
)=)+1 
end do 
17 1=1+1 
end do 
If(iprswa.ne.O)then 
wrlte(ktask,22) 
wrlte(ktask,23)(nbarra(I),nbar(i),I=l,n) Inbarra esta ordenado 
wrlte(ktask,24) 
wrlte(ktask,30)(narco(i),nfrom(I),nto(I),I=l,nl) 
wrlte(ktask,36) 
wrlte(ktask,30)(nareo(i),nbar(nsb(I» ,nbar(neb(i» ,1= 1 ,nl) 
wrlte(ktask,26) 
wrlte(ktask,30)(nesene(I),nfrom(nesene(I»,nto(nesene(I», 
• l=l,nce) 
wrlte(ktask,26) 
wrlte(ktask,30)(nshunl(l) ,nfrom(nshunl(l» ,nto(nshunt(i», 
• l=l,ksh) 
wrlte(ktask,32) 
wrlte(ktask,23)(nbusJn(I),nbar(nbusJn(i»,I=l,nin) 
wrlte(ktask,34) 
wrlte(ktask,23)(nbus_out(I),nbar(nbus_out(I»,I=l,nout) 
end If 
22 format(I/,' contadores x codigo de barras ordenados',1) 
23 format(6(14,' - ',14,' f» 
24 format(I/,' contadores das linhas ordenados x codigo de barra' /) 
26 formal(",' clrounos essenelais renumerados x eodigo de barra',I) 
26 format(",' clrounos shunts renumerados x eodlgo de barra',I) 
30 format(4(14,' C,14,' - ',14,')1) 
32 format(",' barras de flntema renumeradas - eontador x codigo',I) 
34 format(II, t barras de fextema renumeradas _ contactor x codigo',I) 
36 format(",' contadores das Ilnhas ordenados via nba( ,I) 
retum 
end 
................................................................................... 
subroutine Inlelo (kb,nbus_out,qqmln,qqmax,pslack,ib,npv,lpv, 
• vspec,e,fv,qmln,qmax,pg,pd,nO,nlpl,nlp2, 
nbout,llnO,vm,angbase,ntlp,p,q,qg,qd,pnbout, 
qnbout,pgnbout,qgnbout,vbase,v) 
................................................................................ ",. 
Impllen double precision (aoh,,,"z) 
c parameter(Ir=3,1w=4) 
common nntgrsf mb,ndadj,njeb 
dimension qqmin('),qqmax('),qmln(,,),qmax('),pg('),pd('), 
• ib("),vspec('),e('),fv(,,),lpv('),angbase('),vm('), 
ntlp('),p('),q('),qg('),qd('),vbase('),v(') 
dimension nbus_ouW) 
radeg = 1.8d2/3.141592653569793d0 
mb =0 
npvcO 
do l=l,kb 
if(Ib(I).eq.l .and. nbout.ne.l)then Ibarra pv 
npv=npv+1 
mb =mb+l 
Ipv(npv) = I 
vspec(npv) = vm(l) 
e(l) • vm(l)"dcos(angbase(l» 
!v(I) = vm(I)'dsln(angbase(l» 
qmln ( mb ) = qqmln(l) 11 oo.OdO Icnacao de qmin e qmax 
qmax (mb) = qqmax(i) 11oo.0d0 lem pu 
else 11(lb(I).eq.O .and. nbout.ne.l)then lbarra slack convertlda em pv 
npv • npv + 1 Icaso faea parte do subsistema 
mb -mb+1 
Ib(l) = 1 
ntlp(l) = 1 
Ipv(npv) = I 
vspec(npv) = vm(l) 
e(l) • vm(I)'dcos(angbase(l» 
!v(I) • vm(I)'dsln(angbase(l» 
II(qqmln(I).eq.O.dO)qqmln(I)=-9999.dO Idefinlndo limnes de reativo 
qmln(mb) = qqmln(I)11oo.dO Ipara a nova barra pv 
W(qqmax(I).eq.O.dO)qqmax(I)=+9999.dO 
qmax(mb)' qqmax(i)11oo.dO 
pg(Q = pslack 
P(I) • pg(l) - pd(l) 
else 11(lb(Q.eq.2 .and. nbout.ne.i)then 
e(l) = vm(I)'dcos(angbase(l» 
!v(I) = vm(I)'dsin(angbase(l» 
end 11 
end do 
c deflnindo a barra slack do sub-sistema 
ttlp1 • Ib(nbout) 
ttlp2 • ntlp(nbout) 
pgnbout= pg(nbout) 
qgnbout= qg(nbout) 
pnbout = p(nbout) 
qnbout = q(nbout) 
nO = nbout Idemarcando nova barra slack 
Ib(nbout) = 0 
ntlp(nbout) = 2 
mb =mb+1 
11 nO = mb 
e(nbout) = vbase(nbout)'dcos(angbase(nbout» 
!v(nbout) = vbase(nbout)'dsln(angbase(nbout» 
qmln(mb) = qqmln(nbout)l1 oo.dO Iso a barra lor pq os Ilmttes de reatlvo 
qmax(mb) = qqmax(nbout)11oo.dO lserao nulos,porem 0 programa nao la: 
!controle de reativo em slack 
do 1=1,1<b 
v(l) • dsqrt (e(i)"2+!v(I)"2) 
end do 
return 
end 
* ...................................................................... . 
subroutine iflout (nl,nadjcY,kdjcy,nlncd,nsb,neb,temer, 
.. nfrom,nto,t,u,ktask) 
........................................................................ 
Impllctt double precision (a-h,a.:) 
dimension nadjcy('),kdjcy('),nlncd(,),nsb('),neb('), 
, temer('),nlrom('),nto('),t('),u(') 
11 =0 
dol= 1,nl 
Appendix C 
TEST SYSTEMS 
C.l. SIX-BUS EXAMPLE SYSTEM 
Fig.C.l Six-Bus Example System 
BRANCH FROM-TO X"'% p lIIO 
1 1-4 0.200 1.50 
2 1-5 0.100 1.50 
3 2-4 0.075 1.50 
4 2-6 0.100 0.75 
5 3-4 0.400 0.80 
6 3-5 0.200 1.25 
7 3-6 0.600 0.50 
8 4-6 Q.400 0.50 
Tab.C.l Branch Data 
BUS BUS POWER 
1 
-
2 0.2 
3 2.0 
4 
-1.0 
5 0.0 
6 
-1.5 
Tab.C.2 Bus Real Power Specification 
Col 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.2 IEEE 51-BUS SYSTEM 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tab.C.3 BRANCH DATA 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM TO NP RES. REAT. CAPAC. TAP TPMIN TPMAX BAR TNORM TEMER 
(% I (% I (MVAI (P.U. I (P.U. I (P.U. I (MVAI (MVAI 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 0 0.83 2.80 12.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
2 3 0 2.98 8.50 8.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
3 4 0 1.12 3.66 3.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
4 5 0 6.25 13.20 2.580 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
4 6 0 4.30 14 .80 3.580 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
6 7 0 2.00 10.20 2.760 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
6 8 0 3.39 1'7.30 4.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
8 9 0 0.99 5.05 5.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
9 10 0 3.69 16.79 4.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
9 11 0 2.58 8.48 2.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
9 12 0 6.48 29.50 1.720 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
9 13 0 4.81 15.80 4.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
13 14 0 1.32 4.34 1.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
13 15 0 2.69 8.69 2.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
1 15 0 1.78 9.10 9.880 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
1 16 0 4.54 20.60 5.460 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
1 17 0 2.38 10.80 2.860 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
3 15 0 1. 62 5.30 5.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
4 18 1 0.00 55.50 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.000 4 O. O. 
4 18 2 0.00 43.00 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.000 4 O. O. 
5 6 0 3.02 6.41 1.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
7 8 0 1.39 7.12 1. 940 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
10 12 0 2.17 12.62 3.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
11 13 0 2.23 7.32 1.880 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
12 13 0 1.78 5.80 6.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
12 16 0 1.80 8.13 2.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
12 17 0 3.97 17.90 4.760 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
14 15 0 1.71 5.47 1.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
18 19 0 46.10 68.50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
19 20 0 28.30 43.40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
20 21 0 0.00 71.67 0.000 1.040 0.800 1.400 20 O. O. 
21 22 0 7.36 11.70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
22 23 0 0.99 1.52 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
23 24 0 16.60 25.60 0.840 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
24 25 1 0.00 118.20 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 2' O. O. 
24 25 2 0.00 123.00 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 24 O. O. 
24 26 0 0.00 4.73 0.000 1.040 0.000 0.000 24 O. O. 
26 27 0 16.50 25.40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
27 28 0 6.18 9.54 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
28 29 0 4.18 5.87 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
7 29 0 0.00 6.48 0.000 0.970 0.800 1. 400 7 O. O. 
25 30 0 13.50 20.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
30 31 0 32.60 49.70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
31 32 0 50.70 75.50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
32 33 0 3.92 3.60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
32 34 0 0.00 95.30 0.000 0.980 0.800 1. 400 32 O. O. 
34 35 0 5.20 7.80 0.320 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
35 36 0 4.30 5.37 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
36 37 0 2.90 3.66 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
37 38 0 6.51 10.09 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
37 39 0 2.39 3.79 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
36 40 0 3.00 4.66 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
22 38 0 1.92 2.95 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
11 41 0 0.00 14.90 0.000 0.960 0.000 0.000 11 O. O. 
41 42 0 20.70 35.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
41 43 0 0.00 41.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
38 44 0 2.89 5.85 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
15 45 0 0.00 10.42 0.000 0.960 0.800 1. 400 15 O. O. 
14 46 0 0.00 7.35 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.000 14 O. O. 
46 47 0 2.30 6.80 0.320 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
47 48 0 1. 82 2.33 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
48 49 0 8.34 12.90 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
49 50 0 8.01 12.80 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
50 51 0 13.86 22.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
10 51 0 0.00 7.12 0.000 0.930 0.800 1. 400 10 O. O. 
13 49 0 0.00 19.10 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.000 13 O. O. 
29 52 0 14.42 18.70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 o. O. 
52 53 0 7.62 9.84 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
53 54 0 18.78 23.20 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
54 55 0 17.32 22.65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
11 43 0 0.00 15.30 0.000 0.960 0,000 0.000 11 O. O. 
44 45 0 6.24 12.42 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
40 56 0 0.00 119.50 0.000 0.960 0.000 0.000 40 O. O. 
41 56 0 55.30 54.90 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
42 56 0 21.25 35.40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
39 57 0 0.00 135.50 0.000 0.980 0.800 1. 400 39 O. O. 
56 57 0 17.40 26.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
38 49 0 11. 50 17.70 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
38 48 0 3.12 4.82 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 O. O. 
9 55 0 0.00 12.05 0.000 0.940 0.900 1. 200 9 O. O. 
Tab.C.4 BUS DATA 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COD TYP NAME TENSAO ANGLE PG QG QMIN QMAX PO Qo QREAT 
(P.U.) (GRAUS) (MW) (MVAR) (MVAR) (MVAR) (MW) (MVAR) (MVAR) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 1.040 0.00 0.0 0.0 -9999.0 9999.0 55.0 17.0 0.0 
2 1 1.000 0.00 90.1 0.0 -9999.0 9999.0 3.0 a8.0 0.0 
3 1 0.990 0.00 90.4 0.0 -9999.0 9999.0 41. 0 21. 0 0.0 
4 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 4.0 0.0 
6 1 0.990 0.00 70.0 0.0 -9999.0 9999.0 75.0 2.0 0.0 
7 0 0.980 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 1 1.000 0.00 180.0 0.0 -9999.0 9999.0 150.0 22.0 0.0 
9 1 0.9BO 0.00 14 O. 0 0.0 -9999.0 9999.0 121. 0 26.0 0.0 
10 0 0.980 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.0 0.0 
11 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12 1 0.990 0.00 300,0 0.0 -9999.0 9999.0 377.0 24.0 0.0 
13 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 2.3 0.0 
14 0 0.000 0,00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 5.3 0.0 
15 0 0.9BO 0,00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 5.0 0.0 
16 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.0 3.0 0.0 
11 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.0 B.O 0.0 
1B 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.2 9.8 10.0 
19 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.6 0.0 
20 0 1.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.0 0.0 
21 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
22 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
23 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 2.1 0.0 
24 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
25 0 0.000 0,00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 3.2 5.9 
26 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.5 0.0 
28 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 2.3 0.0 
29 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 2.6 0.0 
30 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 1.8 0.0 
31 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 2.9 0.0 
32 0 0.920 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 O.B 0.0 
33 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 1.9 0.0 
34 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
35 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 3.0 0.0 
36 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
37 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3B 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 7.0 0.0 
39 0 0.970 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
40 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
41 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 3.0 0.0 
42 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 4.0 0.0 
43 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
44 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 loB 0.0 
45 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
46 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
47 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.7 11. 6 0.0 
48 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
49 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1B.0 8.5 0.0 
50 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21. 0 10.5 0.0 
51 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 5.3 0.0 
52 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 2.2 0.0 
53 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 6.3 
54 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 1.4 0.0 
55 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 3.4 0.0 
56 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 2.2 0.0 
57 0 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 2.0 0.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.3 BRAZILIAN SOUTHERN 749-BUS SYSTEM 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tab.C.5 BUS DATA 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COD TYP NOME TENSAO ANGLE PG QG QMIN QMAX PO QD QREAT 
(P.U.) (GRAUSJ (MW) (MVAR) (MVAR) IMVAR) (MW) (MVAR) (MVAR) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 o ALEGRET2 230 0.998 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 o ALEGRET 2 69 1. 010 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.8 18.1 10.8 
7 o ALEGRET1 138 0.982 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 o ALEGRET1 69 1. 000 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.4 5.1 0.0 
9 o SAGE 2 230 1.023 18.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.6 10.0 0.0 
10 o BASILIO 138 0.968 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.4 7.2 3.6 
18 0 CCORINHA 69 1.000 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.2 25.0 0.0 
19 1 CCORINHA GER 1.020 5.00 0.0 32.3 -999.0 999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
22 o CCORINHA-138 1. 000 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 5.8 0.0 
23 o CALTA 1 138 0.977 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.7 21. 9 0.0 
28 o CCORINHA 000 1.042 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
29 1 CANASTRA 138 1.020 5.00 38.0 23.8-9915.0 9926.0 14.8 7.9 0.0 
35 o CAMAQUA 230 1.036 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.8 13.0 0.0 
38 o CAMPOBOM 230 1.038 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.6 22.6 0.0 
45 o CANDIOTA 230 1.027 20.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
49 o CAXIAS 2 230 1. 013 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.7 46.6 0.0 
53 o C.IND. 230 1.040 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.8 35.7 0.0 
54 o C.IND. 138 1.000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 5.5 0.0 
57 o CHARQUEA 69 1.000 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 72.8 35.8 0.0 
71 o EREXIM 1 138 0.968 6.00 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.5 14.2 0.0 
76 o EVELHA 138 0.980 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.4 14.0 3.6 
79 0 FARRO 69 1. 000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.6 38.8 0.0 
80 o GRAVAT 2 230 1. 035 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.9 14.0 0.0 
81 o GRAVAT2 69 1. 030 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 103.0 51.2 0.0 
83 o GRAVAT2 000 1. 026 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
84 o GUAIBA 2 230 1.039 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.1 7.7 0.0 
85 o GUAPORE 138 0.953 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.7 8.4 0.0 
86 o GUARITA 230 0.975 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 51. 9 14.8 0.0 
93 o ITAUBA 230 1.053 18.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
94 1 ITAUBA-A-GER 1.030 23.00 452.0 8.7 -60.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
95 o ITAUBA-B-GER 1. 050 18.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
96 o ITAUBA-C-GER 1. 050 18.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
97 o ITAUBA-D-GER 1. 050 18.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
98 o JACUI----138 1.000 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.2 0.0 
100 o JAGUARAO 138 0.952 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 4.9 3.6 
101 1 JACUI-A--GER 1.020 30.00 180.0 12.0 -10.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
102 o JACUI-B--GER 0.972 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
103 0 JACUI-C--GER 0.972 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
104 0 JACUI-D--GER 0.972 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
105 0 JACUI-E--GER 0.972 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
106 0 JACUI-F--GE:R 0.972 17 .00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
111 0 LVERMELH 138 0.978 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 2.6 0.0 
114 0 MACAMBAR 230 0.984 1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 12.0 0.0 
123 0 MCOBRE 138 1.009 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 4.6 0.0 
130 o OSORIO 1 138 0.988 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.8 16.8 0.0 
135 o OSORIO 2 138 1.000 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
137 0 PALMAAES 138 0.993 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 3.5 0.0 
140 0 PAL 4 230 1. 032 7.00 0.0 36.0 0.0 0.0 113.0 16.1 0.0 
143 0 PAL 6 230 1. 033 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
144 0 PAL 6 69 1. 000 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 126.0 47.1 0.0 
145 1 PAL 6 GER 1.030 4.00 0.0 8.0 -15.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
146 0 PAL 6 000 1.042 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
150 0 PAL 9 230 1.034 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.7 8.7 0.0 
151 0 PAL 9 69 1.000 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.3 23.4 0.0 
152 1 PAL 9 GER 1.000 5.00 0.0 4.0 -9.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
153 0 PAL 9 000 0.996 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
154 0 PAL 10 230 1. 032 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.7 11. 3 0.0 
161 0 PELOTAS2 138 0.934 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.9 14.8 7.2 
162 0 POLOPETR 230 1. 042 9.00 0.0 29.7 0.0 0.0 67.2 21.7 0.0 
163 0 POLOPETR 69 1.000 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.5 0.0 
165 0 PELOTAS3 230 1.040 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
166 0 PELOTAS3 69 1.000 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 8.0 0.0 
168 0 PIREL-SUL138 0.991 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.0 
171 0 PLANSUL 138 0.992 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 2.1 0.0 
172 0 PMEDtCI 230 1. 028 21. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
173 0 PMEDtCI--138 1. 020 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 6.4 0.0 
174 1 PMEDICIA-13A 1. 040 24.00 112.0 -2.5 -13.0 47.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
175 0 PMEDICIA-13B 1.050 21.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
176 1 PMEDICIB-13A 1.030 30.00 290.0 27.5 -26.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
177 0 PMEDICIB-13B 1.030 21.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
----.-------------------------------------------------
178 0 DPOSORIO 138 0.958 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
181 0 PRE:AL----230 1. 045 16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
182 0 PREAL----138 1. 050 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
183 1 PREAL-A--GER 1. 040 21. 00 126.0 12.4 -18.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
184 o PREAL-B--GER 1.050 16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
186 o QUINTA 230 1.011 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 77.4 36.0 0.0 
195 o S.BORJA2 230 D.978 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2? .1 13.? 5.4 
197 o SCHARLAU 138 1. 000 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 10.6 0.0 
198 o SCHARLAU 69 1.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.8 14.0 3.6 
199 1 SCHARLAU GER 1.010 0.00 0.0 13. ? 
-9.5 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
200 o SCHARLAU 000 0.987 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
201 o SCRUZ 1 230 1.011 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.4 2'.5 0.0 
205 o SIOERURG 230 1. 040 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 3.9 0.0 
208 o SM!\RIA 1 138 0.960 ?OO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31. , 13.6 ?2 
209 o SM!\RIA 3 230 1. 036 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.3 10.6 0.0 
213 o SM!\RTA 230 1.006 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5'.8 22.6 0.0 
215 o SROSA 230 0.950 -1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 79.1 2, .2 10.8 
21? o S.VICENT 138 0.947 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 16.5 10.8 
219 o $MARTA 138 1. 000 5.00 2.9 1.2 0.0 0.0 18.6 5.? 0.0 
220 o TCOROAS 138 1.011 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ?6 3.9 0.0 
223 o TAQUARA 138 LOO' 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 8.0 0.0 
236 o URUGUAI5 230 0.993 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.8 18.6 0.0 
23? o URUGUAI 5 69 1.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
238 1 URUGUAI5-GER 1.010 0.00 0.0 16.3 
-915.0 930.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
239 o URUGUAIASOOO 1. 012 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2'2 o VACARIA 138 0.965 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11. 6 3.8 0.0 
2'3 o V.AIRES 230 1.038 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
245 1 V.AIRES GER 1. 010 9.00 0.0 5.6 -9.5 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2,6 o V.AIRES 000 0.994 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2'8 o V.AIRES 69 1. 000 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 31. 0 0.0 
250 o ZOOLOGIC 138 0.988 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.1 10.8 ?2 
25? o I.CENTRO 138 1. 01, 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 
260 o PAlHOCA-C138 1.020 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 5.5 0.0 
261 o Roc1'J]O 69 1.000 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.6 9.8 0.0 
262 o Roc1'J]O 138 1. 014 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.0 16.0 0.0 
26' o TRINDADE 138 1. 013 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.0 9.8 0.0 
266 1 US.GARC!A. 69 1.030 6.00 ?O 3.5 -4.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
269 o CANOINHAS138 1.020 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.9 10.5 0.0 
272 o HANSEN 69 0.99' 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 3.? 0.0 
214 o Jl\AAGUA 34 1.000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
275 o Jl\AAGUA 69 0.954 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.8 ?8 0.0 
2?6 o JARAGUA 138 0.991 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.' 12.' 0.0 
279 o JOINV. I 69 1.000 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ,1.1 20.8 0.0 
280 o JOINV.III 69 0.98? 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 15.1 0.0 
281 o JOINV.IV 138 1. 000 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.8 10. ? 0.0 
282 o JOINV.IV 69 1.000 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
28' o JOINV. VI 138 0.996 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.0 25.9 0.0 
290 o HArM 138 1.008 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 ?, 0.0 
292 o R.NEGRIN.138 1.005 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ?5 '.2 0.0 
293 o S.BENTO 138 1. 004 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.9 5.? 0.0 
296 o TUP¥ 69 0.993 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.2 11.1 0.0 
298 1 BRA.CINHO 34 1.030 8.00 14 .0 4.2 -7.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
305 0 BL.GARCIA 69 1.000 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 64.' 32.6 0.0 
306 0 BL.GARCIA138 D.976 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
307 0 BLUMEN 2 69 1.000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
308 0 SLUM. II 138 1.001 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.8 12.? 0.0 
315 o BRUSQUE 138 0.958 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.9 13.1 0.0 
321 o GASPAR 138 0.999 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 3.9 0.0 
324 a IBIAAMA 69 0.962 0.00 0.0 0.0 0'.0 0.0 12.2 4.4 0.0 
325 o ILHOTA 69 1. 000 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 72.1 28., 0.0 
327 o INDAIAL A. 69 0.972 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
328 o INDAIAL B 69 0.984 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 3.1 0.0 
336 o RIO SUL 69 1.000 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 2.8 0.0 
337 {) RIO SUL 136 0.945 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5 6.9 0.0 
340 1 BL.SALTO 69 1. 030 4.00 5.0 4.5 -3.5 4.5 23.8 6.8 0.0 
343 o TIJUCAS 138 1. 002 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.5 ?3 0.0 
344 o TIMBO 69 0.973 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.3 9.5 4.8 
346 o TROMBUDO 138 0.942 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 3.5 0.0 
349 1 PAIJvfE:lRAS 69 1. 020 3.00 21. 0 14.0 
-11.0 14.0 2.2 1.0 0.0 
353 {) OTA.CILIO 69 1.000 -3.00 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 30.8 12.8 ?6 
355 o OTACILIO 136 0.963 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
359 o S.JOAQUIM138 1.014 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ?5 3.2 0.0 
363 o V.RJ\MOS 69 1.000 -1. 00 2.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 35.6 16.8 4.8 
364 o V.RJ\MOS 138 0.991 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
366 o CACAOOR 136 0.993 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 1.2 0.0 
367 o C.NOVOS 138 1.003 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 1.1 0.0 
369 o HC.C.NOV138 1.003 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
371 o HERVAl 69 1. 000 0.00 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.7 11.3 0.0 
312 o HERVAl 138 1. 006 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3?5 o VIOEIM 138 0.99? 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.' 5.3 0.0 
380 o CHAPECQ 138 1. 038 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 6.7 0.0 
388 o PINHALZ. 138 1. 003 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 7.7 0.0 
396 o S.MIGUEL 138 1. 000 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.8 6.9 0.0 
397 o S.MIGU~L 69 0.997 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 4.9 0.0 
399 1 XANX~R~ 69 1. 000 4.00 4.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 67.2 26.5 0.0 
407 o CRICIUMA 69 0.992 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.2 17.0 0.0 
408 o CRICIUMA2 69 1. 021 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.1 4.3 0.0 
412 o FORQUILH. 69 0.977 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.6 9.2 0.0 
417 o LC.C. 138 1. 024 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 2.5 0.0 
422 ~J. LACE-RDA 69 1. 000 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 14.3 0.0 
436 o PRO/fORQ. 69 0.976 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.9 7.1 0.0 
437 o PRO/SID~R.69 1.031 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.2 0.0 
441 o SID~ROP.~.69 1. 030 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.1 12.1 0.0 
452 o ACHATEAU-138 0.949 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.8 6.5 2.4 
454 o ANDlRA..---138 1.000 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.1 7.2 0.0 
455 o ANDlRA.--- 88 1.002 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
456 o APARANA--138 0.944 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.4 6.1 0.0 
457 o APA01APA-138 1. 000 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.2 11. 3 7.2 
458 o APAOIAPA-230 0.991 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
460 o AAAPONGA-138 0.999 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.6 8.9 2.4 
461 o ALTONIA--138 0.931 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 4.9 0.0 
463 o ASTORGA--138 0.993 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 6.4 0.0 
464 o AREIA---- 69 1. 000 18.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
465 o ARC01ARC- 69 0.948 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5 6.7 4.8 
469 o BANDElRA-138 0.974 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.6 4.3 0.0 
474 o BFERRAZ-- 69 0.965 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 2.3 0.0 
476 o BVPARAIS-138 0.991 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 3.9 0.0 
478 o CIM.ITAU- 69 0.979 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.7 0.0 
479 o CCPRB---- 69 0.979 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 3.9 0.0 
485 o CASTRO---138 0.998 7. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 6.0 2.4 
4B7 o CBAOICPM- 69 0.994 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.4 16.4 9.6 
488 o CBA02SQT- 69 0.962 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.5 18.0 12.0 
489 o CBA03CCO-230 0.999 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.5 6.1 2.4 
490 o ITAMBE--- 69 0.962 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.6 0.0 
491 o CBA03CCO- 69 1. 000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
492 o CBA04UBR-230 1. 001 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
493 o CBA04UBR- 69 1. 000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.8 18.0 7.2 
494 o CBA05ABA- 69 0.993 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.6 7.8 4.8 
495 o CBA06C~N- 69 0.998 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.7 10.5 9.6 
497 o CBA07BGI- 69 0.969 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.3 11.6 7.2 
499 o CBA08CIC- 69 0.977 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 4.7 3.6 
500 o CBA09PIL-230 0.990 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
501 o CBA09PIL- 69 1.000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 6.4 2.4 
502 o CBAlOPHO- 69 0.993 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.8 13.0 4.8 
503 o CBAl1UMB-230 1.024 14 .00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
504 0 CBAlIUMB- 69 1. 000 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
505 o CBAl2TMA- 69 0.992 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.5 9.7 0.0 
506 o CBAl3BCH- 69 0.999 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.5 7.7 4.8 
509 o CBA16PRO- 69 0.950 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.2 10.0 0.0 
516 o CBA21MER- 69 0.982 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.6 10.5 0.0 
521 0 CELOIPHS-138 0.987 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.8 11.8 7.2 
522 0 CELOIPHS- 69 1.000 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
523 o CEL02CEL-138 1.000 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.5 7.3 0.0 
524 o CEL02C~L-230 1.003 15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
530 o CEUAZUL--138 0.967 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 3.9 0.0 
531 o CI}l.NORTE-138 0.981 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.3 6.8 3.6 
532 o CLEVELAN-138 0.993 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 3:7 0.0 
535 o CLGOICLG- 69 0.963 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.6 8.4 7.2 
536 o COCELPA-- 69 0.997 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.4 0.0 
537 o COCELPAY- 69 0.998 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
538 o CMOOIMOU- 69 1. 001 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
539 1 CMOO1MOU-GER 1. 000 8.00 7.5 1.5 -5.5 5.5 3.9 1.5 0.0 
540 o CM002SSD-138 0.997 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.3 10.3 2.4 
541 o ITAIPU--- 69 0.988 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.3 5.9 0.0 
542 o CM00301O-138 1.000 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
543 o CM003CMO- 69 1.000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
544 o COLOMBO-- 69 0.984 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 1.8 0.0 
547 o CP001CPO-138 0.972 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.8 9.9 4.8 
550 o CHAMINE:-- 69 1. 015 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
551 1 CHAMINE--GER 1. 000 21.00 18.2 -2.6 -13.4 13.4 0.7 0.3 0.0 
552 o DVIZINHO-138 0.946 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.7 7.7 0.0 
554 o FAFEN---- 69 0.999 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 4.2 0.0 
556 o FB~LTRAO-138 0.958 9.00 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.8 6.6 2.4 
558 o FIGUElRA-138 1.000 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.2 4.1 0.0 
559 o FIGUEIRA-230 1.006 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
560 1 FIGUElRA-GER 1.004 5.00 6.0 1.5 -15.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
561 o FLORESTO-138 0.985 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 4.4 0.0 
562 0 FOZAR8IA- 69 0.982 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.3 0.0 
563 o FOZ01FOZ-138 0.934 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.9 15.7 7.2 
566 o FOZ01FOZ- 69 1. 000 1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
568 o GBMROCHA-525 1.021 23.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
569 1 GBMROCHA.-GE:R 1.010 30.00 1420.0 -52.9 -500.0 500.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
570 o GOIOE:RE--138 0.953 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.6 8.5 0.0 
571 o GPSQUZA--138 1.000 14. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.9 0.0 
572 o GPSOUZA--230 1.015 16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 
573 1 GPSOUZA--GE:R 1.025 22.00 222.0 32.7 -125.0 125.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
574 o GUAIRA---138 0.934 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11. 4 4.3 2.4 
575 o GUAIRA---230 1.013 11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
577 o GUARlCAN- 69 1. 008 15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
578 1 GUARICAN-GER 1. 000 19.00 39.0 -3.5 -16.5 16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
579 o GVAOIGVA- 69 0.980 9,00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
582 0 GVAOIGVA-138 0.941 6.00 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.7 9.0 7.2 
583 0 K1J\BIN--- 69 0.994 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0 9.4 0.0 
584 0 IBIPORA--138 0.987 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.9 9.8 0.0 
586 0 lRATI----138 0.959 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
587 1 rAATI----GER 1. 000 5.00 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1 5.2 2.4 
588 0 IVAIPORA-138 0.980 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.7 7.8 2.4 
589 0 PETROBRA- 69 1. 008 15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
590 0 JAGUARIA- 69 1. 000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
593 1 JMESQUIT-GER 1. 000 28.00 45.0 2.3 -37.S 37.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
594 o JMESQUIT- 69 1. 009 23.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
596 o JAGUARIA-138 0.936 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11. 0 4.3 0.0 
597 o JAGUARI2-138 0.936 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
599 o LARDOSUL- 69 0.945 16.00 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 3.4 1.2 
600 o LNA01VCZ-138 0.991 6.00 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 11.3 0.0 
602 o LNA02LNA-138 1. 000 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.2 11.5 7.2 
603 o LNA02LNA-23a 0.994 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
604 o LNA03JBA-138 1. 003 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 7.3 0.0 
605 o LNA04RDA-138 0.991 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.6 18.0 9.6 
608 o LOANDA---138 0.904 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17 .1 6.8 0.0 
610 o MARUMBI--GER 1. 004 6.00 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
612 o MAMBORE:--138 0.981 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 2.0 2.4 
613 o MAMBORE-- 69 1.000 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
615 o MANDAGUA-138 0.994 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 6.6 0.0 
617 o MATINHOS- 69 0.958 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.6 0.0 
618 o MCRONDON-138 0.936 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.7 7.3 4.8 
619 o MEDIANEI-138 0.949 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 5.1 0.0 
620 o MGA01JAL-138 0.993 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.4 19.9 9.6 
621 o MGA02MGA-138 1.000 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.2 14.4 9.6 
622 o MGA02MGA-230 0.979 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
625 o MoRRETES- 69 1.003 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.3 2.4 
631 o PLACASPR- 69 0.997 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 2.3 0.0 
632 o PP.LOTINA-138 0.941 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 4.2 2.4 
633 o pARANAG-- 69 1. 000 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
634 o PARANAG--138 0.989 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21. 0 14.0 10.2 
635 o PARANAVA-138 0.927 -1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21. 6 8.5 4.8 
636 o PATOBRAN-138 1. 000 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
637 o PATOBRAN-230 0.998 15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 5.4 4.8 
639 o PEROX.BR--69 0.997 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.4 0.0 
640 o PGDD! PGN-138 1.000 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
641 o PGOOlPGN-230 0.993 9.00 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.9 12.1 0.0 
642 o PISA-----138 0.934 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.9 7.6 0.0 
643 o PORTO'BRA- 69 0.999 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 
644 o WMARTINS- 69 0.981 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 2.6 0.0 
646 o PG006PGS-230 0.994 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.5 17.1 9.6 
647 o PG007SAA-138 0.997 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 5.6 4.8 
651 o PLESTE--- 69 0.973 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.8 0.0 
653 o REF.M.BR- 69 0.954 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 2.1 0.0 
654 o REPAR---- 69 0.946 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 3.2 0.0 
655 o REFRI PAR- 69 0.998 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 2.2 0.0 
656 o QIGUACU-- 69 0.980 20.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 2.3 0.9 
657 o QBARRAS-- 69 0.983 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11. 9 4.7 0.0 
658 o RBS01RBS- 69 0.980 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 3.4 2.4 
662 o REALEZA--138 0.931 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 10.3 0.0 
663 o RIOAZUL-- 69 0.975 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 2.0 0.0 
666 o R.80SCH-- 69 0.978 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 3.5 0.0 
668 o SJPINHJU- 69 0.996 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.3 8.0 4.8 
669 o SAPLATIN-138 0.969 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 4.2 0.0 
675 o S.GUAIRA- 69 0.955 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 
676 o SIDGUAIR-230 1. 024 14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
677 o SEGREDO-- 69 0.934 14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.1 4.6 0.0 
678 o SMATEUS--230 1.020 15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 3.9 0.0 
680 o SOCORRO-- 69 0.937 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 1.4 0.0 
685 o TE:L80RBA-138 0.992 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
686 o TOLE:DO---138 0.952 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.8 12.8 10.8 
689 o SE:NGES--- 69 0.988 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.9 0.0 
691 o UBlRATA-- 69 0.948 7.00 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 5.0 2.4 
692 o UMU01UMU-138 0.945 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41. 7 14.0 7.2 
697 o UVI01UVI- 69 0.921 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 9.1 0.0 
700 o TgLBORBA- 69 1. 000 -1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.6 2.4 15.0 
702 1 CHARQUEA-GER 1.005 18.00 60.0 -6.8 -21. 0 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
704 1 JLACERDAAGER 1. 040 14.00 90.0 -2.9-1090.0 1090.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
705 1 JLACERDABGER 1. 040 17.00 120.0 34.8-1060.0 1140.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
706 1 JLACERDACGER 1. 040 18.00 220.0 57.8-1188.0 1188.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
710 1 PFUNDO---GER 1. 040 15.00 200.0 70.8-1130.0 1130.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
712 1 SOSORIO--GER 1. 040 28.00 900.0 99.1-1010.0 1010.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
714 1 SSA5TIAGAGER 1. 000 32.00 1080.0 -109.0 -600.0 600.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
722 0 ITA------525 1,001 20.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -300.0 
732 o CURITIBA 525 0.992 16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -300.0 
733 o BLUMENAU-525 0.989 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
734 o BLUMENAU-230 1. 000 11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
735 o BLUMENAU-138 1. 000 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
736 o CNOYOS---525 1. 006 18.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -200.0 
739 o CURITIB--230 1. 020 14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
742 o C.LARGO 525 1. 003 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
748 o fAREIA---525 1. 021 23.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -150.0 
749 o FAREIA---230 1. 000 21. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
750 o GAAVATAI-52S 0.960 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -300.0 
754 o I.GRANDE 230 1. 012 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
755 o IG.ELDOR-138 0.933 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
760 o IYAIPORA-525 1. 000 21.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -200.0 
762 o LONDRINA 525 1. 008 17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
763 o LONDRINA 230 1. 000 14.00 0.0 0.0 ·0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
766 o SSANTIAG-525 1. 019 25.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
776 o CMOURAO--230 0.993 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
778 o CANOINHAS230 1.011 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
780 o CHARQUE:A.-230 1. 032 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
782 o FARROUPI-230 1. 026 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
783 o FARROU-A-OOO 1. 000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
784 o FARROU-8-000 1. 000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
785 o FARROUPI- 13 1. 003 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
794 o JOINVILL-230 0.977 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
795 o JOINVILLE138 1. 020 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
800 o JLACERDA-230 1. 000 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
802 o JI.ACERDAC230 1.000 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
803 o JLA.CERDA-138 1. 000 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
808 o PALHOCA--230 0.996 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
809 o PALHOCA-E138 1. 020 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
812 o pruNDD 230 1. 000 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
814 o PfUNDO 138 1.000 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
820 o SOSORIO--230 1.000 22.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
821 o SOSORIO-- 69 1.000 23.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
824 o SIDEROPO-230 1.014 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
826 o XANXERE--230 1.000 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
827 o XANXEREA-OOO 1.022 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
830 o XANXERE 138 1. 045 . 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2 6.8 0.0 
831 o XANXERE-- 13 1.000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
833 o ILHOTA---138 1.000 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
834 o ILHOTA---OOO 0.963 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
835 1 ILHOTA---GER 1. 000 1.00 0.0 40.0 -28.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
838 o IMBITUBA 138 1. 024 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.6 8.9 0.0 
651 o ELOORADO-138 0.928 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
852 o ELDORADO-OOO 0.990 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
853 o ELDORADO 13 1. 008 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.8 5.7 
854 o ELDORADO 3' 0.988 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1 6.7 1.8 
855 OF. ITA. IR.138 0.991 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.7 0.0 
856 o P.PORA 138 0.981 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
861 o CAARAPO 13 0.983 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.7 2.1 
862 o CAARAPO 3' 0.972 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 
863 o P.PORA 13 1. 000 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.2 7.3 4.2 
880 o CAARAPO 69 0.980 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 3.9 3.0 
881 o CAARAPO 138 0.983 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
883 o AMAMBAI 69 0.959 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
884 o AMAMBAI 13 0.990 -11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 '.6 2.4 2.1 
885 o AMAMBAI 34 0.992 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.6 
894 o IVINHEMA 000 1.000 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
895 o IVINHEMA. 69 1.000 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 '.6 2.' 2.1 
896 o IVINHEMA. 13 1.004 5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 1.8 1.8 
897 o IVINHEMA 3' 1.001 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.3 
898 o IVINHEMAB 13 1.005 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
901 o N.ANDRAD. 13 1.000 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 2.7 0.6 
902 o N.ANDRAD. 34 0.998 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 
905 o O.MAXWELL 13 1.000 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31. 4 16.1 8.4 
906 o CAARAPO fIC 1.000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
907 o CAARAPO 13A 0.980 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
908 o NACOESFICOOO 1.000 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
909 o O.NACOESB 13 0.987 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
910 o D.NACOES 69 1. 000 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 4.3 1.8 
911 o O.NACOES 13 1. 000 -4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 4.0 1.8 
918 o MARACAJU 13 1. 000 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 3.3 2.1 
920 0 S.GAB. 138 1.005 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
921 0 S.GA8~ FleDOO 1.000 -11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
922 0 S.GABRIEL 13 1. 003 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.8 1.8 
923 0 S.GABRIEL 34 1.000 -11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.2 
925 0 COXIM 138 1.002 -11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
926 o COXIM 13 0.990 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 1.8 1.5 
927 0 COXIM 34 0.985 -17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.6 2.4 
930 0 R.BRILH. 138 0.993 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
931 0 R.BRILH. 13 0.990 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.3 2.1 
932 0 R.BRILH. 34 0.990 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.8 0.0 
942 0 SANESUL 69 0.987 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
943 0 SJlNESUL 138 0.993 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
946 o CG-ASCAFA 13 1.000 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 7.0 6.0 
947 0 CG.MCOUTO 13 1.000 -11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 20.1 15.0 
948 0 CG.CENTRO 13 1.000 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.4 15.6 7.2 
949 0 CG.ALMOXA 13 1.000 -14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.4 22.7 7.2 
950 0 CG.ALMOXA 34 1.019 -17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 3.2 2.1 
954 0 CHAPADAO 138 1.050 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
955 0 CHAPAOAO 34 0.995 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.3 0.0 
956 o CHAE'ADAO 13 0.989 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 
957 0 QUI DAUANA 13 1.000 -16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.1 5.2 1.8 
958 0 QUIOAUANA 69 0.984 -19.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 3.1 2.1 
959 0 QUI DAUANA 34 0.982 -17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.0 
962 0 CASSlLAN .138 1.048 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
963 0 CASSlLAN. 13 0.990 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.7 0.3 
964 0 CASSlLAN. 34 0.991 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
965 0 PARANAIBA138 1.038 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
966 o PARANAlBA 13 0.990 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 6.2 0.9 
968 o MlRANDA. 13 1.029 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.1 0.0 
969 o MlRANDA 34 1.000 -16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 1.1 0.0 
970 o DER.N.AND138 1.020 14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
974 o CORUMBA 13 1.010 -19.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.6 9.5 2.1 
975 o F.CIMENT0138 1.055 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
976 o DOUAADOS 230 0.971 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -27.0 
977 o D.ST.CRUZ138 1. 000 -1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
978 o D.N.A.COES 138 0.993 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
979 o D.MAXWELL138 0.991 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
980 o IVINHEMA. 138 1.007 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
981 o NOVANDRAD138 1.019 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
982 o MARACAJU 138 0.997 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
983 1 MIMOSO A GER 1.030 4.00 9.0 1.1-9999.099999.0 1.2 0.6 0.0 
984 1 MIMOSO-6-GER 1.030 7.00 20.0 1.5-9999.099999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
985 o MIMOSO---138 1.028 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
986 1 CG-ESUL--138 0.993 -6.00 0.0 
-1.1-9999.099999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
988 o CG-ASCAFA138 0.980 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
989 o CG-MCOUT0138 0.988 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
990 o CG-CENTR0138 0.969 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
991 o CG-ALMOXA138 0.971 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
992 o IMBIRUSSU138 1. 007 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
994 o QUlDAUANA138 1. 028 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0-
996 o MlRANDA 138 1. 000 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
997 o ANASTACI0138 1. 029 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
999 o CORUMBA 138 1.043 -16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.6 0.0 
1001 o ADRIAl-T-TER 1. 000 -47.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 120.0 
1002 o ADRIA3-T-TER 1.000 -49.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 
1003 o ANGRA--G-GER 1. 023 -27.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.4 13.8 0.0 
1005 o CAN/SM-1-138 D.991 -56.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11. 3 -0.5 0.0 
1006 1 BR. SUL-S-SIN 0.900 -24.00 0.0 1.0-9030.0 9060.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1007 1 SANDEI-E-EST 1. 010 -14.00 0.0 
-9.9-9050.0 9100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1009 1 BR.GER-S-SIN 1. 005 -29.00 0.0 
-6.3-9020.0 9040.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1010 o C. PAUL-T-TER 1. 000 -23.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1011 o CAMPIN-T-TER 1.000 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
1012 1 ESTREI-G-GER 1. 025 -3.00 726.0 
-228.0-9320.0 9320.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1013 1 FUNIL--G-GER 1. 025 -29.00 200.0 59.5-9100.0 9100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1014 2 FURNA$-G-GER 1.030 -11.00 415.0 -2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1015 1 GRAJAU-S-SIN 0.982 -44.00 0.0 -23.5-9200.0 9400.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1016 o GRAJAU-T-TER 0.985 -44.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1017 1 ITAIPU-5-500 1. 050 36.00 3780.0 871.0-9999.0 9999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1018 o ITUMB2-T-T£R 1.048 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1019 o ITUMB3-T-TER 1.000 -1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1020 1 ITUMBI -G-GE:R 1.035 8.00 1400.0 298.0-9630.0 9630.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1021 o IVAIPO-T-TER 1.000 21.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -720.0 
1022 1 MARIMB-G-GER 1.040 7.00 780.0 -354.0-9400.0 9400.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1023 o MARIM3-T-TER 1.000 -1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1024 1 MASC-A-G-GER 1.025 -2.00 250.0 0.5-9085.0 9085.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1025 1 MASC-B-G-G£R 1.030 -3.00 140.0 4.9.6-9055.0 9055.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1026 1 PCOLMB-G-GER 1.030 6.00 250.0 7.7-9070.0 9070.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1027 o POCOS3-T-TER 1.000 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
1028 o SCRUZG-G-GER 0.958 -52.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1029 o SCRUZP-G-GER 0.958 -52.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1031 1 SROQUE-3-345 1. 001 5.00 0.0 -110.0-9600.091200.0-5985.0 3240,0 3071.0 
1032 1 B.ALTO-2-230 1.025 -42.00 0.0 -0.5-9999.0 9999.0 0.0 0.0 55.4 
1034 1 TPRETO-S-SIN 1.030 -5.00 0.0 -2.2-9150.0 9300.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1035 0 TPRETS-T-TER 1.000 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1036 0 TPRETO-3-345 1.000 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 600.0 
1037 1 VITORI-S-SIN 1.000 -66.00 0.0 1.4-9030.0 9066.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1038 o VITORI-T-TER 1. 076 -70,00 17 .1 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.4 13.5 60.0 
1081 o ADRIAl-O-ODD 1. 030 -47.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1082 o ADRIA3-T-TER 1.011 -49.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1083 o ADRIA3-0-000 0.996 -49.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1084 o ADRIA3-0-000 1.011 -49.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1085 o ADRIAN-1-138 1.000 -46.00 24.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 459.0 81. '1 0.0 
1086 o ADRIAN-3-345 1. 000 -42.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -60.0 
1087 o ADRIAN-5-500 1. 000 -35.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1088 o ANGRA.--5-500 1. 000 -26.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1089 o AAARAQ-5-500 1. 084 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -294.0 
1090 o BR.GE3-*- 34 1.000 -29.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 86.2 1.7 0.0 
1091 o BR.GER-2-230 1.000 -26.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1092 0 BR.SUL-1-138 I.DOD -28.00 24.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 382.0 6.6 0.0 
1093 0 BR.SUL-2-230 1. 044 -26.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 
1094 o BR.SUL-3-34S 1.000 -24.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1095 o BANDEI-2-230 1.003 -17.00 121.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 454.0 73.0 0.0 
1096 o BANDEI-3-345 1.018 -14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1097 o BR.GER-O-OOO 1.012 -29.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1098 o BR.GER-O-OOO 1.012 -29.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1101 o CPAULI-D-OOO 1.04l -23.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1102 o CPAULI-1-138 1. 000 -23.00 30.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 78.0 2.5 0.0 
1103 o CPAULI-5-500 1. 000 -19.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1104 o CAMPI3-0-000 1.072 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1105 o CAMPIN-3-345 1.000 -7.00 17.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 256.0 50.0 0.0 
1106 o CAMPIN-5-500 1.000 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -73.0 
1107 0 CAMPOS-3-345 1.000 -57,00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -120.0 
1109 0 ESTREI-3-345 1.000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1110 0 FOZ.IG-7-750 1. 000 32.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -660.0 
1111 0 FUNIL--1-138 1. 000 -34.00 166.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 382.0 2.3 0.0 
1112 0 F1JRNAS-3-345 1. 000 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1113 0 GRAJAU-1-138 0.985 -44.00 262.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1806.0 38.0 0.0 
1114 0 GRAJAU-5-500 1.000 -4 O. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1115 o GUARUL-3-345 1.001 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1116 o IT/TP1-C-750 0.978 22.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1117 o IT/TP2-C-750 0.978 22.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1119 o ITBERA-7-750 1. 014 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0-1320.0 
1120 o ITAORN-1-138 0.974 -54.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.7 10.1 35.0 
1121 0 ITUMB2-0-000 1. 048 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1122 o ITUMB3-0-000 1.043 -1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1123 0 ITUMBI-2-230 1.047 -2.00 277.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.7 -15.5 0.0 
1124 o ITUMBI-3-345 1.000 -1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -96.0 
1125 o ITUMBI-5-500 1.000 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -91.0 
1126 0 ITUTIN-3-345 1.030 -29.00 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 159.0 -17.3 0.0 
1127 0 IV/E'Ol-C-750 1.007 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -150.0 
1128 0 IV/E'02-C-750 1.007 13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -150.0 
1130 0 IV/IT1-C-750 1. 028 29.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -330.0 
1131 0 IV/IT2-C-750 1. 028 29.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -330.0 
1133 0 IVAIPO-O-OOO 1. 006 21. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1134 0 IVAIPO-7-750 1.000 20.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -330.0 
1135 0 JACARE-1-138 0.983 -47.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 350.0 4.3 200.0 
1136 0 JACARE-3-345 1.000 -44.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1137 0 S.JOSE-5-500 1.001 -38.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1139 o MARIM3-0-000 1.052 -1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1140 o MARIMB-3-345 1. 000 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
114l o MARIMB-5-500 1. 000 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1142 o MASCAR-1-138 1. 000 -8.00 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 280.0 -24.5 0.0 
1143 o MASCAR-3-345 1.000 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1144 o MOGI---2-230 1.006 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1145 o MOGI---3-345 1.000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1147 o NIQUEL-2-230 1.000 -50.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.9 3.9 0.0 
1148 o PCOLOM-1-138 1.000 1.00 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 164.0 13.7 0.0 
1149 0 PCOLOM-3-345 1. 042 -1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1150 0 POCOS--3-345 1. 000 -9.00 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 333.0 62.7 0.0 
1151 0 POCOS--5-500 1. 000 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -136.0 
1152 0 POCOS3-0-000 1.135 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1153 o RVERD1-T-TER 1.037 -17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1154 0 RVERD1-0-000 1.037 -17.00 57.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 119.0 0.7 0.0 
1155 0 RVERDE-2-230 1.000 -16.00 84.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 262.0 -68.6 0.0 
1156 0 S.CRUZ-1-138 1. 000 -52.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 362.0 36.6 0.0 
1157 0 S.MESA-1-138 0.998 -55.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.5 -9.2 0.0 
1158 0 S.MESA-2-230 1. 000 -53.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.8 -3.2 0.0 
1160 0 SROQUE-5-500 1. 000 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1161 0 B.ALTO-6-069 1. 014 -45.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.0 5.6 0.0 
1163 0 TPRET3-0-000 1.046 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1164 o TPRET3-0-000 1. 047 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1165 o TPRET5-0-000 0.993 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1166 o TPRETO-5-500 1. 000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1167 o TPRETO-7-750 1.000 1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -660.0 
1168 o T/12---5-500 1.060 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1169 o VITORI-3-345 1.025 -66.00 85.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 577.0 5.3 -60.0 
1181 1 A. LA.YD-G-GER 1.031 9.00 80.0 48.7-9052.0 9052.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1182 1 ASOLIV-G-GER 1.020 -6.00 25.9 3.5-9017.0 9017.0 25.4 5.1 0.0 
1183 1 AVERML-4-440 1.034 11.00 940.0 -306.0-9999.0 9999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1184 1 AVANHA.-G-GER 1. 040 18.00 240.0 25.9-9144.0 9144.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1185 1 BBONIT-G-GER 1. 035 0.00 113.0 38.8-9056.0 9056.0 82.2 42.4 0.0 
1186 o CABREU-T-TER 1. 000 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1187 1 CACOND-G-GE:R 1. 020 -6.00 51.2 19.1-9050.0 9050.0 48.8 21.4 0.0 
1189 1 CAPIVA-G-GER 1. 027 21. 00 526.0 148.0-9308.0 9308.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1190 1 ECUNHA-G-GER 1. 035 -6.00 82.7 23.3-9068.0 9068.0 74.1 14.3 0.0 
1191 1 EMBU -4-440 1. 030 -5.00 0.0 1.6-9175.0 9275.0 0.1 63.9 0.0 
1192 1 I.SOr.T-4-440 1. 040 15.00 2000.0 -668.0-9999.0 9999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1193 1 IBITIN-G-GE.R 1. 044 13.00 110.0 -4. 3-9054.0 9054.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1195 1 JUPIA -4-440 1. 044 14 .00 770.0 -355.0-9999.0 9999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1196 1 JUPI.A-G-GER 1. 035 16.00 190.0 3.5-9096.0 9096.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1197 1 LNGAAC-G-GER 1. 038 10.00 60.0 33.2-9036.0 9036.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1198 1 MALIMA-G-GER 1.040 4.00 131. 0 -5.5-9069.0 9069.0 67.7 7.3 0.0 
1200 1 PROMIS-G-GER 1.040 18.00 240.0 40.0-9141.0 9141.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1201 1 ROSANA-G-GER 1.040 23.00 150.0 -7.1-9999.099989.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1202 1 SANGEL-4-440 1.027 -7.00 0.0 148.0-9175.0 9275.0 1.5 18.8 0.0 
1203 1 T.IRMAOS-440 1.035 15.00 144.0 -20.3-9999.0 9999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1204 1 TAQUAAUC-GER 1.015 21.00 90.0 1. 6-9999. 0 9999.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1205 1 XAVANT-G-GER 1.039 13.00 372.0 120.0-9200.0 9200.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1211 o A.LAYD-2-230 1.000 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1212 o AVERME-5-500 1.073 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1213 o AAAAAQ-4-440 1.023 1. 00 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 362.0 135.0 -540.0 
1214 o ASSIS -2-230 1.000 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1215 o ASSIS -4-440 1.014 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -180.0 
1216 o BAURU -4-440 1.035 4. 00 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.6 127.0 -720.0 
1217 o BOTUCA-2-230 1. 000 -2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1218 o CBONIT-2-230 0.946 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.5 70.8 0.0 
1219 o CABREU-O-OOO 1. 016 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1220 o CABREU-2-230 1. 000 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1221 o CABREU-4-440 1. 000 -6.00 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.7 33.4 0.0 
1222 o CAPIVA-4-440 1.000 15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1223 o M.MIR3-4-440 1.019 -4.00 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 207.0 167.0 0.0 
1225 o BJAAOI-4-440 1.030 -11.00 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.4 29.2 0.0 
1226 o LNGAAC-2-230 1.037 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1227 o LNG.Y.-2-230 1.037 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1228 o R.PRET-4-440 0.972 -2.00 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 200.0 179.0 -180.0 
1230 o S.BARB-4-440 0.988 -5.00 24.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 513.0 312.0 0.0 
1232 o SUMAf{E-4-440 0.994 -6.00 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 167.0 125.0 0.0 
1233 o D.OEST-4-440 1. 045 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1234 o TAQUAA-4-440 1. 000 16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -90.0 
1235 o TAUBAT-4-440 1. 000 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1236 o TAUBAT-5-500 1. 059 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1237 o XAVANT-2-230 1.000 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1261 o A. LAYO-1-138 1.042 -1. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1262 o ALPAAG-1-138 0.984 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 2.3 0.0 
1263 o ASSIS -8-088 0.987 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.2 23.9 0.0 
1264 o BOTUCA-I-138 1.043 -5.00 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 163.0 -15.7 0.0 
1265 o BOTUCA-8-088 1.000 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2 18.2 0.0 
1266 o ITAISC-l-138 1.026 -3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.9 -14.4 0.0 
1267 o ITAP.2-1-138 0.973 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.8 -13.7 0.0 
1268 o LNGAAC-8-088 1.000 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.6 17.6 0.0 
1269 o LAAANJ-1-138 1.011 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.9 6.4 0.0 
1270 o TATUI2-1-139 0.987 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 5.0 0.0 
1271 o TIETE -1-138 1. 000 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 6.3 0.0 
1272 o XAVANT-8-098 1. 000 4. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 13.7 0.0 
1273 o PIRELI-1-138 0.998 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 3.2 0.0 
1281 o AVERML-1-138 1. 000 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1282 o ANOMD-1-138 1.040 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 5.4 0.0 
1283 o AAACAT-1-138 1.015 11. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.2 23.5 0.0 
1284 o AVANHA-1-138 1.045 14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.5 4.5 0.0 
1285 o CAROOS-1-138 1.027 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 3.9 0.0 
1286 o CATAND-1-138 1.032 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.8 14.4 0.0 
1287 0 FERNAN-1-138 1.020 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.7 8.6 0.0 
1288 0 I.SOLT-1-136 1. 040 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 4.2 0.0 
1289 o IBITIN-1-138 1.000 8.00 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.5 -18.6 0.0 
1290 o JALES -1-138 1.024 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.6 16.4 0.0 
1291 o JUPIA -1-138 1.000 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 1.1 0.0 
1292 o MIAAND-1-138 1. 019 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 3.8 0.0 
1293 o P.BARR-1-138 1. 034 8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 4.1 0.0 
1294 0 P.OEST-I-138 1. 028 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 2.4 0.0 
1296 0 PROMIS-1-138 1. 000 13.00 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 135.0 12.3 0.0 
1297 o SJRPRE-1-138 1.018 7.00 0 •• 0.0 0.0 0.0 132.0 24.1 0.0 
1298 o UBAAAN-1-138 1.044 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.7 9.7 0.0 
1299 o V.VENT-1-138 1. 025 7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 2.2 0.0 
1300 o VALPAR-1-13B 1.012 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1301 o VOTUPO-1-138 1.022 6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37 •• 10.0 0.0 
1311 o CAPIVA-1-138 1.0'8 12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 
1313 0 F.PAUL-1-138 0.987 9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.2 33.6 0.0 
131. 0 PPRU02-1-138 1. 006 10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 6.2 0.0 
1315 o PPRUDE-!-138 1.008 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 71. 0 '2.2 0.0 
1317 0 PIRAPZ-1-138 1.019 11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17 .3 6.8 0.0 
1318 o ROSANA-1-138 1. 048 20,00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.7 7.1 0.0 
1319 o TAQ.Yl-1-138 1.058 16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1320 o TAQUAR-1-138 LOS. 15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 2.9 0.0 
1322 o TAQ.Y2-1-138 1.039 1'.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1350 o S.JOSE-1-138 1.000 -43.00 209.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 793.0 
-'7.1 0.0 
1352 o R.LEAO-1-138 1. 003 -59.00 103.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 295.0 -,6.1 0.0 
1354 o CAMPOS-1-138 1. 012 -60.00 49.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 249.0 
-26.' 0.0 
1356 o V.EMA. -3-345 0.990 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 570.0 3.3 0.0 
1358 o XAVANT-3-3.5 1. 010 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1360 o A.SERl-3-345 0.998 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1362 o A.SER2-3-345 0.999 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1363 o ALTINO-3-345 1.010 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49 •• 0 5.9 0.0 
136. o ANHANG-3-345 1.000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1365 o BAIXAO-3-345 1. 000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 170.0 101.0 0.0 
1366 o BANOEI-3-345 1.011 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 916.0 8.' 0.0 
1367 o EMBU 
-3-3'5 1. 000 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1368 o TIETE -3-345 1.001 
-'.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -140.0 
1369 o GLICER-3-345 1.001 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.8 -0.2 
-1'0.0 
1310 o INTERL-3-34S 1. 000 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1371 o ITAPET-3-345 1. 000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1372 o LESTE -3-345 0.990 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60'.0 2.2 0.0 
1314 0 DNORD!-3-345 1. 001 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1375 o ONOR02-3-345 1. 002 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1376 o NORDES-3-345 1.001 -7.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 561. 0 6.3 0.0 
1377 o NORTE -3-345 1.001 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 601. 0 2.2 0.0 
1378 o S.ANGE-3-3'5 1. 000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1319 o SUL -3-3'5 0.995 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 857.0 14.0 0.0 
1381 o ANHANl-2-230 1.011 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -60.0 
1382 o ANHAN2-2-230 1.011 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -60.0 
1383 o ANHAN3-2-230 1.006 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1384 o ANHAN4-2-230 1.006 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1385 o ANHANG-2-230 1.011 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1386 o APAREC-2-230 0.997 -16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.9 1.2 0.0 
1387 o ARUJA -1-138 1.011 -13.00 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 131. 0 6.8 0.0 
1388 o BAIXAO-8-088 0.998 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 221.0 36.1 33.3 
1389 o BAIXAO-2-230 1.000 -6.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 13.2 0.0 
1390 o BIRITI-1-138 1.026 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.2 -18.1 0.0 
1391 o C.B.A.-2-230 0.999 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2'0.0 86.8 0.0 
1392 o CENTIl-2-230 1.013 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1393 o CENTI2-2-23D 1.013 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1394 o CENTRO-2-230 1.015 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 300.0 13 •• 0.0 
1395 0 E.SOUZ-2-23D 1.010 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 225.0 0.2 0.0 
1396 0 EMBU -1-138 1.043 -10.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 199.0 -47.8 0.0 
1397 1 H.B013-G-GER 0.975 
-2.00 235.0 62.8-9100.0 9371. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1398 0 H.BO N-8-088 1. 000 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1399 1 H.BO N-G-GER 0.990 -3.00 100.0 39.2-9035.0 9058.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1400 0 H.BO S-8-088 1.000 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 323.0 4.7 0.0 
1401 1 H.BO S-G-GER 0.980 -3.00 295.0 83.0-9080.0 9163.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.02 0 H.BORD-2-2:30 1. 000 -5.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.03 0 INTERL-2-230 1.006 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1404 0 B.JARO-8-088 1.000 -15.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 280.0 -3.7 0.0 
1405 o MANAH -1-138 1. 017 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 -15.0 0.0 
1406 o HOGI -2-230 1. 006 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 136.0 5.6 0.0 
1407 o MOGIQl-2-230 1.006 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1408 o MOGIQ2-2-230 1.006 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1409 0 PIRATI-8-068 0.997 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 262.0 12.9 24.8 
1410 0 PIRATI-2-230 1. 000 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1411 0 PIRITU-2-230 1.005 -11.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 426.0 0.9 0.0 
1412 o STACAB-2-230 0.995 -16.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.6 1.1 0.0 
1413 o S.JOSE-2-230 1.000 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
141. o S.SEBA-1-138 1.019 -13.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 ••• -9.5 0.0 
1415 o SIFAO -1-138 1. 023 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 -7.2 0.0 
1416 o SKOL -1-138 1. 003 -17.00 11. • 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.6 -0.5 0.0 
1417 o T.OEST-4-440 1. 0.5 -4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 365.0 -6.8 0.0 
1418 o TAUBAT-1-138 0.99' 
-1'.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 178.0 -0.9 0.0 
1419 o TAUBAT-2-230 1.002 -14.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1420 o V.CARV-1-138 1.015 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.6 15.7 0.0 
1421 o CARAGU-1-138 1.022 -15.00 27.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 21. 0 -3.0 0.0 
1422 o EMBRAE-8-068 1.005 -17.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 0.4 0.0 
1423 o S.JOSE-8-088 1. 005 -17.00 31.1 0,0 0.0 0.0 310.0 28.8 57.1 
1430 0 PlRAT2-8-088 0.998 -12.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 281. 0 -12.0 24.8 
1431 0 BARREI-T-TER 1.041 -33.00 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.8 24.2 25.2 
1432 0 BARREl-S-SIN 1. 005 -33.00 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.9 12.9 0.0 
1436 0 lGARAP-G-GER 0.988 -35.00 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.1 25.4 0.0 
1439 0 JAGUAR-T-TER 1.030 -8.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1440 0 IAFAIE-T-TER 1.051 -32.00 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.2 23.2 36.0 
1441 1 MESQUI-S-SIN 1.030 -34.00 2.7 -10.8-9060.0 9100.0 30.8 8.0 0.0 1444 1 NEVES--S-SIN 1.035 -31.00 0.5 -15.2-9120.0 9200.0 167.0 86.3 0.0 
1445 0 NEVES--T-TER 1. OOD -28.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1448 0 SGOTAR-T-013 1. 052 -21. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1451 1 OPRET2-E-EST 1. 035 -29.00 5.6 -11. 0-9060. 0 9100.0 99.2 53.8 0.0 
1452 o TAQUAl-T-TER 1. 232 -30.00 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 -14.7 60.0 
1453 o TAQUAZ-T-TER 1.229 -30.00 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.6 -14.6 60.0 
1459 1 TMARIA-3-300 1. 030 -28.00 343.0 -25.6-9120.0 9120.0 137.0 23.4 0.0 
1460 1 SGRAND-1-161 1.040 -29.00 88.1 -11. 3-9030. 0 9030.0 67.8 2.1 0.0 
1461 1 ITUTIN-1-138 1. 035 -31. 00 80.4 -8.0-9030.0 9030.0 97.4 -20.7 0.0 
1462 o JFORA--T-TER 1.047 -35.00 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.3 20.5 36.0 
1463 o BARBAC-T-TER 1. 056 -32.00 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.4 18.3 36.0 
1470 o BARREI-3-345 1.033 -29.00 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 362.0 168.0 0.0 
1471 1 EMBORC-5-50D 1. 035 -4.00 800.0 -349.0-9300.0 9300.0 310.0 
-8.7 -91. 0 
1473 o JFORA--3-345 1.038 -33.00 7.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 133.0 40.6 0.0 1474 1 JAGUAR-3-345 1.030 -8.00 392.0 -129.0-9135.0 9135.0 163.0 36.3 0.0 1475 o JAGUAR-5-500 1.000 -9.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -455.0 
1476 o LAE"AIE-3-345 1. 040 -30.00 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 132.0 38.4 0.0 
1477 o MESQUI-5-500 1.067 -31. 00 25.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 362.0 95.5 0.0 1478 o NEVES--3-34S 1.040 -28.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1479 o NEVES--5-500 1.000 -26.00 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 355.0 33.2 0.0 
1480 0 PIMENT-3-345 1. 040 -18.00 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 177.0 18.9 0.0 
1482 1 SSIMAO-5-S00 1. 035 7.00 990.0 -371.0-9480.0 9480.0 0.0 0.0 -182.0 
1483 o TMARIA-3-345 1. 037 -29.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1484 o OPRET2-3-34S 1. 038 -28.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1485 o OPRET2-5-50a 1.000 -26.00 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 152.0 -16.4 -91.0 
1486 o TAQUAR-3-345 1.039 -29.00 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 383.0 152.0 0.0 
1487 1 VGRAND-3-345 1. 035 -2.00 330.0 -78.9-9120.0 9120.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1490 o MCLARO-3-345 1.044 -42.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 228.0 -74.9 0.0 
1491 o VPALMA-3-345 1. 016 -37 . .00 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 304.0 141. 0 0.0 
1492 o SGOTAR-3-345 1. 052 -21. 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1493 o SGOTAR-5-500 1.000 -19.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1495 o BARBAC-3-345 1. 043 -30.00 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.3 33.0 0.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.3 BRAZILIAN SOUTHERN 749-BUS SYSTEM 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tab.C.6 BRANCH DATA 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BARRA BARRA C RES. REAT. CAPAC. TAP TPMIN TPMAX BAR TNORM TEMER 
INIC. FIN. 1%1 (%1 (MVAI (P.U.I (P.U.I (P.U.I (MVAI (MVAI 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 4 0 0.00 16.52 0.000 0.947 0.850 1.15 4 83. 83. 
3 9 0 5.22 26.01 46.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 200. 310. 
3 114 0 1.62 8.11 14.535 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
3 209 0 3.38 18.80 34.490 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
3 236 0 2.31 11.54 20.690 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 201. 
4 8 0 2.01 4.52 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 33. 46. 
1 8 1 0.00 29.93 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 a 25. 25. 
1 8 2 0.00 29.93 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 8 25. 25. 
1 211 0 9.00 28.28 6.520 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
9 45 0 0.76 3.82 6.840 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
10 173 0 5.06 20.24 4.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 14. 104. 
10 118 0 1.69 6.29 1.490 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 14. 104. 
18 22 0 0.00 21.81 0.000 1. 004 0.951 1.02 18 40. 40. 
18 28 1 0.00 34.53 0.000 1. 004 0.951 1.02 18 35. 35. 
18 28 2 0.00 34.53 0.000 1. 004 0.951 1. 02 18 35. 35. 
19 28 1 0.00 23.79 0.000 0.956 0.956 0.95 19 15. 15. 
19 28 2 0.00 23.19 0.000 0.956 0.956 0.95 19 15. 15. 
22 28 1 0.00 -1. 46 0.000 0.956 0.956 0.95 22 35. 35. 
22 28 2 0.00 -1. 46 0.000 0.956 0.956 0.95 22 35. 35. 
22 54 0 0.66 2.45 0.580 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 14. 104. 
22 223 0 3.58 10.90 2.680 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 66. 92. 
23 98 0 4.61 11.13 4.060 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 14. 104. 
29 220 0 1.27 3.85 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 66. 92. 
35 84 0 1. 99 9.92 17.780 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 200. 310. 
35 172 0 3.74 18.71 33.920 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 141. 207. 
38 80 1 0.45 2.31 3.910 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
38 ao 2 0.45 2.31 3.970 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
38 782 1 1.20 6.14 10.540 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 201. 
38 782 2 1.20 6.14 10.540 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 141. 201. 
45 172 0 0.12 0.66 1.210 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
49 782 0 0.39 2.13 3.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
54 53 1 0.00 4.38 0.000 0.962 0.900 1.10 5, 150. 150. 
54 53 2 0.00 4.38 0.000 0.962 0.900 1.10 54 150. 150. 
53 80 1 0.19 1.03 2.040 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
53 80 2 0.22 1.11 2.320 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
53 80 3 0.22 1.11 2.320 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
53 84 0 0.45 2.22 3.980 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 200. 310. 
53 150 0 0.28 1.31 2.700 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
53 162 1 0.41 2.24 4.132 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 215. 335. 
53 162 2 0.41 2.24 4.132 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 215. 335. 
53 165 0 4.72 23.59 42.290 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 200. 310. 
53 181 0 3.81 21.10 39.200 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
53 201 0 2.18 11. 92 21. 730 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
53 205 0 0.26 1.29 2.380 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
53 243 0 2.07 9.33 17.180 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 124. 173. 
53 780 0 0.83 4.31 7.420 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 215. 335. 
54 l300 4.55 23.11 54.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 124. 
54 171 0 0.68 2.28 0.710 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
54 250 0 1. 06 3.59 1.040 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
780 51 1 0.00 10.88 0.000 1. 012 0.864 1.13 57 50. 83. 
780 57 2 0.00 10.88 0.000 1. 012 0.864 1.13 57 50. 83. 
71 814 0 5.11 12.42 2.750 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 51. 78. 
76 197 0 0.56 1. 93 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 14. 104. 
19 783 0 0.00 -0.31 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 79 83. 83. 
19 784 0 0.00 -0.31 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 79 83. 99. 
80 83 0 0.00 13.24 0.000 0.950 0.950 1.10 -81 100. 165. 
80 1431 0.54 2.81 4.980 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 141. 207. 
80 143 2 0.54 2.81 4.980 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 107. 207. 
80 750 1 0.00 1.25 0.000 1.100 1.100 1.10 80 600. 720. 
80 750 2 0.00 1.25 0.000 1.100 1.100 1.10 80 600. 720. 
80 750 3 0.00 1.25 0.000 1.100 1.100 1.10 80 600. 720. 
81 83 0 0.00 -0.40 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 81 100. 165. 
85 219 0 10.00 24.42 5.740 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 57. 78. 
86 215 0 1. 82 9.06 16.250 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 110. 260. 
86 812 0 2.21 8.42 14.625 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 123. 173. 
94 93 1 0.00 9.45 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 94 139. 139. 
94 93 2 0.00 9.45 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 94 O. O. 
9' 93 3 0.00 9.45 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 94 O. O. 
94 93 4 0.00 9. ,5 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 94 O. O. 
95 93 0 0.00 9.45 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 95 139. 139. 
e 
96 93 0 0.00 9.45 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 96 139. 139. 
97 93 0 0.00 9.45 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 96 139. 139. 
93 162 0 3.30 18.46 33.710 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 215. 335. 
93 181 0 0.51 2.86 5.230 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
93 209 0 1.43 7.94 14.510 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 159. 223. 
93 243 0 2.04 11.23 20.500 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
93 780 0 3.19 11.75 32.430 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 215. 335. 
98 101 1 0.00 56.52 0.000 1. 074 1.074 1.07 98 O. O. 
98 101 2 0.00 56.52 0.000 1. 074 1.074 1.07 98 O. O. 
98 101 3 0.00 56.52 0.000 1.074 1.074 1.07 98 O. O. 
98 101 4 0.00 56.52 0,000 1.074 1. 074 1.07 98 O. O. 
98 101 5 0.00 56.52 0.000 1.074 1.074 1.07 98 33. 33. 
98 102 0 0.00 56.52 0.000 1. 074 1. 074 1.07 98 33. 33. 
98 103 0 0.00 56.52 0.000 1.074 1.074 1.07 98 33. 33. 
98 104 0 0.00 56.52 0.000 1. 074 1.074 1.07 98 33. 33. 
98 105 0 0,00 56.52 0.000 1.074 1.014 1.07 98 33. 33. 
, 98 106 0 0.00 56.52 0.000 1. 074 1. 074 1.07 98 33. 33. 
I 98 182 1 0.56 1. 89 0.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
98 182 2 0.56 1.89 0.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
I 98 208 0 9.67 23.48 5.190 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 57. 78. 
100 178 0 7.32 24.79 5.911 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 66. 92. 
111 219 0 10.39 25.36 5.950 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 57. 78. 
111 242 0 7.55 17.97 4.140 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 57. 78. 
114 195 0 1. 02 5.10 9.150 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
123 173 0 8.86 21.09 4.860 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 57. 78. 
135 137 0 4.85 11.56 2.660 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 57. 78. 
135 223 0 6.62 16.01 3.570 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 57. 76. 
140 143 0 0.14 0.88 1. 970 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 183. 255. 
140 154 0 0.05 0.27 0.611 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 183. 255. 
143 144 0 0.00 10.80 0.000 0.970 0.970 0.97 144 83. 83. 
143 146 0 0.00 11.14 0.000 0.970 0.970 0.97 144 83. 63. 
143 154 0 0.10 0.61 1.370 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 255. 291. 
144 146 0 0.00 -0.29 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 144 83. 83. 
145 146 0 0.00 10.93 0.000 1.DDO 1. 000 1. 00 145 25. 25. 
150 153 0 0.00 13.27 0.000 1.010 0.900 1.05 151 165. 165. 
151 153 0 0.00 -0.40 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 151 165. 165. 
152 153 0 0.00 10.84 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 152 SS. SS. 
161 118 0 3.45 12.82 3.040 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
162 163 0 0.00 25.58 0.000 1.041 0.850 1.15 163 50. SO. 
165 166 0 0.00 16.87 0.000 1.027 0.850 1.15 166 83. 83. 
165 186 0 2.69 13.45 24.110 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
168 171 0 0.13 0.45 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
168 197 0 0.82 2.77 0.810 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
113 172 0 0.00 16.67 0.000 1.032 0.850 1.15 173 100. 100. 
174 172 1 0.00 12.30 0.000 1.025 1.025 1.02 174 82. 82. 
114 . 172 2 0.00 12.30 0.000 1. 025 1. 025 1. 02 174 O. O. 
175 172 0 0.00 12.30 0.000 1.025 1.025 1.02 175 82. 82. 
176 172 1 0.00 12.12 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 176 165. 165. 
176 172 2 0.00 12.12 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 176 O. O. 
177 172 0 0.00 12.12 O.DDO 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 177 165. 165. 
172 186 0 2.90 14.36 26.610 0.000 O.ODO 0.00 0 147. 207. 
182 181 0 0.00 4.36 0.000 1. 029 0.850 1.15 182 150. 150. 
183 181 1 0.00 14.57 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 183 84. 84. 
183 181 2 0.00 14.57 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 183 O. O. 
184 181 0 0.00 14.57 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 184 184. 84. 
181 213 0 2.86 10.62 19.400 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 123. 113. 
181 243 0 3.37 12.86 23.670 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 124. 173. 
197 200 0 0.00 16.30 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 197 60. 60. 
197 250 0 0.56 1. 88 0.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 104. 
198 200 0 0.00 -0.20 0.000 1. 032 1.032 1. 03 198 60. 60. 
199 200 0 0.00 9.41 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 199 28. 28. 
208 217 0 7.62 23.94 5.520 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 66. 92. 
219 213 0 0.00 12.45 0.000 1. 006 0.900 1.10 219 75. 75. 
213 812 0 1.83 9.15 16.410 0.000 0,000 0.00 0 147. 207. 
220 223 0 1.35 4.11 1.020 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 66. 92. 
236 239 0 0.00 18.19 0.000 1.010 1.010 1.01 -237 50. 83. 
239 237 0 0.00 -1.33 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 237 83. 83. 
238 239 0 0.00 11.45 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 238 30. 30. 
243 246 0 0.00 18.20 0.000 1. 018 0.950 1.10 248 75. 75. 
243 248 0 0.00 17.37 0.000 1.018 0.950 1.10 248 75. 75. 
245 246 0 0.00 10.56 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 245 25. 25. 
248 246 0 0.00 -0.92 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 248 75. 75. 
257 809 0 1. 97 4.67 6.740 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
260 809 0 0.15 0.39 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
262 261 1 0.00 29.61 0.000 1. 009 0.900 1.10 261 25. 33. 
262 261 2 0.00 29.61 0.000 1.009 0.900 1.10 261 25. 33. 
262 261 3 0.00 29.61 0.000 1.009 0.900 1.10 261 25. 33. 
261 266 0 21. 87 41.97 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 35. 60. 
262 343 0 3.08 11.18 2.960 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
262 809 1 0.78 2.69 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
262 809 2 0,78 2.69 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
262 833 0 5.95 21. 41 5.430 0.000 0.000 0,,00 0 100. 165. 
264 809 0 1. 75 6.12 9.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
269 290 1 6.50 16.05 4.340 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
269 290 2 6.50 16.05 4.340 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
269 778 1 o,ao 12.16 0.000 1.015 0.950 1.05 269 75. 90. 
269 778 2 0.00 12.16 0.000 1.015 0.950 1.05 269 75. 90. 
272 279 0 1. 99 4.82 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
272 280 0 1. 64 3.96 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
275 274 0 0.00 58.58 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.99 274 16. 19. 
274 298 1 51.01 63.34 0.090 0.000 0.000 0,00 0 15. 18. 
274 298 2 51.01 63.34 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 15. 18. 
275 279 0 35.88 44.43 0.620 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 30. 35. 
276 795 0 2.87 6.89 1.890 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
795 279 1 0.00 26.53 0.000 0.964 0.900 1.00 279 33. 40. 
795 279 2 0.00 26.53 0.000 0.964 0.900 1. 00 279 33. 40. 
795 279 3 0.00 26.53 0.000 0.964 0.900 1.00 279 33. 40. 
280 296 0 1. 77 4.29 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
281 282 1 0.00 9.14 0.000 0.991 0.950 1. 05 282 40. 48. 
281 282 2 0.00 9.14 0.000 0.991 0.950 1. 05 282 40. 48. 
281 282 3 0.00 9.14 0.000 0.991 0.950 1.05 282 40. 48. 
281 284 0 0.28 0,98 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
281 795 1 0.51 1.28 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
281 795 2 0.51 1.28 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
282 296 1 2.48 6.20 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
282 296 2 2.48 6.20 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
290 292 1 2.70 6.67 1. 800 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
290 292 2 2.70 6.67 1. 800 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
292 293 1 1. 80 4.44 1.200 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130, 
292 293 2 1.80 4.44 1.200 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
293 795 1 6.04 14.91 4.030 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
293 795 2 6.04 14.91 4.030 0.000 O.ODO 0.00 0 85. 130. 
306 305 1 0.00 28.20 0.000 0.950 0.950 1.05 305 33. 40. 
306 305 2 0.00 28.20 0.000 0.950 0.950 1.05 305 33. 40. 
306 305 3 0.00 28.20 0.000 0.950 0.950 1.05 305 33. 40. 
306 315 0 2.75 '7.39 1. 680 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
306 735 1 1. 99 6.33 1.770 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
306 735 2 1. 99 6.33 1.770 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
308 307 1 0.00 16.60 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.99 307 66. 80. 
308 307 2 0.00 16.60 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.99 307 66. 80. 
307 340 1 4.50 10.85 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
307 340 2 4.50 10.85 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
308 735 1 0.08 0.28 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
308 735 2 0.08 0.28 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
321 735 0 3.04 7.50 1. 960 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
321 833 0 1. 08 2.67 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
324 327 0 31. 39 44.53 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 25. 40. 
324 328 0 31. 39 44.53 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 25. 40. 
324 336 0 17.32 24.94 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 25. 40. 
325 834 1 0.00 -1.58 0.000 1. 040 1. 040 1.04 325 50. 60. 
325 834 2 0.00 -1.58 0.000 1.040 1. 040 1.04 325 50. 60. 
327 344 0 3.91 9.29 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
328 340 0 10.82 15.58 0.230 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 25. 4 O. 
337 336 0 0.00 29.27 0.000 0.950 0.950 1.05 336 33. 40. 
337 346 0 1. 80 4.62 1.150 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
337 735 0 5.51 19.97 5.030 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
340 349 0 25.27 37.65 0.530 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 25. 40. 
343 833 0 2.98 10.72 2.710 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
344 349 0 10.36 24.63 0.440 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 40. 70. 
355 353 1 0.00 36.00 0.000 0.953 0.950 1.05 353 33. 40. 
355 353 2 0.00 36.00 0.000 0.953 0.950 1.05 353 33. 40. 
355 364 0 6.67 10.82 2.030 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
359 364 1 7.20 17.78 4.800 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
359 364 2 8.04 17.94 4.760 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 70. 119. 
359 803 1 10.95 24.42 6.480 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 119. 
359 803 2 9.80 24.20 6.540 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
364 363 1 0.00 36.00 0.000 0.968 0.950 1. 05 363 33. 40. 
364 363 2 0.00 36.00 0.000 0.968 0.950 1. 05 363 33. 40. 
364 369 0 9.84 24.32 6.570 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
364 372 0 14. 03 34.67 9.370 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
366 375 0 3.10 7.71 2.060 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
367 369 0 0.05 0.13 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
369 372 0 4.20 10.36 2.800 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
372 371 1 0.00 29.27 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 371 33. 40. 
372 371 2 0.00 64.00 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 371 13. 16. 
372 375 1 4.20 10.45 2.790 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
372 375 2 4.20 10.45 2.790 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
372 830 1 10.00 24.69 6.670 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
372 830 2 10.00 24. 69 6.670 0.000 0,000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
380 830 0 3.40 8.74 2.170 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
388 396 0 3.39 11.61 3.280 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
388 830 0 4.56 15.65 4.420 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
396 397 0 0.00 28.40 0.000 0.970 0.970 0.97 396 33. 40. 
830 399 1 0.00 16.60 0.000 LOOO 1.000 1. 00 399 66. 80. 
830 399 2 0.00 29.27 0.000 LOOO LOOO 1. 00 399 33. 40. 
830 399 3 0.00 29.27 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 399 33. 40. 
407 412 1 3.28 8.96 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 45. 80. 
407 412 2 3.28 8.96 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 45. 80. 
407 441 1 4.14 11.32 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 45. 80. 
407 441 2 4.14 11.32 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 45. 80. 
408 441 0 4.90 13.52 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 45. 80. 
412 436 0 0.34 0.92 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 45. 80. 
417 838 0 0.16 0.32 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 70. 115. 
803 422 1 0.00 16.60 0.000 LOOO 1.000 1. 00 422 50. 50. 
803 422 2 0.00 16.60 0.000 LOOO 1. 000 1.00 422 50. 30. 
437 441 0 0.34 0.92 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 45. 80. 
824 441 1 0.00 44.18 0.000 0.960 0.900 1.10 441 33. 40. 
824 441 2 0.00 44.18 0.000 0.960 0.900 1.10 441 33. 40. 
824 441 3 0.00 10.58 0.000 0.960 0.900 1.10 441 83. 99. 
824 441 4 0.00 10.58 0.000 0.960 0.900 1.10 441 83. 99. 
452 521 0 6.44 19.66 4.871 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
452 632 0 3.15 9.65 2.378 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
452 692 0 7.13 21. 72 5.380 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
455 454 1 0.00 38.66 0.000 LOOO 1.000 LOO 454 20. 24. 
455 454 2 0.00 37.86 0.000 LOOO LOOO 1.00 454 20. 24. 
454 469 0 2.61 5.56 1.411 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
454 547 0 6.14 12.?3 3.218 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
454 669 0 2.68 8.21 2.024 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
455 1268 1 9.50 19.33 0.804 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 78. 
455 1268 2 9.50 19.33 0.804 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 78. 
456 621 0 6.71 14.02 3.331 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
456 635 0 2.86 6.06 L406 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
458 457 1 0.00 6.68 0.000 0.983 0.870 1.04 457 150. 180. 
458 457 2 0.00 6.68 0.000 0.983 0.870 1.04 457 150. 180. 
457 460 0 1.18 3.34 0.861 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 98. 141. 
457 588 0 8.18 24.97 6.149 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
457 600 0 7.85 12.47 2.574 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 73. 105. 
457 615 0 3.27 6.85 1. 630 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
458 559 0 2.18 11.35 19.054 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
458 622 0 1.10 5.68 9.786 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
458 763 0 0.74 4.15 13.345 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 410. 570. 
458 776 0 2.22 11.48 19.738 0.000 0,000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
461 692 0 5.81 17.74 4.371 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
463 621 0 3.47 10.56 2.619 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
464 562 0 3.97 7.72 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
464 697 0 16.22 68.77 1.008 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
749 464 0 0.00 10.60 0.000 L014 0.864 1.13 464 83. 100. 
465 497 0 5.97 11. 47 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
465 654 0 L35 2.60 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
469 584 0 10.43 21. 44 5.399 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
474 538 0 37.74 39.92 0.496 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 27. 39. 
476 561 0 2.78 8,47 2.114 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
476 602 0 3.38 10.27 2.553 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
478 658 0 2.64 3.89 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 23. 34. 
479 658 0 0.39 0.76 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 68. 68. 
485 640 0 2.65 8.10 1. 996 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
487 493 1 2.28 '1.64 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 62. 86. 
487 493 2 2.28 '1.64 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 62. 86. 
488 497 1 0.64 3,S5 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 118. 
488 497 2 0.64 3.85 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 118. 
488 577 1 31. 03 55.38 0.847 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 36. 52. 
488 577 2 31. 03 55.38 0.847 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 36. 52. 
488 675 0 1.18 3.21 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
489 491 1 0.00 18.46 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 491 100. 120. 
489 491 2 0.00 17.97 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 491 120. 144. 
489 500 0 0.33 1.72 3.059 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
489 503 0 0.49 2.51 4.354 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 328. 328. 
489 646 0 1. 80 9.14 15.998 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
490 535 0 3.27 6.26 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
491 497 1 2.02 5.90 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
491 497 2 2.02 5.90 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
491 501 0 4.32 12.60 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
491 516 0 2.72 9.18 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
491 535 1 9.55 19.55 0.301 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
491 535 2 5.23 23.19 0.371 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 60. 85. 
491 658 0 11.26 23.05 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
492 493 1 0.00 18.80 0.000 0.951 0.870 1. 04 493 150. 180. 
492 493 2 0.00 19.10 0.000 0.951 0.870 1. 04 493 150. 180. 
492 503 0 0.68 3.35 6.472 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
492 572 0 1. 44 7.36 12.928 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
493 494 0 3.93 11. 42 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
493 502 0 3.82 11.13 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
493 504 0 6.22 18.11 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
493 505 0 1. 89 5.51 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
493 625 0 16.33 45.03 0.855 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
493 655 0 1. 96 3.76 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
493 668 1 3.44 10.39 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
493 668 2 3.44 10.39 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
494 501 1 2.84 8.27 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
494 501 2 2.84 8.27 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
494 505 0 2.02 5.90 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
494 544 0 7.80 15.68 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
494 657 0 4.30 11. 78 0.230 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 60. 85. 
495 501 1 2.55 8.13 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 81. 92. 
495 501 2 2.48 7.94 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 81. 92. 
497 499 1 1.82 5.31 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
497 499 2 1.82 5.31 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
499 644 0 0.68 1. 97 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
499 666 0 0.33 0.98 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
500 501 1 0.00 18.83 0.000 0.939 0.870 1. 04 501 150. 180. 
500 501 2 0.00 19.01 0.000 0.939 0.870 1. 04 501 150. 180. 
500 572 0 1.26 6.40 11.189 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
501 506 1 1.89 4.94 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
501 506 2 1. 97 4.98 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
501 516 0 3.13 10.38 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
501 658 0 4.30 21. 42 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 74. 103. 
502 504 0 2.39 6.98 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
503 504 1 0.00 18.99 0.000 0.984 0.870 1. 04 504 150. 180. 
503 504 2 0.00 18.86 0.000 0.984 0.870 1. 04 504 150. 180. 
503 676 0 0.24 1. 43 2.840 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 286. 395. 
503 739 1 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 665. 665. 
503 739 2 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,00 0 665. 665. 
504 537 0 0.82 4.97 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 118. 
504 554 1 2.56 5.25 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
504 554 2 2.44 5.31 0.083 0.000 0,000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
504 644 0 2.88 8.36 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
504 666 0 3.22 9.35 0.161 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
509 675 0 0.72 2.68 0.072 0.000 a.aoo 0.00 0 80. 115. 
521 522 0 0.00 36.00 0.000 0.970 0.825 1.00 522 21. 25. 
521 523 1 1.71 5.14 1.310 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
521 523 2 1. 71 5.14 1.310 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
521 523 3 2.34 7.18 1.829 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
521 686 0 5.02 10.27 2.541 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
522 594 0 26.86 79.25 1.302 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
522 691 0 75.36 76,97 1.038 0.000 0,000 0.00 0 27. 39. 
524 523 1 0.00 6.64 0.000 0.994 0.870 1. 04 523 150. 180. 
524 523 2 0.00 6.71 0.000 0.994 0.870 1.04 523 150. 180. 
524 523 3 0.00 6.28 0.000 0.994 0.870 1.04 523 150. 180. 
523 530 0 3.90 11. 98 2.994 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
523 563 0 5.43 34.32 7.991 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 171. 237. 
524 575 0 0.77 8.71 35.526 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 315. 415. 
524 820 1 1.22 7.68 13.791 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 286. 395. 
524 820 2 1.22 7.71 13.843 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 286. 395. 
530 619 0 2.88 8.80 2.173 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157, 
531 540 0 5.68 11.63 2.878 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
531 621 0 8.84 18.75 4.322 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
531 692 0 9.14 19.39 4.470 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
532 636 0 3.39 10.38 2.557 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
535 653 0 5.75 17.33 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
536 537 0 0.54 1.48 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
l 531 639 0 0.14 2.25 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 60. 85. 538 539 0 0.00 94.66 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 539 9. 11. 
538 543 0 3.31 6.73 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
538 613 0 37.03 37.83 0.509 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 27. 39. 
540 542 0 0.85 1.76 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
541 566 0 4.56 8.77 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
542 543 0 0.00 35.75 0.000 1.000 0.825 1.00 543 21. 25. 
542 612 0 2.57 7.86 1. 944 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
776 542 0 0.00 6.69 0.000 0.976 0.870 1. 04 542 150. 180 .. 
544 658 0 7.80 15.68 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
547 584 0 6.00 12.42 3.128 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
550 551 1 0.00 87.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 551 10. 12. 
550 551 2 0.00 87.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 551 10. 12. 
550 577 0 7.71 13.64 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 23. 34. 
552 556 0 3.09 9.10 2.402 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
556 636 0 3.64 11.13 2.141 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 111. 157. 
556 662 0 5.07 15.50 3.815 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
559 558 1 0.00 6.68 0.000 1.000 0.870 1.04 558 150. 160. 
559 558 2 0.00 6.69 0.000 1.000 0.870 1.04 558 150. 180. 
558 560 1 0.00 72.63 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 560 16. 19. 
558 560 2 0.00 70.27· 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 560 13. 15. 
558 560 3 O,OD 70.24 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 560 13. 15. 
558 597 0 4.42 22.47 5.095 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 165. 225. 
558 685 1 7.77 16.25 3.862 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
558 685 2 5.23 15.97 3.939 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
559 641 0 2.59 13.47 22.604 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
559 1237 0 2.01 10.28 17.820 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
562 677 0 18.74 57.24 0.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 60. 85. 
562 680 0 33.88 68.32 1.097 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
563 56. 0 0.00 35.99 0.000 0.909 0.825 1.00 566 21. 25. 
563 619 0 4.92 15.00 3.697 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 1ll. 157. 
568 569 1 0.00 3.27 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 569 465. 558. 
568 569 2 0.00 3.26 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 569 465. 558. 
568 569 3 0.00 3.28 0.000 1. ODD 1. 000 1. OD 569 465. 558. 
568 569 4 0.00 3.22 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 569 465. 558. 
568 748 1 0.01 0.12 15.157 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 2350. 3ll0. 
568 748 2 0.01 0.12 15.157 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 2350. 3ll0. 
570 612 0 4.69 14.35 3.536 0.000 0,000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
570 692 0 4.44 13.59 3.345 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 ll1. 157. 
572 571 0 0.00 10.40 0.000 1. 003 0.870 1.04 571 75. 90. 
571 634 1 5.18 15.55 3.982 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 ll1. 157, 
571 634 2 5.07 15.50 3.815 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
572 573 1 0.00 19.21 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 573 70. 84. 
572 573 2 0.00 19.27 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 573 70. 84. 
572 573 3 0.00 19.30 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 573 70. 84. 
572 573 4 0.00 19.36 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 573 70. 84. 
574 618 0 4.71 14 .59 3.593 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
574 632 0 4.01 12.23 3.015 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 ll1. 157. 
574 755 0 0.80 3.87 0.972 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 165. 225. 
575 754 0 0.29 1.39 2.697 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 270. 360. 
577 578 1 0.00 42.13 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 578 19. 22. 
577 578 2 0.00 84.00 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 578 10. 12. 
577 578 3 0.00 41. 00 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 578 20. 24. 
577 589 0 11. 01 23.02 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
582 579 0 0.00 21.59 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 0 31. 37. 
579 599 0 50.47 96.77 1.717 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
579 680 0 15.23 31.36 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 6l. 
582 586 0 10.61 21. 75 5.383 0.000 0.000 0.00 579 85. 122. 
583 700 0 0.81 3.89 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 80. ll5. 
5B4 600 1 l.09 2.43 0.614 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B5. 122. 
584 600 2 1.09 2.43 0.614 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
586 587 0 0.00 18.47 0.000 0.938 0.825 1.00 587 42. 50. 
586 647 0 8.19 16.78 4.152 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
587 663 0 14.18 29.02 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
596 590 0 0.00 146.00 0.000 0.929 0.825 1.00 590 20. 24. 
590 689 0 41.49 36.96 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 23. 34. 
594 593 1 0.00 38.32 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 593 31. 37. 
594 593 2 0.00 38.32 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 593 31. 37. 
594 656 0 13.22 25.35 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
594 821 0 16.71 17.67 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 27. 39. 
596 597 1 0.10 0.31 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
596 597 2 0.10 0.31 0.078 0,000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
597 642 0 0.17 0.51 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
599 656 0 27.39 52.52 0.931 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 6l. 
600 602 0 1.39 4.22 1. 076 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 lll. 157. 
600 605 0 0.30 0.61 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
603 602 1 0.00 6.71 0.000 0.977 0.870 1. 04 602 150. 180. 
603 602 2 0.00 6.61 0.000 0.977 0.870 1. 04 602 150. 180. 
602 604 0 0.35 1.32 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 165. 
602 605 0 1.71 4.85 1.232 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
603 763 0 0.42 2.36 7.593 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 410. 570. 
603 1214 0 1.35 7.63 24.460 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 410. 570, 
608 635 0 6.28 19.19 4.725 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 ll1. 157. 
610 625 0 3.72 10.98 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 55. 79. 
612 613 0 0.00 35.92 0.000 0.956 0.825 1.00 613 2l. 25. 
613 691 0 64.38 65.75 0.887 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 27. 39. 
615 620 0 3.85 8.06 1. 916 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
617 651 0 9.47 17.97 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
618 686 0 4.64 9.50 2.350 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
620 621 0 1.56 3.23 D.779 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
622 621 1 0.00 6.51 0.000 0.959 0.870 1. 04 621 150. 180. 
622 621 2 0.00 6.64 0.000 0.959 0.870 1.04 621 150. 180. 
622 776 0 1.56 8.05 13.833 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
622 1214 0 3.81 19.63 33.740 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 410. 570, 
631 655 0 0.80 1.53 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
634 633 1 0.00 50.29 0.000 0.969 0.825 1.00 633 42. 50. 
634 633 2 0.00 49.91 0.000 0.969 0.825 1. 00 633 42. 50. 
633 643 0 1. 76 3.36 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
633 651 0 12.27 23.52 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 43. 61. 
637 636 1 0.00 11.09 0.000 0.987 0.870 1. 04 636 75. 90. 
637 636 2 0.00 10.86 0.000 0.987 0.870 1. 04 636 75. 90. 
637 820 0 1. 64 8.44 14.508 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
637 826 0 1.55 7.94 13.664 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
641 640 1 0.00 10.90 0.000 0.981 0.870 1.04 640 75. 90. 
641 640 2 0.00 13.85 0.000 0.981 0.870 1.04 640 50. 60. 
640 647 0 1.15 2.36 0.584 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 122. 
641 646 0 0.42 2.11 3.819 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
641 749 0 3.47 17 .86 30.703 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
663 697 0 56.97 97.88 1. 449 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 27. 39. 
678 739 0 2.35 12.07 20.759 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
678 749 0 2.35 12.07 20.759 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
678 778 0 0.86 4.42 7.590 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 248. 343. 
685 700 1 0.00 50.00 0.000 0.995 0.825 1.00 700 42. 50. 
685 700 2 0.00 48.12 0.000 0.995 0.825 1.00 700 42. 50. 
685 700 3 0.00 50.59 0.000 0.995 0.825 1.00 700 42. 50. 
780 702 0 0.00 24.42 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 702 83. 99. 
803 704 1 0.00 17.41 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 803 58. 69. 
803 704 2 0.00 17.41 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 803 58. 69. 
800 705 1 0.00 14.35 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 800 79. 95. 
800 705 2 0.00 14.35 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 800 19. 95. 
802 706 1 0.00 9.05 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 802 196. 235. 
802 706 2 0.00 9.05 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 802 196. 235. 
812 710 1 0.00 9.26 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 812 130. 156. 
812 710 2 0.00 9.26 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 812 130. 156. 
820 7121 0.00 6.90 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 820 196. 235. 
820 7122 0.00 6.90 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 820 196. 235. 
820 7123 0.00 6.90 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 820 196. 235. 
820 712 4 0.00 6.90 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 820 196. 235. 
820 712 5 0.00 6.90 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 820 196. 235. 
820 712 6 0.00 6.90 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 820 196. 235. 
714 766 1 0.00 4.34 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 714 350. 420. 
714 766 2 0.00 4.32 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 714 350. 420. 
714 766 3 0.00 4.34 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 714 350. 420. 
714 766 4 0.00 4.32 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 714 350. 420. 
722 750 0 0.31 3.95 482.620 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
722 766 0 0.17 2.09 255.504 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
732 733 0 0.12 1. 58 192.984 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
739 732 1 0.00 1.25 0.000 1.046 0.880 1.12 739 600. 720. 
739 732 2 0.00 1.25 0.000 1.046 0.880 1.12 739 600. 720. 
732 742 0 0.04 0.46 56.779 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
732 748 0 0.22 2.74 334. 994 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
734 733 0 0.00 1.25 0.000 1. 021 0.950 1.05 734 600. 720. 
735 734 1 0.00 12.16 0.000 1.015 0.900 1.10 735 75. 90. 
735 734 2 0.00 12.16 0.000 1. 015 0.900 1.10 735 75. 90. 
735 734 3 0.00 6.08 0.000 1. 015 0.900 1.10 735 150. 180. 
735 734 4 0.00 6.08 0.000 1. 015 0.900 1.10 735 150. 180. 
734 794 1 1.29 6.67 11.470 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 180. Z78. 
734 794 2 1.42 7.29 12.780 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 180. 278. 
734 802 0 3.75 19.42 33.380 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
734 808 0 2.82 14.61 25.094 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
735 833 0 4.06 10.49 2.644 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
736 748 0 0.16 2.04 249.744 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
736 750 0 0.24 3.09 377.450 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
739 794 1 1. 80 9.32 16.050 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 171- 278. 
739 794 2 1. 90 9.71 17.046 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
142 748 0 0.19 2.44 298.090 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
749 748 a 0.00 1.25 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 749 600. 720. 
748 760 0 0.16 2.01 245.487 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
748 766 a 0.11 1. 33 163.257 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 2350. 3110. 
749 820 1 3.04 15.69 27.040 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 157. 278. 
749 820 2 3.04 15.69 27.040 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 157. 278. 
754 976 0 2.30 17.01 42.005 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 260. 435. 
755 851 0 3.02 7.61 2.019 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 600. 720. 
760 762 0 0.11 1. 42 178.175 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
760 766 0 0.15 1. 94 236.973 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
760 1133 1 0.00 -0.19 0.000 0.998 0.950 1.05 760 1650. 1980. 
760 1133 2 0.00 -0.19 0.000 0.998 0.950 1.05 760 1650. 1980. 
763 762 a 0.00 1.25 0.000 0.990 0.950 1.05 763 600. 720. 
776 820 1 3.52 18.24 31. 430 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 157, 278. 
776 820 2 3.52 18.24 31. 430 0.000 0.000 0.00 a 157. 278. 
780 782 0 3.37 12.50 22.800 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 123. 173. 
782 783 0 0.00 11.11 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 79 83. 99. 
782 784 0 0.00 11.11 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 79 83. 99. 
782 812 1 4.62 23.45 41.680 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
782 812 2 4.62 23.45 41. 680 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
782 824 0 3.86 19.85 34.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 157. 278. 
783 785 0 0.00 10.89 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 783 83. 99. 
784 785 a 0.00 10.80 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 784 83. 99. 
795 794 1 0.00 12.36 0.000 1.075 0.950 1.07 795 75. 90. 
795 794 2 0.00 12.36 0.000 1.075 0.950 1. 07 795 75. 90. 
795 794 3 0.00 12.36 0.000 1.075 0.950 1.07 795 75. 90. 
795 794 4 0.00 12.36 0.000 1. 075 0.950 1.07 795 75. 90. 
795 833 1 5.35 19.25 4.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 135. 185. 
795 833 2 5.35 19.25 4.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 100. 165. 
800 802 0 0.01 0.07 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
603 800 1 0.00 11.63 0.000 1. 030 1.030 1.03 803 79. 95. 
603 800 2 0.00 11. 83 0.000 1. 030 1.030 1. 03 803 75. 90. 
602 808 0 2.06 10.69 18.358 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
802 824 1 0.95 4.91 8.430 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 204. 278. 
802 824 2 0.95 4.91 8.430 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
803 809 0 7.12 25.87 6.460 0.000 0.000 0,00 0 O. O. 
803 838 0 3.31 12.04 3.010 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
809 808 1 0.00 12.32 0.000 1. 048 0.950 1.05 809 75. 90. 
809 808 2 0.00 12.32 0.000 1. 048 0.950 1. 05 809 75. 90. 
809 838 0 4.65 16.91 4.220 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
814 812 0 0.00 12.19 0.000 0.994 0.881 1.13 814 O. O. 
812 826 1 1. 52 7.84 13.520 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 178. 278. 
812 826 2 1.52 7.84 13.520 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 178. 278. 
820 821 0 0.00 38.00 0.000 1.043 0.870 1.04 821 75. 90. 
820 826 0 3.07 15.88 27.370 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 157. 278. 
826 827 1 0.00 15.89 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 826 75. 90. 
826 827 2 0.00 15.89 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 826 75. 90. 
826 827 3 0.00 15.89 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 826 75. 90. 
826 827 4 0.00 15.89 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 826 75. 90. 
830 827 1 0.00 -2.69 0.000 1. 021 0.950 1. 07 830 75. 90. 
830 827 2 0.00 -2.69 0.000 1. 021 0.950 1.07 830 75. 90. 
830 827 3 0.00 -2.69 0.000 1. 021 0.950 1. 07 830 75. 90. 
830 827 4 0.00 -2.69 0,000 1. 021 0.950 1. 07 830 75. 90. 
831 827 1 0.00 24.41 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 831 25. 30. 
831 827 2 0.00 24.41 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 831 25. 30. 
831 827 3 0.00 24. 41 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 831 25. 30. 
831 827 4 0.00 24.41 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 831 25. 30. 
833 834 1 0.00 16.62 0.000 1.047 0.857 1.04 833 50. 60. 
833 834 2 0.00 16.62 0.000 1. 047 0.857 1. 04 833 50. 60. 
835 834 1 0.00 14.94 0.000 0.956 0.956 0.95 835 20. 24. 
835 834 2 0.00 14.94 0.000 0.956 0.956 0.95 835 20. 24. 
851 852 0 0.00 39.50 0.000 0.935 0.900 1.10 852 85. 130. 
852 853 0 0.00 36.50 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 652 O. O. 
852 854 0 0.00 3.50 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 852 O. o. 
B55 B56 0 4.50 11.67 2.840 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 89. 130. 
855 977 0 6.00 15.59 3.7B9 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B9. 130. 
856 863 0 0.00 40.00 0.000 0.970 0.900 1.10 863 20. 25. 
861 880 0 0.00 135.40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
862 6BO 0 0.00 148.80 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
880 863 0 32.40 84.06 1.278 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
880 906 0 0.00 -2.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
BBl 906 0 0.00 24.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
681 978 0 5.30 13.75 3.346 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
B63 8B4 0 0.00 90.00 0.000 0.964 0.900 1.10 883 O. O. 
864 885 0 0.00 120.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
894 895 0 0.00 -2.00 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 894 O. O. 
B94 89B 0 0.00 31.00 0,000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 B94 O. O. 
9BO B94 0 0.00 24.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 895 O. O. 
895 896 0 0.00 130.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 895 O. O. 
B95 897 0 0.00 149.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 B95 5. O. 
901 902 0 0.00 150.00 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 901 O. O. 
901 981 0 0.00 90.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 901 O. O. 
979 905 1 0.00 60.00 0.000 0.964 0.900 1.10 905 20. O. 
979 905 2 0.00 60.00 0.000 0.964 0.900 1.10 905 20. O. 
906 907 0 0.00 31.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 906 O. O. 
906 909 0 0.00 31.00 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 90B O. O. 
90B 910 0 0.00 -2.00 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 90B O. O. 
978 908 0 0.00 24.00 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 910 O. O. 
910 942 0 15.33 22.48 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
978 911 0 0.00 50.00 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 911 25. O. 
9B2 918 0 0.00 90.00 0.000 0.987 0.900 1.10 918 O. O. 
920 921 0 0.00 39.50 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 923 O. O. 
920 925 0 11.79 29.67 7.874 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
920 9B6 0 12.50 32.42 7.888 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B5. 130. 
921 922 0 0.00 36.50 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 921 O. O. 
921 923 0 0.00 3.50 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 921 O. O. 
925 926 0 0.00 40.00 0.000 1. OOB 0.900 1.10 926 O. O. 
926 927 0 0.00 120.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
930 931 0 0.00 90.00 0.000 1.009 0.900 1.10 931 O. O. 
930 932 0 0.00 40.00 0.000 0.999 0.900 1.10 932 O. O. 
930 978 0 6.00 15.59 3.789 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
943 986 0 1.88 3.20 1.152 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
988 946 1 0.00 40.00 0.000 0.978 0.900 1.10 946 20. O. 
98B 946 2 0.00 .40.00 0.000 0.978 0.900 1.10 946 O. O. 
989 947 1 0.00 60.00 0.000 0.975 0.900 1.10 947 20. 24. 
989 947 2 0.00 59.00 0.000 0.975 0.900 1.10 947 20. 24. 
989 947 3 0.00 60.00 0.000 0.975 0.900 1.10 947 20. 24. 
990 948 1 0.00 60.00 0.000 0.941 0.900 1.10 948 20. O. 
990 948 2 0.00 60.00 0.000 0.941 0.900 1.10 948 20. 0.· 
949 950 1 0.00 140.00 0.000 0.915 0.975 0.91 949 5. 7. 
949 950 2 D,OD 140.00 0.000 0.975 0.975 0.97 949 5. 7. 
991 949 1 0.00 38.00 0.000 0.935 0.900 1.10 949 41. 49. 
991 949 2 0.00 38.00 0.000 0.935 D.900 1.10 949 41. 49. 
954 955 0 0.00 35.00 0.000 1. 049 0.900 1.10 955 20. 25. 
954 962 0 12.51 28.62 6.932 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
955 956 0 0.00 200.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 3. O. 
957 958 0 0.00 89.50 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 957 5. O. 
957 959 0 0.00 305.00 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 957 2. O. 
994 957 0 0.00 58.00 0.000 0.996 0.900 1.10 957 20. 24. 
962 963 0 0.00 90.00 0.000 1.044 0.900 1.10 963 O. O. 
962 965 0 10.23 23.41 5.672 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
963 964 0 0.00 120.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
965 966 0 0.00 87.00 0.000 0.995 0.900 1.10 966 10. 12. 
965 1288 0 10.00 25.94 6.311 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
969 968 0 0.00 200.00 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 969 O. O. 
996 968 0 0.00 54.00 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 996 O. O. 
970 980 0 4.79 13.21 3.088 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
970 981 0 1.44 3.96 0.926 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
910 1318 0 5.95 16.38 3.829 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
999 974 1 0.00 59.00 0.000 1. OOg 0.980 1. 03 974 20. 24. 
999 974 2 0.00 60.00 0.000 1.009 0.980 1. 03 974 20. O. 
975 996 0 7.00 18.19 4.421 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 90. 
975 999 0 22.47 57.20 14.502 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
977 976 1 0.00 12.16 0.000 1. 029 0.950 1. 05 971 75. O. 
977 976 2 0.00 12.16 0.000 1.029 0.950 1.05 977 75. O. 
977 978 0 1.58 8.17 1. 817 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 164. O. 
977 979 0 3.00 7.63 1. 933 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
977 997 0 6.74 49.74 15.918 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
978 979 0 0.70 1. 78 0.451 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 89. 130. 
978 980 0 12.00 33.33 8.200 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
978 982 0 9.00 23.35 5.679 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 89. 130. 
982 986 0 15.34 39.79 9.680 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
983 985 0 0.00 93.00 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 983 O. O. 
984 985 0 0.00 59.00 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 984 O. O. 
985 986 1 11.50 28.72 7.572 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
985 986 2 11.50 28.72 7.572 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
985 986 3 11.50 28.72 7.572 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
985 986 4 11.50 28.72 7.572 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
985 1291 1 21.26 52.74 13.958 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
985 1291 2 21.26 52.74 13.958 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
985 1291 3 21.26 52.74 13.958 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
985 1291 4 21.26 52.74 13.958 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
986 989 1 0.49 1.79 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 200. 
986 989 2 0.49 1.79 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 200. 
986 992 0 2.23 10.39 3.003 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
988 989 0 0.96 2.50 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
988 990 0 1. 84 4.76 1.160 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
989 991 0 2.80 7.26 1. 760 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
991 994 0 12.91 34.79 8.500 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
992 994 0 11.87 30.25 7.670 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 130. 
994 996 0 7.00 17 .80 4.513 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 85. 90. 
994 997 0 0.48 1.30 0.312 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 120. 200. 
994 999 0 28.96 73.12 18.695 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1001 1081 1 0.00 9.33 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1001 75. 75. 
1001 1081 2 0.00 9.33 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1001 75. 75. 
1001 1081 3 0.00 9.33 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1001 75. 75. 
1002 1083 0 0.00 17 .24 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1002 186. 186. 
r 
1088 1003 0 0.00 1. 97 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1088 760. 760. 
1005 1157 0 6.68 15.77 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1094 1006 0 0.00 21.67 0.000 1.1'25 1.125 1.12 1094 60. 60. 
1096 1007 0 0.00 7.80 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 1096 100. 100. 
1009 1097 0 0.00 11.63 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1009 44 • 44. 
1010 1101 1 0.00 7.20 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1010 83. 83. 
1010 1101 2 0.00 7.20 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1010 83. 83. 
1011 1104 0 0.00 17 .24 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 1011 186. 186. 
1109 1012 0 0.00 0.92 0.000 0.980 0.980 0.98 11091136. 1136. 
1111 1013 0 0.00 3.79 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1111 270. 270. 
1112 1014 0 0.00 0.96 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 11121280. 1280. 
1015 1113 0 0.00 1. 36 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 400. 400. 
1016 1113 0 0.00 1.36 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 400. 400. 
1110 1017 1 0.00 0.67 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 11101650. 1650. 
1110 1017 2 0.00 0.67 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 11101650. 1650. 
1110 1017 3 0.00 0.67 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 11101650. 1650. 
1018 1121 1 0.00 12.88 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 75. 75. 
1018 1121 2 0.00 12.88 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 75. 75. 
1019 1122 1 0.00 ·15.75 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1019 187. 187. 
1019 1122 2 0.00 15.75 0.000 l~OOQ 1.000 LOO 1019 167. 181. 
1019 1122 3 0.00 15.75 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1019 187. 187. 
1125 1020 0 0.00 0.69 0.000 1. 050 1.050 1. 05 11252400. 2400. 
1021 1133 1 0.00 3,67 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1021 550. 550. 
1021 1133 2 0.00 3.67 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1021 550. 550. 
1141 1022 0 0.00 0.79 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 11411520. 1520. 
1023 1139 0 0.00 17.24 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1023 186. 186. 
1143 1024 0 0.00 4.11 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1143 378. 378. 
1142 1025 0 0.00 6.33 0.000 1. 030 1.030 1. 03 1142 200. 200. 
1148 1026 0 0.00 3.41 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1148 336. 336. 
1027 1152 0 0.00 17.24 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1027 186. 186. 
1156 1028 0 0.00 2.90 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1156 480. 480. 
1156 1029 0 0.00 10,05 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1156 200. 200. 
1031 1036 1 0.19 2.62 62.060 0.000 0.000 0.00 01150. 2030. 
1031 1036 2 0.19 2.62 62.060 0.000 0.000 0.00 01150. 2030. 
1031 1115 1 0.11 1. 76 49.282 0.000 0.000 0.00 02416. 2416. 
1031 1115 2 0.11 1. 76 49.282 0.000 0.000 0.00 02416. 2416. 
1160 1031 0 0.00 0.76 0.000 1.050 1. 050 1. 05 11601050. 1050. 
1031 1370 1 0.08 1.29 38.341 0.000 0.000 0.00 01600. 2500. 
1031 1370 2 0.08 1.29 38.341 0.000 0.000 0.00 01600. 2500. 
1032 1093 0 1. 70 12.24 21. 990 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 350. 350. 
1032 1147 0 1.17 8.38 15.064 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 350. 350. 
1032 1161 0 0.00 16.03 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1032 50. 50. 
1034 1164 0 0.00 2.50 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1034 500. 500. 
1035 1165 0 0.00 3.67 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1035 550. 550. 
1036 1163 0 0.00 -0.23 0.000 0.962 0.962 0.96 10361500. 1500. 
1036 1164 0 0.00 -0.23 0.000 0.962 0.962 0.96 10361500. 1500. 
1036 1365 1 0.08 0.78 12.560 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1036 1365 2 0.08 0.78 12.560 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1036 1371 1 0.08 0.74 12.845 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1036 1371 2 0.08 0.74 12.841 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1036 1372 1 0.11 0.98 17.073 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1036 1372 2 0.11 0.98 17.073 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1036 1372 3 0.11 0.98 17.073 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1037 1169 0 0.00 16.00 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1037 60. 60. 
1038 1169 0 -0.14 10.06 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1085 1081 1 0.00 -0.33 0.000 1.006 1.006 1.00 1085 225. 225. 
1085 1081 2 0.00 -0.33 0.000 1. 006 1.006 1. 00 1085 225. 225. 
1085 1081 3 0.00 -0.33 0.000 1.006 1.006 1. 00 lOBS 225. 225. 
1086 1081 1 0.00 4.44 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1086 225. 225. 
1086 1081 2 0.00 4.44 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1086 225. 225. 
1086 1081 3 0.00 4.44 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 1086 225. 225. 
1082 1084 0 0.00 17.24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 187. 187. 
1066 1063 0 0.00 -2.55 0.000 1.050 1.050 1.05 1086 560. 560. 
1067 1083 0 0.00 4.99 0.000 1.050 1.050 1. 05 1087 560. 560. 
1086 1084 0 0.00 -2.50 0.000 1. 050 1. 050 1. 05 1066 560. 560. 
1087 1084 0 0.00 4.99 0.000 1. 050 1. 050 1. 05 1087 560. 560. 
1085 1352 0 4.08 17.38 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1086 1107 1 0.76 8.20 143.090 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1086 1107 2 0.77 6.20 143.479 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1086 1126 1 0.70 6.16 104.923 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1066 1126 2 0.58 6.14 105.493 0.000 0.000 0,00 o 766. 1132. 
1066 1136 1 0.11 1.13 19.060 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766, 1132. 
1066 1136 2 0.14 1.19 20.032 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1067 1086 0 0.11 1. 61 135.199 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1067 1103 1 0.16 2.36 200.293 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1087 1103 2 0.16 2.38 200.293 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1087 1114 0 0.04 0.76 76.500 0.000 0.000 0.00 04000. 4000. 
1087 1137 0 0.03 0.46 51. 660 0.000 0.000 0.00 04000. 4000. 
1086 1103 0 0.09 1.41 117.512 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
r 
1069 1106 0 0.16 2.42 203.657 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1069 1141 1 0.16 2.73 231. 429 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1069 1141 2 0.16 2.71 229.043 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1069 1151 0 0.16 2.47 206.611 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1090 1097 0 0.00 0.04 0.000 0.980 0.980 0.98 1090 60. 60. 
1090 1096 0 0.00 0.21 0.000 0.980 0.960 0.96 1096 60. 60. 
1091 1093 0 0.19 1.26 2.230 0.000 0.000 0.00 243. 345. 
I 1091 1095 0 3.73 19.26 33.045 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 204. 286. 
1091 1097 0 0.00 13.62 0.000 1.020 1.020 1. 02 1091 60. 60. 
1091 1096 0 0.00 12.10 0,000 1.020 1.020 1. 02 1091 60. 60. 
1094 1092 1 0.00 6.81 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 1092 150. 150. 
1094 1092 2 0.00 6.81 D.OOO 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1092 150. 150. 
1094 1092 3 0.00 6.81 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1092 150. 150. 
1094 1093 1 0.00 3.30 0.000 0.971 0.971 0.97 1094 225. 225. 
1094 1093 2 0.00 3.30 0.000 0.971 D.971 0.97 1094 225. 225. 
1094 1096 1 0.49 5.22 89.372 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1094 1096 2 0.49 5.22 89.372 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1096 1095 1 0.00 3.28 0.000 1.007 1. 007 1. 00 1096 225. 225. 
1096 1095 2 0.00 3.28 0.000 1.007 1. 007 1. 00 1096 225. 225. 
1095 1123 0 3.31 19.11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. o. 
1095 1155 0 18.01 73.46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1096 1124 1 0.53 5.59 93.127 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 766. 1132. 
1096 1124 2 0.51 5.44 89.372 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 766. 1132. 
1102 1101 1 0.00 0.10 0.000 0.988 0.988 0.98 1102 250. 250. 
1102 1101 2 0.00 0.10 0.000 0.988 0.988 0.98 1102 250. 250. 
1103 1101 1 0.00 4.80 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1103 250. 250. 
1103 1101 2 0.00 4.80 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1103 250. 250. 
1102 1111 1 2.05 12.07 3.457 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 189. 256. 
1102 1111 2 9.54 56.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. o. 
1102 1113 0 15.71 85.41 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1103 1106 0 0.20 3.06 259.906 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1103 1151 0 0.18 2.68 226.463 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1103 1166 0 0.16 2.44 220.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1103 1236 0 0.06 1. 00 82.610 0,000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1105 1104 0 0.00 -2.55 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 1105 560. 560. 
1106 1104 0 0.00 4.99 0.000 1. 050 1.050 1.05 1106 560. 560. 
1105 1115 0 0.26 2.75 46.765 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1105 1150 0 0.37 3.93 67.035 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1105 1230 0 0.94 11.19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1105 1232 0 0.57 21. 94 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1106 1160 0 0.10 1.54 128.535 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2738. 
1107 1169 1 0.69 7.40 128.373 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1107 1169 2 0.69 7.40 128.122 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1107 1354 0 0.00 4.21 0.000 1. 013 1. 013 1.01 1107 225. 225. 
1109 1112 0 0.39 4.12 70.274 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1109 1143 0 0.10 1.03 17.529 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1109 1150 1 0.58 6.14 105.636 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1109 1150 2 0.57 6.11 105.097 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1109 1474 0 0.07 0.76 12.290 0,000 0.000 0.00 01201. 1200. 
1109 1487 0 0.33 3.50 59.559 0.000 0.000 0,00 o 766. 1132. 
1110 1127 0 0.07 1. 81 868.600 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1110 1128 0 0.07 1.81 868.600 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1111 1113 0 3.61 15.42 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1111 1350 0 7.04 32.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. o. 
1112 1126 1 0.70 6.13 104.387 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1112 1126 2 0.58 6.17 106.031 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1112 1143 0 0.37 3.26 54.695 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1112 1150 1 0.47 4.10 69.269 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1112 1150 2 0.47 4.10 69.269 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1112 1480 0 0.24 2.13 35.846 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1114 1113 1 0.00 2.12 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 1114 600. 600. 
1114 1113 2 0.00 2.12 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 1114 600. 600. 
1114 1113 3 0.00 2.12 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1114 600. 600. 
1114 1113 4 0.00 2.12 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1114 600. 600. 
1113 1135 0 0.23 1.32 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. o. 
1113 1350 0 0.29 1.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1114 1137 0 0.05 0.91 97.030 0.000 0.000 0.00 04000. 4000. 
1115 1150 1 0.65 5.73 97.520 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1115 1150 2 0.65 5.67 96.450 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1115 1374 0 0.08 0.83 12.585 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 728. 1036. 
1115 1377 1 0.01 0.15 3.589 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. o. 
1115 1377 2 0.01 0.15 3.589 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1116 1119 0 0.00 -0.92 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1116 1161 0 0.07 1.83 876.980 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1117 1119 0 0.00 -0.92 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1117 1167 0 0.07 1. 83 876.980 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1119 1130 0 0.06 1.56 745.300 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1119 1131 0 0.06 1.56 745.300 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1120 1156 1 3.94 23.26 6.676 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 146. 207. 
1120 1156 2 2.87 13.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1121 1123 1 0.00 -0.88 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 225. 225. 
1121 1123 2 0.00 -0.88 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 225. 225. 
1124 1121 1 0,00 3.10 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 1124 225. 225. 
1124 1121 2 0.00 3.10 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1124 225. 225. 
1124 1122 1 0.00 0.26 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 1124 560. 560. 
1124 1122 2 0,00 0.26 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 1124 560. 560. 
1124 1122 3 0.00 0.26 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 1124 560. 560. 
1125 1122 1 0.00 1.46 0.000 1. 024 1. 024 1.02 1125 560. 560. 
1125 1122 2 0.00 1.46 0.000 1.024 1. 024 1.02 1125 560. 560. 
1125 1122 3 0.00 1.46 0.000 1.024 1.024 1.02 1125 560. 560. 
1123 1154 0 13.70 56.76 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. o. 
1123 1155 1 4.46 20.79 37.881 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 243. 345. 
1123 1155 2 5.90 32.41 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1123 1471 0 19.29 98.49 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. o. 
1124 1149 0 0.58 6.23 107.303 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1125 1471 0 0.11 1.81 149.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1125 1482 0 0.15 2.32 195.544 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1126 1461 0 4. 62 13.90 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1127 1134 0 0.00 -0.12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1128 1134 0 0.00 -0.72 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1130 1134 0 0.00 -0.78 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1131 1134 0 0.00 -0.78 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02820. 5330. 
1134 1133 1 0.00 0.86 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 11341650. 1650. 
1134 1133 2 0.00 0.86 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 11391650. 1650. 
1136 1135 1 0.00 4.28 0.000 1.057 1. 057 1. 05 1136 225. 225. 
1136 1135 2 0.00 4.28 0.000 1. 057 1. 057 1. 05 1136 225. 225. 
1136 1135 3 0.00 4.28 0.000 1. 057 1. 057 .1. 05 1136 225. 225. 
1136 1135 4 0.00 4.28 0.000 1. 057 1. 057 1. 05 1136 225. 225. 
1135 1156 1 1.71 9.17 2.629 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 146. 207. 
1135 1156 2 0.58 3.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1350 1137 1 0.00 2.07 0.000 0.980 0.980 0.98 1350 600. 600. 
1350 1137 2 0.00 2.07 0.000 0.990 0.980 0.98 1350 600. 600. 
1140 1139 0 0.00 -2.55 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1140 560. 560. 
1141 1139 0 0.00 4.99 0.000 1. 050 1. 050 1. 05 1141 560. 560. 
1140 1149 0 0.23 2.44 41.440 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1141 1212 0 0.13 1. 96 164.735 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2460. 
1143 1142 0 0.00 6.53 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1143 150. 150. 
1142 1148 0 11.69 29.83 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1142 1213 0 27.86 89.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1142 1228 0 4.45 40.31 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1142 1474 0 7.14 27.60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1145 1144 0 0.00 2.40 0.000 1.005 1. 005 1. 00 1145 500. 500. 
1144 1406 0 0.04 0.42 1.256 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 359. 359. 
1144 1413 0 0.76 5.02 8.212 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 359. 359. 
1145 1150 0 0.59 6.32 108.923 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 766. 1132. 
1145 1371 0 0.02 0.18 2.661 0.000 0.000 0.00 1016. 1016. 
1145 1375 0 0.09 0.87 13.189 0.000 0.000 0.00 728. 1036. 
1147 1158 0 1.14 5.46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1149 1148 0 0.00 6.05 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1148 150. 150. 
1148 1213 0 13.12 74.67 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1148 1291 0 16.16 56.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1149 1487 0 0.13 1.38 23.364 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 766. 1132. 
1150 1152 0 0.00 -2.55 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 1150 560. 560. 
1150 1190 0 6.37 46.51 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1150 1223 0 1.99 35.70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1150 1230 0 14.40 60.24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
~ 1151 1152 0 0.00 4.99 0.000 1.050 1.050 1.05 1151 560. 560. 
1153 1154 0 0.00 16.44 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 33. 33. 
1155 1154 1 0.00 8.23 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1155 100. 100. 
1155 1154 2 19.70 58.38 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1155 O. O. 
1158 1151 1 0.00 8.30 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1158 50. 50. 
1158 1151 2 0.00 8.30 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1158 50. 50. 
1167 1163 0 0.00 1.03 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 11671500. 1500. 
1161 1164 0 0.00 1.03 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1.00 11671500. 1500. 
1166 1165 0 0.00 -0.19 0.000 1.069 1.069 1. 06 11661650. 1650. 
1167 1165 0 0.00 0.86 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 11671650. 1650. 
1166 1168 0 0.01 0.22 18.940 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2738. 
1168 1236 0 0.10 1.50 124.840 0.000 0.000 0.00 01665. 2738, 
1169 1354 0 9.63 39.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1169 1477 0 9.11 76.1S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1211 1181 0 0.00 12.59 0.000 1.050 1. 050 1.05 1211 114. 114. 
1182 1190 0 -15.94 90.19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1183 1192 0 0.18 2.39 132.945 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1183 1212 0 0.00 1. 42 0.000 0.970 0.910 0.97 1183 750. 839. 
1183 1213 0 0.41 5.15 328.911 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1183 1228 0 0.40 5.48 311. 600 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1281 1183 0 0.00 4.61 0.000 1.005 1.005 1.00 1281 300. 420. 
1184 1284 0 0.00 3.15 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 1184 336. 336. 
1185 1198 0 -1. 61 36.95 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1185 126. 0 3.36 20.0' 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1186 1219 1 0.00 2.02 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1186 125. 175. r 1186 1219 2 0.00 2.02 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 1186 125. 175. 
1187 1190 0 -5.05 60.03 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1222 1189 0 0.00 2.11 0.000 1.025 1.025 1. 02 1222 712. 712. 
1191 1202 0 0.10 1.24 75.269 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1191 1216 0 0.38 4. .15 313.791 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 23'0. 
1191 1221 0 0.10 1.21 13.260 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1191 1233 0 0.14 1. 69 107.674 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1367 1191 1 0.00 0.72 0.000 0.985 0.985 0.98 1367 750. 1050. 
1367 1191 2 0.00 0.12 0.000 0.985 0.985 0.98 1367 750. 1050. 
1367 1191 3 0.00 0.72 0.000 0.985 0.985 0.98 1367 750. 1050. 
1191 1396 0 0.00 4.99 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1192 1203 0 0.04 0.51 21.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1192 1213 1 0.45 5.77 389.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1192 1213 2 0.45 5.77 389.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1192 1216 1 0.40 5.03 334.298 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1192 1216 2 0.40 5.03 334.298 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1289 1193 0 0.00 8.75 0.000 0.995 0.995 0.99 1289 146. 146. 
1195 1203 0 0.04 0.51 27.880 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1195 1216 1 0.38 4.85 320.968 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1195 1216 2 0.38 4.85 320.968 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1291 1195 0 0.00 8.53 0.000 0.985 0.985 0.98 1291 150. 193. 
1291 1196 0 0.00 4.73 0.000 1. 005 1. 005 1. 00 1291 224. 224. 
1268 1197 0 0.00 11. 72 0.000 1.010 1. 010 1. 01 1268 85. 85. 
1198 1264 0 11.85 33.70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1296 1200 0 0.00 3.33 0.000 1.010 1. 010 1.01 1296 300. 300. 
1201 1318 0 O.DO 3.38 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 1201 356. 356. 
1202 1213 0 0.37 4.62 304.890 0.000 O.OOD 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1202 1223 0 0.23 2.88 189.900 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1202 1225 0 0.15 1. 96 119.570 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1202 1235 0 0.14 1. 88 103.493 0.000 O.OOD 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1378 1202 1 0.00 0.72 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 1378 750. 1050. 
1378 1202 2 0.00 0.72 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1378 750. 1050. 
1378 1202 3 0.00 0.72 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1378 750. 1050. 
1202 1387 0 1. 05 26.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,00 0 O. O. 
1202 1390 0 0.51 10.59 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,00 0 O. O. 
1202 1415 0 0.78 20.16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1204 1234 0 0.00 11.16 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1024 112. 112. 
1237 1205 0 0.00 2.83 0.000 1. 030 1. 030 1. 03 1237 460. 460. 
1211 1217 0 1.11 6.47 19.615 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 374. 374. 
1211 1237 0 0.70 3.93 12.695 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 374. 374. 
1211 1261 1 0.00 13.00 0.000 0.980 0.980 0.98 1211 75. 105. 
1211 1261 2 0.00 13.00 0.000 0.980 0.980 0.98 1211 75. 105. 
1212 1482 0 0.08 1.36 112.770 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1213 1216 0 0.14 1.81 99.855 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1213 1223 0 0.17 2.21 14 5.800 0.000 O,DOD 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1213 1228 0 0.71 30.85 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1213 1230 1 0.18 2.43 134.891 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1213 1230 2 10.17 53.19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1214 1215 0 0.00 7.24 0.000 1. 050 1.050 1. 05 1214 336. 409. 
1214 1227 0 0.65 3.63 11. 730 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 374. 451. 
1214 1263 1 0.00 31. 97 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1214 38. 53. 
1214 1263 2 0.00 31.67 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1214 38. 53. 
1215 1216 0 0.18 2.32 134.588 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1215 1222 0 0.14 1. 81 104.570 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1216 1221 1 0.30 3.72 241.870 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1216 1221 2 0.30 3.72 241.870 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1216 1233 0 0.25 3.16 214.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1216 1264 0 12.46 81.29 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1216 1289 0 4.85 25.89 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1217 1218 0 2.18 11.58 20.070 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 217. 262. 
1217 1237 0 2.61 13.32 23.394 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 217. 262. 
1217 1264 1 0.00 13.00 0,000 0.910 0.910 0.91 1217 75. 105. 
1217 1264 2 0.00 13.00 0.000 0.910 0.910 0.91 1217 75. 105. 
1217 1264 3 0.00 13.00 0.000 0.910 0.910 0.91 1217 O. O. 
1217 1395 0 2.39 13.85 42.026 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 374. 374. 
1218 1266 0 5.75 31. 96 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1218 1267 0 2.66 16.76 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1218 1396 0 14.11 88.19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1220 1219 1 0.00 -0.07 0.000 0.999 0.999 0.99 1220 750. 825. 
1220 1219 2 0.00 -0.07 0.000 0.999 0.999 0.99 1220 750. 825. 
1221 1219 1 0.00 0.84 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1.00 1221 750. 825. 
1221 1219 2 0.00 0.84 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1221 750. 825. 
1220 1391 1 0.45 2.59 7.860 0.000 0.000 0 .. 00 0 374. 451. 
1220 1391 2 0.45 2.59 7.860 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 374. 451. 
1220 1395 1 0.30 2.20 7.900 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 434. 434. 
1220 1395 2 0.30 2.20 7.900 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 434. 434. 
1220 1395 3 0.30 2.20 7.900 0.000 0.000 0,00 0 434. 434. 
1220 1395 4 0.30 2.20 7.900 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 434. 434. 
1221 1232 0 0.09 1.14 69.190 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1221 1387 0 6.94 28.67 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. r 1222 1234 0 0.10 1. 33 72.360 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1222 1311 0 0.00 8.33 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 1222 150. 190. 
1223 1230 0 -0.37 29.93 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1225 1235 0 0.20 2.54 153.600 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1225 1387 0 9.71 36.58 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1404 1225 1 0.00 4.60 0.000 0.970 0.970 0.97 1404 300. 420. 
1404 1225 2 0.00 4.60 0,000 0.970 0.970 0.97 1404 300. 420. 
1226 1227 0 0.12 0.71 2.300 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 374. 374. 
1268 1226 1 0.00 23.64 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.99 1268 40. 56. 
1268 1226 2 0.00 23.64 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.99 1268 40. 56. 
1227 1237 0 0.44 2.50 8.078 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 374. 451. 
1228 1230 0 0.22 2.84 147.433 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1230 1232 1 0.04 0.52 28.830 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1230 1232 2 0.04 16.51 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1230 1264 0 17.62 53.70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1233 1417 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02050. 2340. 
1234 1320 0 0.00 4.67 0.000 0.960 0.960 0.96 1234 300. 420. 
1235 1236 0 0.00 1.11 0.000 0.950 0.950 0.95 1235 900. 1260. 
1235 1418 1 0.00 4.66 0.000 1. 025 1. 025 1.02 1235 300. 418. 
1235 1418 2 0.00 4.66 0.000 1.025 1.025 1.02 1235 300. 418. 
1235 1419 0 0.00 4.67 0.000 1. 015 1.015 1. 01 1235 300. 356. 
1272 1237 0 O.OD 23.60 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1272 40. 56. 
1261 1266 1 2.70 6.87 1.762 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. B8. 
1261 1266 2 2.70 6.87 1.762 O.ODO 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
1262 1267 1 3.50 8.74 2.324 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. 8B. 
1262 1267 2 3.50 8.74 2.324 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
1262 1270 1 0.B4 2.10 0.55B 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B8. B8. 
1262 1270 2 0.B4 2.10 0.55B 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B8. BB. 
1265 1264 1 0.00 54.50 0,000 1. 020 1.020 1. 02 1265 24. 34. 
1265 1264 2 o.co 54.50 0,000 1. 020 1. 020 1. 02 1265 24. 34. 
1264 1269 1 3.2B 14.82 4.325 0.000 O.DDO 0.00 0 15B. 1BO. 
1264 1269 2 3.28 14.82 4.325 0.000 o. aDO 0.00 0 158. 1BO. 
1264 1289 0 57.64 91.78 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1266 1267 0 22.17 35.97 0.000 O.ODO 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1269 1271 1 1. 79 4.6B 1.210 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 158. 1BO. 
1269 1271 2 1. 79 4.6B 1.210 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 158. 180. 
1270 1273 1 2.54 6.35 1.6BB 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. 106. 
1270 1273 2 2.54 6.35 1.68B 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. 106. 
1271 1273 1 0.55 1.37 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8B. 106. 
1211 1273 2 0.55 1.37 0.364 0,000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 106. 
1281 1285 1 3.07 13.86 4.046 0.000 O.DDO 0.00 0 158. 180. 
1281 1285 2 3.07 13.86 4.046 0.000 0,000 0.00 o 158. 180. 
1281 1290 1 5.31 13.71 3.408 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 106. 
1281 1290 2 5.31 13.71 3.408 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 106. 
1282 1291 1 3.17 7.92 2.105 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 88. 
1282 1291 2 3.17 7.92 2.105 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 88. 
1282 1292 1 3.79 19.47 2.517 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B8. 88. 
1282 1292 2 3.79 19.47 2.517 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. B8. 
1283 12S4 1 4.48 11.20 2.918 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 ss. SS. 
12S3 12S4 2 4.4S 11.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1283 1300 1 4.42 11.04 2.935 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8S. ss. 
1283 1300 2 4.42 11.04 2.935 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B8. BB. 
12S4 1296 0 1. 76 7.95 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
12S4 1297 1 5.63 25.44 7.422 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 130. 130. 
1294 1297 2 5.63 25.44 7.422 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 130. 130. 
12B5 1301 1 1. 43 6.45 1.889 0.000 0,000 0.00 o 158. 1BO. 
1285 1301 2 1.43 6.45 1.889 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 15B. 180. 
1286 1289 1 3.65 16.49 4.B13 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 8B. 
1286 12B9 2 3.65 16.49 4.813 0.000 0.000 0.00 11 BB. BB. 
1286 129B 1 3.71 16.73 4.BB3 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 130. 130. 
1286 1298 2 3.71 16.73 4.883 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 130. 130. 
1286 1299 1 2.22 5.55 1.474 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 B8. BB. 
12B6 1299 2 2.22 5.55 1.474 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
1Z87 1290 1 3.06 7.64 2.032 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. B8. 
l2a7 1290 2 3.06 7.64 2.032 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
1287 1301 1 4.44 11. 09 2.94B 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
1287 1301 2 4.44 11.09 2.94B 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
12B8 1291 1 6.81 17 .01 4.522 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
12B8 1291 2 6.81 17 .01 4.522 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
1288 1293 1 3.92 9.79 2.603 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
12BB 1293 2 3.92 9.19 2.603 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8B. BB. 
1290 1294 1 2.69 6.75 1.793 0,000 0.000 0.00 0 8B. 8B. 
1290 1294 2 2.69 6.75 1.793 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. B8. 
1292 1300 1 2.71 6.77 1.798 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 SB. B8. 
1292 1300 2 2.71 6.77 1.798 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8B. SB. 
1293 1294 1 4.46 11.14 2.961 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. BS. 
1293 1294 2 4.46 11.14 2.961 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8S. B8. 
1296 129B 1 1.00 4.52 1.318 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 130. 130. 
1296 129B 2 1.00 4.52 1.31B 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 130. 130. 
1297 1299 1 2.10 5.25 1.394 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. BB. 
-, 1297 1299 2 2.10 5.25 1.394 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8S. BS. 
1297 1301 1 S.22 20.56 5.465 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. BS. 
1297 1301 2 B.22 20.56 5.465 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. BB. 
1300 1313 1 5.45 13.62 3.619 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 SS. BS. 
1300 1313 2 5.45 13.62 3.619 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8B. BB. 
1311 1317 1 3.50 B.90 2.2S4 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8S. BS. 
1311 1317 2 3.50 8.90 2.2B4 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. SS. 
1313 1314 1 6.00 15.28 3.923 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 8S. BS. 
1313 1314 2 6.00 15.2B 3.923 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. BS. 
1314 1315 1 0.50 1.25 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. 88. 
1314 1315 2 0.50 1.25 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 88. BB. 
1315 1317 1 1.66 4.15 1.102 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 BB. 106. 
1315 1317 2 1.66 4.15 1.102 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 S8. 106. 
1315 1318 0 9.53 43.02 12.556 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 158. 1BO. 
1315 1322 0 3.77 17 .02 4.947 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 15B. 1BO. 
1318 1319 0 6.35 2B.68 8.371 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 158. IS0. 
1319 1320 0 2.70 6.74 1. 793 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 106. 121. 
1320 1322 0 2.70 6.74 1. 793 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 106. 121. 
1350 1352 0 7.35 25.38 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1350 1354 0 20.38 66.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1352 1354 1 6.39 26.69 7.580 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1352 1354 2 6.37 27.22 7.370 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1352 1354 3 7.83 18.43 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1356 1372 1 0.01 0.15 4.127 0.000 0.000 0.00 02416. 2416. 
1356 1372 2 0.01 0.15 4.127 0.000 0.000 0.00 02416. 2416. 
1358 1363 1 0.02 0.32 8.941 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1358 1363 2 0.02 0.32 8.941 0,000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1358 1366 1 0.01 0.11 116.840 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 400. 600. 
1358 1366 2 0,01 0.17 116.840 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 400. 600. 
1358 1366 3 0.01 0.17 116.840 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 400. 600. 
1358 1370 1 0.01 0.20 5.502 0.000 0.000 0.00 02416. 2416. 
1358 1370 2 0.01 0.20 5.502 0.000 0.000 0.00 02416. 2416. 
1360 1365 0 0.02 0.19 3.380 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1360 1367 0 0.16 1.31 22.768 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1362 1367 0 0.16 1.31 22.768 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1362 1379 0 0.05 0.47 8.130 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1363 1364 1 0.01 0.14 2.459 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1363 1364 2 0.01 0.14 2.459 0.000 0.000 0,00 0 o. O. 
1364 1385 0 0.00 1. 59 0.000 1.000 1.000 1. 00 1364 500. 500. 
1365 1379 0 0.07 0.66 11. 430 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1365 1388 1 0.00 5.64 0.000 1.010 1.010 1. 01 1365 400. 400. 
1365 1388 2 0.00 5.64 0.000 1.010 1.010 1.01 1365 400. 400. 
1365 1389 0 0.00 1. 59 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1389 500. 500. 
1367 1370 1 0.08 0.70 12.166 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1367 1370 2 0.08 0.70 12.166 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1368 1369 1 0.02 0.22 158.400 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1368 1369 2 0.02 0.22 158.400 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1368 1377 1 0.06 0.09 2.750 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1368 1377 2 0.06 0.09 2.750 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1370 1403 0 0.00 1.59 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1370 500. 500. 
1371 1378 1 0.05 0.45 6.738 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1371 1378 2 0.05 0.45 6.738 0.000 0.000 0.00 01076. 1076. 
1371 1408 0 0.00 1.58 0.000 1.000 1. 000 1. 00 1371 O. O. 
1374 1376 0 0.02 0.19 3.279 0.000 0.000 0.00 01208. 1208. 
1375 1376 0 0.02 0.19 3.279 0.000 0.000 0.00 01208. 1208. 
1381 1385 0 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1381 1392 0 0.08 0.44 1.420 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534. 534. 
13Bl 1395 0 O.H 1.10 3.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534. 534. 
13B2 1385 0 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
13B2 1393 0 0.08 0.44 1.420 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534. 534. 
13B2 1395 0 0.19 1.10 3.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534. 534. 
1383 1395 0 0.19 1.10 3.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534- 534. 
1383 1411 0 0.0'1 0.45 1.460 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534. 534-
13B4 1395 0 0.19 1.10 3.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534. 534. 
13B4 1411 0 0.07 0.45 1.460 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 534. 534. 
13B6 1412 0 0.59 3.18 5.060 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 307. 307, 
13B6 1419 0 0.66 3.48 6.150 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 307. 307. 
1387 1390 0 2.86 6.46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1387 1415 0 5.31 12.34 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1387 1416 0 11.35 66.86 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1388 1400 1 0.66 3.01 D.OOD 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1388 1400 2 0.66 3.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
13B9 1402 1 0.04 0.39 1.31B 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 71B. ?lB. 
13B9 1402 2 0.04 0.39 1.31B 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 718. 718. 
13B9 1405 0 0.37 15.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1390 1414 0 4.68 11. 87 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1390 1415 0 2.15 4.87 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 12 O. O. 
1392 1394 0 0.04 0.B2 76.695 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 450. 520. 
1393 1394 0 0.04 0.B2 76.695 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 450. 520. 
" 
1402 1397 0 0.00 2.19 0.000 1. 050 1.050 1.05 1402 O. O. 
139B 1399 0 0.00 B.95 0.000 1. 050 1. 050 1.05 1398 O. O. 
1398 1400 0 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1398 1402 0 0.00 16.07 0.000 0.956 0.956 0.95 1398 75. O. 
1398 1409 1 3.36 18.72 0.940 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1398 1409 2 3.36 18.72 0.940 0,000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1400 1401 0 0.00 3.00 0.000 1.050 1.050 1. 05 1400 o. O. 
1402 1410 0 0.66 3.37 5.540 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 307. 307. 
1403 1410 1 0.01 0.11 0.360 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 614. 614. 
1403 1410 2 0.01 0.11 0.360 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 614. 614. 
1405 1420 0 0.24 1.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1406 1408 0 0.01 0.06 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 359. 359. 
1407 1408 0 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1407 1413 0 0.94 5.07 8.250 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 307. 307. 
1410 1409 1 0.00 15.70 0.000 1.010 1.010 1.01 1410 100. 140. 
1410 1409 2 0.00 15.70 0.000 1.010 1.010 1.01 1410 100. 140. 
1410 1409 3 0.00 15.70 0.000 1. 010 1. 010 1. 01 1410 100. 140. 
1410 1409 4 0.00 15.70 0.000 1. 010 1. 010 1.01 1410 100. 140. 
1410 1430 1 0.00 8.20 0.000 1.015 1.015 1.01 1410 150. 210. 
1410 1430 2 0.00 8.20 0.000 1. 015 1.015 1. 01 1410 150. 210. 
1410 1430 3 0.00 8.20 0.000 1.015 1.015 1.01 1410 150. 210. 
1413 1419 0 0.90 4.77 8.430 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 307. 307. 
1413 1423 1 0.00 8.20 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1413 150. 210. 
1413 1423 2 0.00 8.20 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1413 150. 210. 
1413 1423 3 0.00 8.20 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1413 150. 210. 
1413 1423 4 0.00 21.00 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.00 1413 60. 66. 
1414 1415 0 7.88 20.23 D.OOO 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1414 1420 0 8.54 22.43 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1414 1421 0 1.08 30.22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1415 1420 0 2.07 5.47 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1416 1423 0 11.44 29.53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1421 1423 0 9.70 25.03 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1422 1423 0 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1431 1470 0 -1.24 22.75 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1432 1470 0 -1.24 22.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
1436 1470 0 0.62 29.82 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1436 1479 0 4.71 57.06 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1474 1439 1 0.00 8.03 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1474 133. 133. 
1474 1439 2 0.00 7.95 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00 1474 133. 133. 
1440 1476 0 -0.45 7.06 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1440 1495 0 20.41 88.23 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1441 147"7 0 -0.58 15.26 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1444 1470 0 10.52 67.39 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1444 1479 0 -0.11 5.47 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1445 1478 1 0.00 8.13 0.000 1. 000 1.000 1. 00 1445 133. 133. 
1445 1478 2 0.00 8.13 0.000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 00 1445 133. 133. 
1448 1492 1 0.00 8.13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 133. 133. 
1448 1492 2 0.00 8.13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 133. 133. 
1451 1485 0 -0.27 6.94 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1451 1486 0 1.68 39.99 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1452 1486 0 -0.34 22.49 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1453 1486 0 -0.34 22.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1459 1483 0 0.00 1.35 0.000 0.999 0.999 0.99 1459 428. 428. 
1459 1491 0 4.91 20.84 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1460 1477 0 4.12 18.74 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1461 1495 0 27.38 83.16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1462 1473 0 -0.20 6.37 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1462 1495 0 16.09 64.03 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1463 1473 0 16.09 64.03 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1463 1416 0 20.41 88.23 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1463 1495 0 -0.47 '1.15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1470 1478 0 0.11 1.10 17.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 778. 778. 
1470 1479 0 5.07 32.51 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1470 1480 0 0.67 6.72 100.266 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 814. 814. 
1470 1485 0 22.11 91.03 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1470 1486 1 0.05 0.57 8.809 0.000 0.000 0.00 01200. 1200. 
1470 1486 2 2.23 25.54 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1471 1474 0 12.00 42.09 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1471 1475 0 0.16 2.63 227.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1411 1493 0 0.24 3.50 284.460 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1413 1495 1 0.21 2.51 42.200 0.000 0.000 0.00 01030. 1030. 
1473 1495 2 9.70 38.59 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1475 1474 1 0.00 2.18 0.000 1. 025 1. 025 1. 02 1475 400. 400. 
1475 1474 2 0.00 2.17 0.000 1.025 1. 025 1. 02 1475 400. 400. 
1415 1474 3 0.00 2.17 0.000 1.025 1. 025 1. 02 1475 400. 400. 
1474 1480 1 0.50 5.69 93.537 0.000 0.000 0.00 01200. 1200. 
1474 1480 2 0.50 5.69 93.537 0.000 0.000 0.00 01200. 1200. 
1474 1487 0 0.24 2.74 44.583 0.000 0.000 0.00 01200. 1200. 
1475 1479 0 0.33 4.94 413.300 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1475 1482 0 0.32 4.70 389.700 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
'-
1475 1485 0 0.38 6.02 490.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1476 1484 0 0.19 1. 92 29.800 0.000 0.000 0.00 01030. 1030. 
1476 1485 0 22.43 82.69 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1476 1495 1 0.22 2.15 33.660 0.000 0.000 0.00 01030. 1030. 
1476 1495 2 12.30 53.18 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1477 1479 0 0.16 2.51 212.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1477 1486 0 1.17 13.23 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
1479 1478 1 0.00 2.18 0.000 1.050 1.050 1.05 1479 400. 400. 
1479 1478 2 0.00 2.18 0.000 1.050 1.050 1.05 1479 400. 400. 
1418 1483 0 0.69 6.81 106.550 0.000 0.000 0.00 o 778. 778. 
1478 1486 0 0.14 1.58 25.642 0.000 0.000 0.00 01090. 1090. 
1479 1493 0 0.21 3.09 249.850 0.000 0.000 0.00 02400. 2400. 
1480 1486 0 0.56 6.74 114.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 01200. 1200. 
1480 1495 0 0.60 7.21 122.100 0.000 0.000 0.00 01200. 1200. 
1483 1491 0 0.27 2.97 48.800 0.000 0.000 0.00 01090. 1090. 
1483 1492 0 0.48 5.18 84.140 0.000 0.000 0.00 131000. 1000. 
1485 1484 1 0.00 2.18 0.000 1.050 1.050 1.05 1485 400. 400. 
1485 1484 2 0.00 2.18 0.000 1. 050 1.050 1.05 1485 400. 400. 
1484 1486 0 0.13 1.31 21.600 0.000 0.000 0.00 01030. 1030. 
I 
~. 
r·· 
I' 
I 
r 
1485 1486 
1490 1491 
1490 1491 
1493 1492 
1493 1492 
0 1. 21 28.93 
1 0.42 4.50 
2 10.96 28.98 
1 0.00 2.18 
2 0.00 2.18 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 o. O. 
74.500 0.000 0.000 0.00 01090. 1090. 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 O. O. 
0.000 1. 050 1.050 1.05 1493 400. 400. 
0.000 1.050 1. 050 1. 05 1493 400. 400. 

